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Abstract
The association between attentional bias for threat (ABT) and anxiety has
conventionally been studied from the information-processing approach, via research
traditions adapted from the field of cognitive psychology. While ABT is thought to play a
causal role in anxiety, the tendency to orient more quickly to negative compared to neutral
stimuli can also represent an adaptive habit which facilitates survival by preparing the
organism to respond swiftly to danger. The latter notion bears implications for the design of
research on the ABT-anxiety link which are not well reflected within the informationprocessing approach. Specifically, given the adaptive aspects of ABT, the pathway between
ABT is not likely to be direct, nor does the expression of ABT unmask underlying anxiety in
all instances. However, led by the dominant information-processing approach, a significant
proportion of studies on the ABT-anxiety link has focused on characterizing ABT in anxiety
via methodologically rigorous experimental paradigms, where ABT is investigated as an
isolated process involved in anxiety. The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link
in the context of a research program extending from that of the information-processing
approach, specifically one where the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study
design by considering ABT as an indirect or component predictor of anxiety. The end goal
was to identify theoretically-relevant mediators and/or moderators of the ABT-anxiety link
which may ultimately serve to refine the design of attentional bias modification programs, in
which significant effort has been invested in the search for novel ways to treat and prevent
anxiety.
Two preliminary studies (Chapters 2 and 3) were conducted to inform and support the
three empirical studies (Chapters 4 to 6) addressing the main aims of the present thesis: a
scoping review to identify priorities in research on the etiology and maintenance of anxiety as
conceptualized within a relevant framework, and a protocol study to support the development

of the main behavioural measure of ABT used across the main studies of the present thesis.
Informed by outcomes of the scoping review, the following third variables were examined for
their potential role in the ABT-anxiety link: positive attentional bias, loneliness, and
neurocognitive functioning across multiple domains. Positive attentional bias moderated the
association between ABT and anxiety (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, findings supported a proxy
model of the role of loneliness in the ABT-anxiety link. Mediation analyses to examine the
role of cognitive functioning in the ABT-anxiety link were targeted in Chapter 6, but could
not be pursued in the absence of correlations between cognitive performance and selfreported anxiety. An incidental finding across the main studies of the present thesis was that
ABT was preferentially associated with anxiety when indexed based on sadness- relative to
fear-related stimuli. This finding was partially replicated when probed in a follow-up study
(Chapter 7). Collective findings point to individual differences as a source of variance in the
ABT-anxiety link, and highlight the utility of an extended research program towards
advancing theoretical models and clinical interventions for anxiety centered around ABT.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“… the problems and the method pass each other by.”
– Wittgenstein (1953), Philosophical Investigations, p.231.

1.1. Anxiety
Anxiety is a cognitive, affective, physiological, and behavioural response that is
activated when an individual encounters an event or object that could pose a threat to their
safety (Steimer, 2002). While anxiety is ubiquitous to the human experience, some
individuals experience anxiety with a greater intensity, frequency, and duration than others,
even in the absence of triggers or actual danger (Craig, Brown, & Baum, 1995; Barlow,
2000).
Individuals who experience excessive and debilitating reactions to normative
experiences (i.e. pathological anxiety) present commonly in clinical practice (World Health
Organization, 2017). Besides experiencing a compromised quality of day-to-day life (Barrera
& Norton, 2009), these individuals are at higher risk for a range of serious mental and
physical health issues, including depression (Stein, Fuetsch, Müller, Höfler, Lieb, &
Wittchen, 2001), suicidal ideations and/or attempts (Sareen et al., 2005), heart conditions
(Celano, Daunis, Lokko, Campbell, & Huffman, 2016; Bowen, Senthilselvan, & Barale,
2000), and respiratory problems (Bowen et al., 2000).
1.1.1. Transdiagnostic or Nondiagnosis-Specific Conceptualizations of Anxiety
Widely-accepted formal classification systems for mental disorders [e.g. Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders/DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association,
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2013); International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems/ICD10 (World Health Organization, 1992)] put forward distinct diagnostic categories to organise
different clusters of anxiety-related symptoms based on specific feared stimuli (e.g. bodily
symptoms in panic disorder, and social situations in social anxiety). In a complementary
manner, drawing from various lines of evidence including genetics, comorbidity, and
treatment response, transdiagnostic or nondiagnosis-specific conceptualizations of anxiety
have also been developed to recognise and focus on the overlap between structurally
delineated anxiety diagnoses. To elaborate, twin studies have consistently pointed to a
common genetic vulnerability across anxiety disorders (Purves et al., 2019; ShimadaSugimoto, Otowa, & Hettema, 2015; Kendler, Health, Martin & Eaves, 1987), and anxiety
disorders frequently co-occur (Goldstein-Piekarski, Williams, & Humphreys, 2016; Noyes,
2001). These findings suggest that formally-recognised anxiety disorders may not necessarily
represent independent conditions (Norton, 2008). In a third line of evidence, meta-analyses
have demonstrated that highly similar cognitive-behavioural and pharmacological treatments
are comparably effective across the anxiety disorders (i.e. regardless of the specific feared
stimuli associated with the disorder; Fedoroff & Taylor, 2001; Norton & Price, 2007; Gould,
Otto, & Pollack, 1995; van Etten & Taylor, 1998), suggesting that there are core features
underlying different anxiety diagnoses upon which treatment mechanisms act (Norton, 2008).
Collectively, these findings inform and support models which emphasize a common anxious
pathology (e.g. Norton, 2006; Brown & Barlow, 2009; Goldberg, 1996; Barlow, Allen, &
Choate, 2004; Sharp, Miller, & Heller, 2019; Vigne et al., 2019).
The presence of transdiagnotisc models of anxiety can be identified in several areas of
anxiety-related research. While more commonly explicitly articulated where the treatment of
anxiety is being studied (i.e. to justify a unified treatment approach), such models can and
have commonly been applied to study the etiology and maintenance of anxiety by evaluating
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a given mechanism against anxious pathology quantified by valid, global measures.
Examples include the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993) and Anxiety
subscale of the Depression, Stress and Anxiety Scales 21 (DASS-21; S. Lovibond & P.
Lovibond, 1995a), on which scores have been shown to be elevated among anxious
individuals regardless of their specific anxiety diagnosis (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, &
Swinson, 1998; Vigne et al., 2019; Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997).
1.2. Attentional Bias for Threat and Anxiety
1.2.1. The information-processing approach
Attentional bias for threat (ABT), or the tendency to orient more quickly to negative
compared to neutral stimuli (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016), is a
construct that features prominently in research on the etiology and maintenance of anxious
pathology from a transdiagnostic perspective (although disorder-specific lines of work have
also been developed). The conceptual origins of the ABT-anxiety link can be traced back to
early cognitive theories of anxiety (Beck, 1976; 1986). Based on introspective and self-report
sources of data, it was deduced that anxious individuals appear to be characterised by an
overactive alarm system, and hypothesised that this tendency to be over-alert to unsafe
features in the environment may play a role in the development and maintenance of anxious
pathology (Beck, 1986). However, set in motion by increasing demands for methodological
rigorousness in psychological research (including the study of psychopathology), discoursebased methods of investigating ABT in anxiety were soon phased out in favour of the
information-processing approach to allow for ABT to be quantified based on publicly
observable indices (e.g. reaction times; MacLeod, 1993; McNally, 2001). While sometimes
referred to as “the” cognitive approach to the study of anxious pathology, the informationprocessing approach specifically entails the use of terminologies, experimental paradigms,
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and research practices adapted from the field of cognitive psychology, in addition to the
theoretical position that cognitive processes play a causal role in the etiology and
maintenance of anxiety (McNally & Reese, 2008). Such an approach has also been taken to
the study of other cognitive processes associated with anxious pathology, including biases in
interpretation and memory (McNally & Reese, 2008).
Examining findings from laboratory observations across 172 studies (i.e. studies
conducted within the information-processing approach), an early meta-analytic review (BarHaim et al., 2007) concluded that ABT is indeed prevalent across all presentations of anxious
pathology (i.e. the full range of formally-recognised anxiety disorders), among children,
adults, and older adults, and is displayed by anxious individuals in both the clinical and subclinical range. In turn, this prompted further research enthusiasm for the ABT-anxiety link,
with the number of articles published on the topic increasing steadily from 74 to 170 per year
over the past decade1. Beyond simply establishing an association between ABT and anxiety,
the focus of research shifted further towards developing more methodologically rigorous
experiments to determine the conditions under which ABT can be observed among anxious
individuals, and describing more specific models of ABT in anxiety. Common areas of study
and debate include whether ABT in anxiety unmasks facilitated attention for, difficulty
disengaging from, or attentional avoidance of negative stimuli; whether ABT is an automatic
or strategic process; and, the best experimental paradigms (and/or the experimental settings
which should be manipulated) to address these questions (see Cisler & Koster, 2010 for a
review).

Estimates given for the span of 2009 and 2019 based on the search terms “attentional bias” AND “anxiety” on
Web of Science.
1
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1.2.1.1. Caveats associated with the information-processing approach
Despite the initial promise of ABT as a clinically relevant construct and research
avenue for understanding anxious pathology, the field has also been dampened by a
cumulative body of mixed, contradictory, and/or null findings. For example, groupcomparison studies have not always documented differences between anxious and nonanxious individuals in the attentional processing of negative stimuli (e.g. Staugaard, 2009;
Wirth & Wentura, 2017; see Kruijt, Parsons, & Fox, 2019 for a meta-analysis and van
Bockstaele, Verschuere, Tibboel, Houwer, Crombez, & Koster, 2014 for a review). Further,
although the notion that ABT may play a causal role in the etiology and maintenance of
anxiety largely underlies the impetus for research in the area, studies have demonstrated that
changes in anxiety do not necessarily correspond to changes in ABT (e.g. de Voogd et al.,
2016; Boettcher et al., 2013; Chau, Tse, So, & Chan, 2019). The accumulation and
persistence of such findings over decades of research and increasingly sophisticated
laboratory methods for measuring ABT (e.g. eyetracking, neuroimaging, and
electroencephalography techniques; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, & Hyatt, 2013; Harrewjin et
al., 2020; Kappenman, Farrens, Luck, & Proudfit, 2014) caution against purely
methodological accounts for observed inconsistencies in the association between ABT and
anxiety.
Inconsistent findings on the association between ABT and anxiety, and the prolonged
time they have remained unresolved, can in part be understood by identifying trade-offs in
the course of theory and research development on the ABT-anxiety link within the dominant
information-processing approach. As earlier mentioned, the ABT-anxiety link has conceptual
origins in early cognitive approaches to anxiety (Beck, 1976; 1986), although discoursebased methods of investigating ABT in anxiety were eventually phased out in favour of the
information-processing approach, which allowed for ABT to be quantified based on publicly

6
observable indices. This initial theorizing on the ABT-anxiety link began from a position
which acknowledges the evolutionary function of ABT. That is, being quicker to attend to
negative stimuli in the environment can also represent a functionally adaptive habit which
facilitates survival by preparing the organism to respond swiftly to danger (Beck, 1986), a
sentiment echoed by researchers seeking to understand basic human emotional attention (e.g.
Öhman, 2005; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Öhman, Soares, Juth, Lindström, & Esteves,
2012). When the adaptive aspects of ABT are considered, two key notions bearing
implications for the design of studies on the ABT-anxiety link arise. First, the pathway
between ABT and anxiety is not likely to be direct, given that ABT represents a
fundamentally adaptive function (see Burris, Buss, LoBue, Perez-Edgar, & Field, 2019 for
similar sentiments). Second, and for the same reason, the expression of ABT need not
necessarily confer underlying anxiety or produce anxiogenic consequences in all instances
(van Bockstaele et al., 2014). Thus, precise models of the ABT-anxiety link will require a
research program where ABT is treated as an indirect or component predictor of anxiety, as
much as they rely on the development of experimental paradigms to capture and specify the
observable characteristics of ABT in anxiety.
While the evolutionary function of ABT is sometimes given mention within the body
of research led by the information-processing approach, the position appears to be
ideologically accepted (rather than empirically practiced) at best. As discourse-based
methods of investigating ABT in anxiety were phased out in favour of the informationprocessing approach, this movement entailed the adaption of not only terminologies and
experimental paradigms from the field of cognitive psychology, but also the research practice
of investigating a given cognitive process in isolation, under carefully controlled laboratory
conditions (McNally, 2001; McNally, 2019). While this allowed for targeted and highly
specific hypotheses on the nature of ABT in anxiety to be tested, the body of work led by the
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information-processing approach widely reflects only one of at least two necessary
components of the research program required to develop precise models of the ABT-anxiety
link. The leverage of the information-processing approach (and persistent tradition of
investigating ABT as an isolated process involved in anxiety) has largely left only
methodological accounts available to make sense of inconsistent findings on the ABT-anxiety
link (see McNally, 2019 for similar sentiments), despite cumulative evidence suggesting that
these observations cannot entirely be attributed to the lack of sensitivity of measures of ABT
to anxiety. Borrowing from the Wittgensteinian quote laid out at the outset, problem and
method pass each other by.
1.2.2. Extending the information-processing approach
A call for action for the information-processing approach to be extended to include
mediator and moderator variables where the ABT-anxiety link is being studied (i.e. to
consider ABT as an indirect or component predictor of anxiety) appears excessive where the
defined end goal is merely descriptive. Further, no model of the ABT-anxiety link within the
information-processing approach explicitly denies the adaptive aspects of ABT, or claims that
ABT in isolation explains anxiety; rather, parsimony in research design is favoured towards
descriptive goals. Yet, current directions in the treatment of anxiety point to a need for the
adaptive aspects of ABT to be considered empirically (rather than merely ideologically) in
research. As mentioned earlier, studies demonstrating that changes in anxiety do not
necessarily correspond to changes in ABT (e.g. de Voogd et al., 2016; Boettcher et al., 2013;
Chau, Tse, So, & Chan, 2019) represent one line of work which has dampened the initial
promise of ABT as a clinically relevant construct and research avenue for understanding
anxious pathology. These studies are situated within a fast-expanding, larger body of work
reflecting the latest efforts to develop novel and improved interventions for anxiety in the
form of attentional bias modification programs. Attentional bias modification programs seek
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to reduce ABT in the hope that this will produce reductions in anxiety, and have been
developed and delivered on various digital platforms including mobile, tablets, and
computers. Using modified versions of experimental paradigms initially designed to assess
ABT, attentional bias modification programs (in their most common form) are centred around
multiple training sessions which repeatedly redirect participants’ attention away from
negative stimuli towards neutral or more positive stimuli (Bar-Haim, 2010; Mogg, Waters, &
Bradley, 2017).
Given that ABT represents an indirect or component predictor of anxiety, it is perhaps
unsurprising that reductions in ABT produce modest reductions in anxiety at best (see Mogg
et al., 2017 for a meta-analytic review). In light of these findings, several groups of authors
have recommended targeting ABT as an adjunctive rather than standalone measure in the
treatment of anxious pathology (e.g. Bechor et al., 2014; Linke et al., 2019; Kuckertz et al.,
2014), concurrently highlighting that the effects of attentional bias modification programs
could be strengthened by adjacently targeting clinically meaningfully variables. It is also
worth bringing to the fore cases where reductions in anxiety are not observed even after
individuals undergo procedures to discourage attentional orientation towards negative stimuli
(Maoz, Abend, Fox, Pine & Bar-Haim, 2013; Bunnell, Beidel, & Mesa, 2013). While
possible negative effects of attentional bias modification training have not yet been
examined, questions have been raised on whether discouraging attentional orientation
towards negative stimuli might alter an otherwise adaptive function (van Bockstaele et al.,
2014), and highlight the need to develop ways of identifying candidates less likely to benefit
at the treatment selection phase. As attentional bias modification programs continue to gain
traction, incorporating mediators and moderators into the design of studies on the ABTanxiety link represents an important goal in research not only for the sake of theoretical
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development, but also for the thoughtful design of treatment protocols towards maximised
therapeutic outcomes.
1.2.2.1. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework
The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) is a research framework put forward by the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), and in part reflects the NIMH’s efforts to
encourage communication and integration between bodies of research on categoricallydefined psychiatric disorders (Cuthbert, 2014). According to the RDoC framework, a
common set of functional systems underlie a wide range of psychological conditions (i.e.
psychiatric disorders can be characterised by a profile with common descriptors). Based on
well-developed bodies of evidence for underlying neural circuitry (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013),
the RDoC specifies five basic classes of functional systems (or functional domains) which act
synergistically or additively to determine psychological health: Negative Valence Systems,
modulating responses to aversive situations or contexts; Positive Valence Systems,
modulating responses to positive/rewarding situations or contexts; Cognitive Systems,
modulating neurocognitive functions; Systems for Social Processes, modulating interpersonal
functioning and behaviour; Arousal and Regulatory Systems, responsible for contextual and
homeostatic regulation of neural systems2. Within this framework, ABT has been linked to,
and can be understood as an indicator of, functioning within the Negative Valence Systems
(Gibb, McGeary, & Beavers, 2016; Paulus et al., 2017; Wieser & Keil, 2020).

2

A simplified version of the RDoC framework is presented here and adopted in the present thesis. The RDoC
framework additionally parses each major functional domain into subsidiary functional systems termed
“constructs” (e.g. cognitive control and working memory within the Cognitive Systems). However, these
constructs are and have been subject to continual revision (whether replaced or updated) on the basis of
developments in research (Cuthbert, 2014). Thus, each major functional domain is presently considered
holistically, in accord with their broad definitions. Additionally, at time of writing, a sixth major functional
domain (Sensorimotor Systems) has been proposed. However, the domain is still under evaluation for distinct
neurocircuitry from that of other major RDoC domains (see workshop proceedings on NIMH website), and
research on how functioning in the domain may be assessed is still in stages of infancy. Thus, the initial fivedomain RDoC framework was adopted in the current thesis.
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A key challenge to extending the information-processing approach to the ABTanxiety link is the lack of literature from which theoretically relevant third variables can be
drawn, given few studies have been conducted with an approach where ABT is treated as an
indirect or component predictor of anxiety. Selecting anxiety-relevant variables with
conceptual ties to other functional systems in the RDoC framework (i.e. besides the Negative
Valence Systems) represents a useful heuristic to this end, for reasons laid out as follows.
First, the functional nature of the RDoC domains inherently limits conceptually compatible
variables to those which contribute to a mechanistic understanding of a given
psychopathological outcome (anxiety in this case), and thus encompass greater potential to be
modifiable targets in clinical practice relative to those which do not (e.g. sociodemographics).
Second, the fundamental nature of the RDoC domains to human psychological functioning
would favour the selection of third variables which also have independent, meaningful
relevance for understanding anxious pathology, even if interactive effects with ABT are not
observed. Both aspects are of important service to current priorities in research on the ABTanxiety link, as highlighted in treatment outcomes of attentional bias modification programs:
namely (and respectively), the need for attentional bias modification programs to be
supplemented by adjacently targeting other clinically relevant variables, and the need for a
treatment protocol for anxious individuals who may not be suitable candidates for attentional
bias modification programs.
1.3. Aims of the Present Thesis and Outline of Chapters
The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link in the context of a research
program extending from that of the information-processing approach, specifically one where
the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by considering ABT as an
indirect or component predictor of anxiety. A key novel element in the approach to the study
of the ABT-anxiety link in this thesis is that the ABT-anxiety link is considered to be
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modulated by stable individual differences, and not only by transient psychological states
and/or procedural moderators (i.e. variations in experimental manipulations). The end goal is
to identify theoretically-relevant moderators and mediators of the ABT-anxiety link which
may ultimately be clinically useful (precisely, serve to refine the design of attentional bias
modification programs)3, and the RDoC framework was used as the basis for selecting third
variables to be studied to facilitate this goal.
There are two preliminary studies in the present thesis spanning Chapters 2 and 3,
conducted to inform and support the empirical studies across Chapters 4 to 6 addressing the
main aims of the present thesis. In Chapter 2, a scoping review was conducted to characterise
existing research on the etiology and maintenance of anxiety according to the RDoC domain
to which studied processes could be conceptually linked. This procedure was undertaken in
keeping with preparatory customs prior to conducting research on a given psychological
condition within the RDoC framework. Specifically, the extent and nature of RDoC-relevant
research on the given psychological condition is commonly first examined to identify any
disparities in research focus, and ultimately highlight the RDoC domains which should be
prioritised in future research (Glenn, Cha, Kleiman, & Nock, 2017; Rabasco, Ambrosino, &
McKay, 2019; Koudys, Traynor, Rodrigo, Carcone, & Ruocco, 2019; Wildes & Marcus,
2015; Schreiner, Klimes-Dougan, Begnel, & Cullen, 2015). The present scoping review
served to the same end by informing the selection of third variables which were studied in
relation to the ABT-anxiety link in subsequent empirical studies. Chapter 3 presents a
protocol study conducted to support the development of the main behavioural measure of
ABT (a visual dot probe task) used across the main studies of the present thesis (Chapters 4
to 6). Using a modified version of this dot probe task, a follow-up study on the nature of the

3

While this thesis may produce findings relevant to a broader range of interventions for anxiety, the current
thesis will focus on the relevance of findings to the design of attentional bias modification programs in light of
priorities highlighted in Section 1.2.2.
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anxiety-related attentional bias was conducted and is presented in Chapter 74. Chapter 8
concludes with a general discussion that summarises key findings, limitations, and
implications of the current thesis.

4

It should be noted that the focus of the present thesis was not on the procedural moderators of ABT in anxiety
(i.e. the experimental conditions under which the anxiety-linked attentional bias can be observed). However, this
study (Chapter 7) was conducted in light of the pattern of association between indices of attentional bias and
self-reported anxiety incidentally observed across the empirical studies in Chapters 4 to 6, owing to
methodological considerations taken on board in the assessment of ABT (described in Chapter 3).
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Chapter 2: A Scoping Review on the Extent and Nature of Anxiety-Related Research
within the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Framework*

*

The manuscript presented in this chapter (Section 2.1) is currently being reviewed for
publication (under the same title) at New Ideas in Psychology:
Wei, M., & Roodenrys, S. (2020). A Scoping Review on the Extent and Nature of AnxietyRelated Research within the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Framework. New
Ideas in Psychology. Revisions submitted March 2021.
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2.1. Manuscript
Abstract
Background: The need for research on modifiable risk factors in anxiety has been
highlighted in previous reviews synthesizing existing literature on the etiology and
maintenance of anxiety. The National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC) provides a useful framework to lead this body of work.
Methods: A scoping review was conducted to examine the extent and nature of research
evidence on each RDoC functional domain as they have been investigated in anxiety via
relevant correlates, with the end goal of informing priorities in future anxiety-related research
within the RDoC framework. The selection criteria for this scoping review resulted in 171
cases (across 95 studies) where RDoC-relevant correlates of anxiety were studied.
Results and Conclusions: Results highlight disparate research focus across domains (limited
research on processes within the Positive Valence Systems, Systems for Social Processes, and
Arousal/Regulatory Systems), inconsistent findings within domains (Cognitive Systems), and
a lack of research on cross-domain interactions. These findings provide a starting point for
advancing the design and scope of anxiety-related research within the RDoC framework.
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Introduction
Anxiety-related conditions represent one of the most commonly encountered forms of
psychopathology in mental health practice, whether in trait-like or clinical form (Douglas &
James, 2013). While formal classification systems for mental disorders [e.g. Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders/DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013);
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems/ICD-10
(World Health Organization, 1992)] put forward distinct diagnostic categories for different
clusters of anxiety-related symptoms, there also exist core features and hence shared
mechanistic underpinnings across the range of formally recognized anxiety-spectrum
disorders (Bystritsky et al., 2013; Lang & McTeague, 2009). The most recent systematic
review of research on the etiology and maintenance of anxious pathology (Zimmermann et
al., 2020) concluded with the need for more research on modifiable risk factors in anxiety on
the whole, a sentiment supported by the volume of studies on sociodemographic and familial
risk factors identified in previous anxiety-related reviews (Mirza & Jenkins, 2004; MorenoPeral et al., 2014).
The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) is a research framework put forward by the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), and in part reflects the NIMH’s efforts to
circumvent stalled progress in the treatment of major psychiatric disorders by improving the
applied value of research findings (Elmer, Brown, & Shepard, 2016; Cuthbert, 2014; Vilar et
al, 2019). To this end, the RDoC framework proposes that there are five1 major functional
domains which act synergistically to determine psychological health, and encourages
research to be structured around these domains: Negative Valence Systems, driving responses

1

A sixth domain (Sensorimotor Systems) has been proposed at time of writing. However, there is overlap
between processes operating within the Sensorimotor Systems and other domains (see workshop proceedings on
NIMH website), and research on mapping distinct psychological constructs onto this new domain is still in
stages of infancy. Thus, the initial five-domain RDoC framework was applied in the present study.

16
to aversive stimuli; Positive Valence Systems, driving responses to positive stimuli;
Cognitive Systems, responsible for various (neuro)cognitive processes; Systems for Social
Processes, driving interpersonal functions; and Arousal/Regulatory Systems, responsible for
the context-appropriate activation of neural systems and provision of homeostatic regulation.
Each major functional domain can be examined across seven units of analysis (genes,
molecules, cells, neural circuits, physiology, behaviour, self-report), and subsumes several
sub-dimensions (termed “constructs”) which specify subsidiary processes operating in each
domain (e.g. “working memory” within the Cognitive Systems). The focus of the RDoC
framework on mechanistic processes which underpin mental health conditions is particularly
well-aligned with current priorities in anxiety-related research, namely the need for a better
understanding of modifiable risk factors which may be targeted in psychological practice.
Scoping reviews are carried out to develop an understanding of the research landscape
on a given area by examining the extent, range and nature of associated research evidence
(Arksey & O’Malley, 2005; Grant & Booth, 2009). The current scoping review sought to
examine the extent and nature of research evidence on each RDoC domain as they have been
investigated in anxiety via relevant correlates (i.e. relevant indices of functioning), with the
end goal of informing priorities in future anxiety-related research within the RDoC
framework. Integrating the RDoC’s purpose of maximising the generalisability and applied
value of research findings (Cuthbert, 2014; Vilar et al., 2019), this scoping review examined
existing research on the RDoC-relevant correlates of anxiety with a focus on correlates which
have predictive value in non-disorder-specific anxious pathology (i.e. correlates which may
be relevant across the full range of formally recognised anxiety-spectrum disorders). Previous
anxiety-related studies approached using the RDoC framework have focused on
characterising anxiety in terms of constructs or subsidiary processes operating within a single
functional domain (e.g. Hamm et al., 2016; Liu, Lieberman, Stevens, Auerbach, &
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Shankman, 2017). The present review is distinct from these studies in that 1) all major
functional domains put forward in the RDoC framework are considered for their contribution
to anxious pathology, and 2) given the status of constructs as concepts subject to continual
revision on the basis of developments in research (Cuthbert, 2015), each major functional
domain is considered holistically, without further breaking down the subsidiary processes
operating in each domain.

Methods
Literature Search Strategy
The first search to identify relevant studies was conducted by the first author using the
following databases: SCOPUS, PubMed, and PsycINFO. Articles published from database
inception to October 2019 containing the following terms within their title, abstract, or
keywords were located:
1. [Title] Anxiety
2. [Title, Abstract, Keywords] At least one of the following terms: risk factor*,
contributing factor*, predisposing factor*, predict*, correlat*, associat*
To limit the scope of located studies to those with interests in non-disorder-specific
anxious pathology, the “NOT” Boolean operator was applied to the following terms (and
their abbreviations/variants) across title, abstract, and keywords: obsessive-compulsive
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, social anxiety, phobia, panic disorder, depression.
The exact string of search terms entered in each database can be found in Appendix A.
Study Selection
Eligible articles were required to meet the following criteria:
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1. Published in English in a peer-reviewed journal.
2. Examined the relationship between one or more correlates of anxious pathology (as
narrowed down by the “NOT” Boolean operator described above) which have a
causal or bidirectional relationship with anxiety. The selection of RDoC-relevant
correlates was delineated in a secondary procedure; see sub-section below.
3. Anxiety is studied as a syndrome or a collection/constellation of symptoms (i.e. study
interests are not limited to a specific symptom of anxiety).
4. Anxiety is quantified directly via self-report or diagnostic status, and not inferred
indirectly via physiological or behavioural indices.
Articles were excluded if they satisfied one of the follow criteria:
1. Correlates of transient or experimentally induced anxiety were studied (e.g. elevated
plasma inflammatory markers, heightened pain perception, increase in heart rate and
skin conductance from baseline).
2. Findings on anxiety only apply to a specific sub-population (i.e. anxiety was studied
in a specific medical, psychiatric, or sociodemographic population).
3. Anxiety being examined is situation-specific (e.g. pain, health, math, dental, death,
preoperative anxiety).
4. Predictors of change in anxiety are being studied (e.g. intervention outcomes).
5. Group-comparison studies where anxiety was not represented as an independent
grouping variable, and thus could not be modelled as a continuous outcome variable.
Selection of RDoC-relevant Correlates
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Articles which met the eligibility criterion listed above were reviewed for RDoCrelevant cases. Eligible correlates had to be variables which could be linked to at least one of
the five major RDoC domains: Negative Valence Systems (NVS), Positive Valence Systems
(PVS), Cognitive Systems (CS, Systems for Social Processes (SS, and Arousal/Regulatory
Systems (ARS). RDoC guidelines (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013) specify that variables need to be
continuous, transdiagnostic, and granular enough to be tied to an RDoC domain. In accord
with these guidelines (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013) and previously used procedures (Glenn et al.,
2018), the following categories of variables were not included in the current review:
Sociodemographics (40 cases), health-risk behaviours or lifestyle factors (19 cases), family
history of psychopathology (15 cases), negative life events or life stressors (18 cases), other
mental health disorders or chronic physical health conditions (26 cases), parenting factors (27
cases), physical environmental factors (2 cases) and variables too broad to be tied to an
RDoC domain (12 cases). A full list of excluded cases (and their studies of origin) is
available in Appendix B. Figure 1 presents an adapted PRISMA flow diagram
(http://www.prisma-statement.org/Extensions/ScopingReviews) to illustrate the steps
involved in the initial selection of studies and subsequent selection of RDoC-relevant
correlates.
Figure 2.1. Adapted PRISMA flow diagram for the initial selection of studies and subsequent
selection of RDoC-relevant correlates. References for the 154 articles assessed for eligible
correlates are given in Appendix C.

20

Data Extraction and Coding Procedures
For each included correlate, the following information was extracted and is presented
in Table 2.1: (1) its best-fitting major RDoC domain, (2) its level of measurement (unit of
analysis), according to descriptors given in the RDoC framework (self-report, behaviour,
physiology, neural ciruits, cells/molecules or genes), and (3) its associated anxiety outcome,
in terms of whether anxiety was studied in a paediatric or adult population, and whether
anxiety was quantified continuously or dichotomously (i.e. diagnostic status). Exact sample
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age ranges are provided for cases examined in association with paediatric anxiety (< 18 years
old). Where age ranges were not provided, mean ages are given instead.
The aim of the current scoping review was to examine the extent and nature of
research evidence on each RDoC domain as they have been investigated in anxiety via
relevant correlates, with the end goal of informing research priorities in future research on
anxiety within the RDoC framework. A key challenge to this end was to categorise a range of
variables into RDoC domains where they have (for the most part) not been previously linked,
in a way which presents the landscape of the existing RDoC-relevant literature on anxiety as
objectively as possible. To this end, the NIMH guidelines were used as the main point of
reference. Additionally, besides resolution via discussion, relevant literature was probed
where there was ambiguity or disagreement between present authors in placing a given
correlate2. This latter process identified several cases where correlates were linked to two
different RDoC domains by different groups of scholars in existing literature. The RDoC
domain for such cases is specified in the format [A/B], where A and B represent the two
disputed domains. Further, there were several cases where an affective load was added to
measures of cognition (CS) or arousal/regulation (ARS), so that the measured construct likely
also taps one of the Valence Systems. RDoC domains for such cases are also specified in the
format [A/B], where A is either CS or ARS, and B is either PVS or NVS3.
In some cases, the association between a given primary variable of interest and
anxiety was examined in the context of a third moderating variable. Such moderating effects

2

Authors agreed on the placement of correlates 82.5% of the time.
Decisions to classify psychological constructs into singular or hybrid [A/B] RDoC domains were based on the
original designated purpose of measures developed to capture the psychological constructs. For example, the
attentional blink task was originally developed to capture the phenomenon reflecting temporal limitations in the
ability to deploy visual attention (a Cognitive Systems construct); it was later adapted for assessing temporal
limitations in the ability to deploy visual attention to emotional/threatening stimuli, so that the captured
psychological construct is likely to tap at both the Cognitive and Negative Valence Systems.
3
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are specified where applicable. Where these moderating effects represent a cross-domain
interaction between two major RDoC domains, the RDoC domain for the given case is
specified in the format [A x B], where A represents the RDoC domain of the primary variable
of interest, and B the domain of the moderating variable.
Finally, similar to a previous, analogous study (Glenn et al., 2018), a separate multidomain category was created to accommodate correlates which likely operate across the full
range of RDoC domains.

Results
The selection criteria for this scoping review resulted in 171 cases (across 95 studies)
where RDoC-relevant correlates of anxiety were studied (see Table 2.1 for a list of cases and
their studies of origin). Table 2.2 provides a summarised count of the total cases, nonsignificant cases, and cases where cross-domain interactions were examined for each RDoC
domain. Figure 2.2 presents a bubble chart illustrating the extent and nature of research
evidence on each RDoC domain based on these case counts. The narrative that follows
presents a breakdown of information in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 (see Appendix D for
additional details). Studies on paediatric and adult anxiety are not considered separately as
the landscape of RDoC-relevant research was similar in both lines of work.
Table 2.1. Included RDoC-relevant correlates and their studies of origin. The “NS”
superscript marks cases where a correlate yielded a non-significant association with an
outcome measure of anxiety. Asterisks mark cases where an affective load was added to
measures of cognition (CS) or arousal/regulation (ARS), so that the measured construct likely
also taps at either of the Valence Systems (PVS or NVS).
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Table 2.2. Descriptive summary of cases (Total cases = 171) in each RDoC domain.
RDoC Domain

No. of Cases

Non-significant

Cases Where

Cases

Cross-Domain
Interactions
Examined

Negative Valence Systems

56

7

2

Positive Valence Systems

15

5

3

PVS/CS

2

0

0
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2

1

0

46
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3
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0

0

CS/PVS

1
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0

Cognitive Systems

45
Systems for Social
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1

1

0

ARS/PVS
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1

0

14

0

0

Processes
Arousal and Regulatory
Systems

Multi-Domain

Figure 2.2. Visualization of extent and nature of research evidence on each RDoC domain as
they have been investigated in anxiety, based on case counts in Table 2.2. Larger bubbles
denote more extensive research (i.e. more number of cases) in a given domain. Darker
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bubbles indicate a higher proportion of cases where correlates were significantly associated
with anxiety. The area of overlap between bubbles correspond to the number of cases where
correlates from two domains were examined for interactive effects on anxiety, although not
all these interactive effects were significant (see Table 2.2).
For each sub-section below, variables are presented in descending order of counts of cases
where they have been examined in association with anxiety, along with counts of cases where
non-significant associations were documented with anxiety (where applicable).
Negative Valence Systems
Negative Valence Systems drive responses to aversive stimuli. The following NVSvariables or classes of NVS-related variables (56 cases in total) have been examined in
association with anxiety: Abnormalities in relation to the visual processing of threatening
stimuli (16 cases; non-significant in 1 case)4, higher behavioural inhibition (11 cases; nonsignificant in 1 case), facilitated learning of conditioned threat cues (5 cases; non-significant
association in 3 cases), abnormalities in relation to interoceptive processing (5 cases), early
temperamental factors (4 cases; non-significant in 1 case), higher tendencies for avoidantrelated behaviours (4 cases; see Case #37 and #38 for discrepant results across different
levels of measurement/units of analysis), higher Neuroticism (3 cases), Behavioural
Inhibition System (BIS) sensitivity (2 cases), greater negative interpretation bias (2 cases;
non-significant in 1 case), higher levels of worry (2 cases), decreased lateral prefrontal brain

4

Drawing back to the focus of this thesis on attentional bias for threat and anxiety, it should be noted that cases
in this class of variables were mostly related but not identical to the attentional bias for threat construct (e.g. in
eight cases, abnormal neural activity during the visual processing of threatening stimuli was examined; see
Appendix D for a full breakdown of variable classes). For this reason, the relative consistency of the association
between “abnormalities in relation to the visual processing of threatening stimuli” and anxiety documented in
the studies captured in the current review should not be understood as contradictory to literature reviewed in
Chapter 1, specifically where inconsistent associations between attentional bias for threat and anxiety are
described (p. 5).
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responses during negative feedback (1 case), and higher perceived stress (1 case). Crossdomain interactions were examined in 2 cases.
Positive Valence Systems
Positive Valence Systems drive responses to positive stimuli. The following PVSrelated variables (15 cases in total) have been examined in association with anxiety:
Facilitated learning of conditioned safety cues (3 cases), lower spiritual well-being (1 case),
lower mindfulness (1 case), increased lateral prefrontal brain responses during reward
anticipation (1 case), decreased attention for positive stimuli (1 case), lower capacity to
engage in positive emotions (1 case), lower self-directedness (1 case), and higher Behavioural
Activation System (BAS) sensitivity (1 case). Cross-domain interactions were examined in 3
cases. The following variables occurred in single cases and yielded non-significant
associations with anxiety: Emotion recognition bias for happy faces, persistence, novelty
seeking, reward dependence, and self-transcendence.
PVS-related Variables with Disputed Domains
Low Conscientiousness (2 cases) and Extraversion (2 cases; non-significant in 1 case)
have been examined in association with anxiety. Disputed domains of classification for these
variables were CS and SS respectively (see Table 2.1, Footnote a and b).
Systems for Social Processes
Systems for Social Processes drive interpersonal functions. The following SS-related
variables (19 cases in total) have been examined in association with anxiety: Attachment
insecurity (8 cases), lower Agreeableness (2 cases), lower social skills/higher social problems
(3 cases), oxytocin levels (2 cases; direction of association varies by population of study – see
Case #23 and #150), perfectionism concerns (1 case), lower self-esteem and lower perceived
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social support (1 case). Only one case/variable (Cooperativeness) yielded a non-significant
association with anxiety. Cross-domain interactions were not examined in any of the 19
cases.
Cognitive Systems
Cognitive Systems are responsible for various (neuro)cognitive processes. The
following CS-related variables (46 cases in total) have been examined in association with
anxiety: Impaired inhibitory control (5 cases; see Case #114 for opposite pattern of findings),
impaired working memory (5 cases; non-significant in 4 cases), impaired attentional control
(4 cases; see Case #128 and #129 for discrepant results across different units of analysis), low
processing efficiency (3 cases), better cognitive flexibility (3 cases, non-significant in 2
cases), higher error monitoring (2 cases), lower estimated intelligence (2 cases; nonsignificant in 1 case), lower Openness (2 cases; non-significant in 1 case), memory (2 cases;
non-significant in both), math ability (2 cases; non-significant in both), attention/vigilance (2
cases; non-significant in both), overestimation of time (1 case), sub-optimal brain-wide
neural connectivity (1 case), increased planning time (1 case), more frequent cognitive
failures (1 case). The following variables occurred in single cases and yielded non-significant
associations with anxiety: psychomotor processing speed, abstract reasoning, orientation,
visual perception, language, hand-eye coordination, praxis, and verbal learning. Crossdomain interaction effects were examined in 3 cases.
CS-Related Constructs Assessed Via Affectively Modified Tasks
In one study (spanning 2 cases), reduced attentional blink for threatening stimuli
(CS/NVS) and positive stimuli (CS/PVS) were examined in association with anxiety. The
latter association was non-significant.
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Arousal/Regulatory Systems
Arousal/Regulatory Systems are responsible for the context-appropriate activation of
neural systems and provision of homeostatic regulation. The following ARS-related variables
or classes of ARS-related variables (13 cases in total) have been examined in association with
anxiety: Irregularities in resting autonomic nervous system activity (8 cases; non-significant
in 1 case), impaired contextual regulation of defensive responses (2 cases; non-significant in
2 cases), higher susceptibility to behavioural conditioning (1 case), symptoms of sensory
processing disorder in childhood (1 case), and sleep deficiency (1 case).
ARS-Related Constructs Assessed Via Affectively Modified Tasks
In one study (spanning 2 cases), startle reactivity during the viewing of unpleasant
images (ARS/NVS) and startle reactivity during the viewing of pleasant images (ARS/PVS)
were examined in association with anxiety. Both associations were non-significant.
Multi-Domain
A separate multi-domain classification was created to accommodate correlates which
likely operate across the full range of RDoC domains. On account of heterogenous (but not
mutually exclusive) views on the psychological constructs emergent from different brain
states in the existing literature, the majority of variables categorised as multi-domain were
indices of neural activity/connectivity. The following multi-domain variables (14 cases in
total) have been examined in association with anxiety: Abnormal baseline connectivity
between the amygdala and other brain regions (8 cases), reductions in amygdala volume (2
cases), baseline functional dominance of amygdala and midline cortices (1 case), higher
variability in functional connectivity in dmPFC and left hippocampus (1 case), presence of
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Met allele of BDNF Vall66Met polymorphism (1 case), and presence of functional Val¹⁵⁸Met
polymorphism (rs4680) of the COMT gene (1 case).
Discussion
The current scoping review examined the extent and nature of research evidence on
each RDoC domain as they have been investigated in anxiety via relevant correlates (i.e.
relevant indices of functioning), with the end goal of informing research priorities in future
anxiety-related research within the RDoC framework. There are several notable findings.
First, the number of cases where interactive effects between RDoC functional domains on
anxious pathology (i.e. cross-domain interactions) were examined is small across-the-board.
This is the case even though abnormal mental functioning, including the expression of
anxious pathology, is likely to reflect the synergistic effects of at least two functional
domains (Elmer et al., 2016).
Second and relatedly, the frequency of cases was not equal across the five major
RDoC domains and sixth multi-domain category, with a disproportionately high number of
cases occurring in the NVS category (56 of 171 cases). This landscape of research is neither
surprising nor unique to anxiety-related research, given the fundamental relevance of the
NVS to affective conditions in general (Carcone & Ruocco, 2017), and anxious pathology
specifically (Lebowitz, Gee, Pine, & Silverman, 2018). However, despite NVS-related
processes appearing to be a leading focus in research on the etiology and maintenance of
anxiety (as conceptualised within the RDoC framework), explicit investigations on how these
processes might interact with those from other functional domains is lacking (observed only
in 2 cases). As a point worth noting, factors related to the attentional bias for threat construct
(i.e. abnormalities in relation to the visual processing of threatening stimuli) were dominant
among cases in the NVS identified through the current search strategy. In ventures to develop
novel and improved interventions for anxiety, considerable effort has been invested in
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behavioural training programs localised in the modification of threat-related attentional
processes. The moderate success of the field in effecting and sustaining therapeutic benefits
(see Mogg & Bradley, 2018; Mogg, Waters, & Bradley, 2017; Mogoaşe, David, & Koster,
2014 for meta-analytic reviews) point to the limitations of single-domain risk models for
anxiety, and further highlight the need for cross-domain interactions to be examined where
NVS-related processes are studied in anxiety, including but not limited to attentional bias for
threat.
Third, although the count of cases was smallest for the ARS and Multi-Domain
categories (13 and 14 cases respectively), many of the factors in these categories tend to be
biologically-driven. In the search for modifiable risk factors for anxiety, these factors may
have utility in elucidating mechanisms of change but may not necessarily be directly targeted
in psychological practice. Examples include irregularities in resting autonomic nervous
system activity (ARS) and abnormal baseline neural activity/connectivity (Multi-domain).
Fourth, there is limited research on the PVS- and SS-related correlates of anxiety (15
and 19 cases, respectively), despite these functional domains encompassing a range of
psychological processes which offer promise in clinical utility (e.g. reward learning,
affiliation and attachment; Glenn et al., 2018). Of note, among the 19 cases where SS-related
variables were examined in association with anxiety, a non-significant association was
observed only in one case (5.3%). However, five of the 15 PVS-related cases (33.3%) yielded
non-significant associations. These findings suggest there may be more heterogeneity in the
PVS domain of the anxious profile relative to the SS domain, a tentative notion which may
nonetheless be useful to keep in view when tailoring future investigations to extend research
on anxiety within the RDoC framework.
Finally, although the count of cases for the CS category (46 cases) was second in
number to that for the NVS, there was an unusually large proportion of non-significant cases
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(23 of 46 cases; 50%). It has been highlighted that there is heterogeneity in measures used to
assess the same neurocognitive constructs within the anxiety-related literature (Leonard &
Abramovitch, 2019). Further research is needed to verify whether there is indeed
heterogeneity in the CS domain of the anxious profile, or whether these mixed findings are
better explained by methodological factors.
Limitations
The current scoping review had several limitations. First, the “NOT” Boolean
operator was applied to terms related to a range of psychological conditions in the present
search strategy, including formally recognised anxiety-spectrum disorders and depression.
While the goal was to limit the scope of located studies to those with interests in nondisorder-specific anxious pathology (i.e. to identify targeted correlates which may be relevant
across the full range of formally recognised anxiety-spectrum disorders), this search strategy
may not have identified all eligible studies. Second, finer-grained details on anxiety outcome
measures were not extracted beyond the population of study (paediatric/adult) and whether
anxiety was quantified continuously or dichotomously (i.e. diagnostic status). Third, it is
possible that the overall number of cases where RDoC-relevant correlates of anxiety were
studied may have been underrepresented due to the exclusion of studies which were not titled
according to the variants of “correlate” used in the current search strategy (listed in the
Methods section). Nonetheless, presently identified disparities in the count of cases across
RDoC domains are unlikely to reflect an artefact of the current search strategy (given no
RDoC-specific terms were used), so that the landscape of the larger RDoC-relevant literature
pertaining to anxiety is likely to be similar to that reported here based on the sample of
included studies. Fourth, as mentioned in the Methods section (Data Coding and Procedures),
a key challenge of this study was to categorise a range of variables into their best-fitting
RDoC domains. While NIMH guidelines and RDoC-relevant literature were consulted to this
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end, the categorisation process relied only on the judgement and consensus of a research team
of two. As highlighted in the Results section, there have been a handful of cases where
variables have been categorised into different RDoC domains by different researchers (see
also Footnote a and b in Table 2.1), and the classification of variables in the current study is
likewise susceptible to alternative opinions. Finally, although it is not the purpose of a
scoping review to undertake any quality assessment procedures (Arksey & O'Malley, 2005),
it should nonetheless be understood that included studies were not further evaluated beyond
the extent required for extracting data relevant to the current scoping review. Barring these
limitations, findings from the current scoping review provide a starting point for advancing
the design and scope of anxiety-related research within the RDoC framework.
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2.2. Addendum
The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link in the context of a research
program extending from that of the information-processing approach, specifically one where
the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by considering ABT as an
indirect or component predictor of anxiety. The end goal is to identify theoretically-relevant
moderators and mediators of the ABT-anxiety link which may ultimately be clinically useful
(precisely, serve to refine the design of attentional bias modification programs), and the
RDoC framework was used as the basis for selecting third variables to be studied to facilitate
this goal.
Section 2.1. presents a scoping review conducted to characterise existing research on
the etiology and maintenance of anxiety according to the RDoC domain to which studied
processes could be conceptually linked. This procedure was undertaken in keeping with
preparatory customs prior to conducting research on a given psychological condition within
the RDoC framework. Specifically, the extent and nature of RDoC-relevant research on the
given psychological condition is commonly first examined to identify any disparities in
research focus, and ultimately highlight the RDoC domains which should be prioritised in
future research (Glenn, Cha, Kleiman, & Nock, 2017; Rabasco, Ambrosino, & McKay, 2019;
Koudys, Traynor, Rodrigo, Carcone, & Ruocco, 2019; Wildes & Marcus, 2015; Schreiner,
Klimes-Dougan, Begnel, & Cullen, 2015). This scoping review was similarly conducted to
inform the selection of third variables most apt to study in relation to the ABT-anxiety link.
In previous analogous reviews on the RDoC-relevant literature conducted in relation
to other forms of psychopathology, prioritised RDoC domains for future research are
typically determined as those which have received lesser attention (i.e. span fewer cases) in
investigations on the etiology and maintenance of that given psychological condition (Glenn
et al., 2017; Rabasco et al., 2019; Koudys et al., 2019; Wildes & Marcus, 2015; Schreiner et
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al., 2015). However, for reasons detailed as follows, this heuristic was adapted for the present
thesis. First, with Negative Valence Systems (i.e. the domain to which ABT has been linked)
as the reference point (56 cases), outcomes of the scoping review indicated that research on
Cognitive Systems span a substantial number of cases in investigations on the etiology and
maintenance of anxious pathology (46 cases, with the next-highest count of cases being 19 in
Systems for Social Processes). However, the inconsistent predictive value of Cognitive
Systems in anxious pathology (23 of 46 cases were non-significant) warrants further
clarification and research in the area, with recommendations having been made to do so in the
context of standardised, more comprehensive neurocognitive measures (Leonard &
Abramovitch, 2019). More specifically, it is possible that neurocognitive functioning is
weighted less in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety, but the notion warrants clarification
by assessing the association between a wider range of neurocognitive domains and anxious
pathology.
Second, the RDoC domains which received relatively lesser attention in research on
the etiology and maintenance of anxious pathology (as determined by fewer case counts)
were not equal in the extent to which they captured anxiety-relevant processes which may be
directly amendable to psychological intervention, and/or had measures available to be used as
feasible screening tools. Specifically, Systems for Social Processes, Positive Valence
Systems, and Arousal/Regulatory Systems spanned relatively fewer cases (range 13 to 19),
among which Arousal/Regulatory Systems appear to capture biologically-modulated
processes of anxiety to a greater extent (e.g. irregularities in resting autonomic nervous
system activity). In a clinical context, biologically-modulated processes may be more useful
for evaluating rather than effecting mechanisms of change (Kazdin, 2007) and tend to require
equipment which is less readily accessible in psychological practice in order to be measured
(e.g. tools for psychophysiological recording; de Los Reyes, 2015). Evaluated against the end

56
goal of the present thesis to contribute to the refinement of attentional bias modification
programs, anxiety-related processes from the Arousal/Regulatory Systems may encompass
lesser potential to serve as direct adjunctive therapeutic targets to ABT, or aid in identifying
individuals who may not be suitable candidates for attentional bias modification programs.
Based on the unique landscape of RDoC-relevant literature on anxious pathology
emergent from the present scoping review, and keeping in view the end goals of the present
thesis, Systems for Social Processes, Positive Valence Systems, and Cognitive Systems were
presently considered as prioritised RDoC domains for research in the selection of third
variables to study in relation to the ABT-anxiety link. The specific factors selected to be
studied in relation to the ABT-anxiety link were chosen on the basis of 1) having conceptual
ties to these RDoC domains at definition level, 2) being broad enough to be used as proxy
indicators of functioning of their conceptually-linked RDoC domain, and 3) having been
linked not only to anxiety but also to ABT (albeit independently) in previous literature, thus
offering enhanced potential to add explanatory value to models of the ABT-anxiety link in
the plausibility of a meaningful interrelationship. These factors were: attentional bias for
positive information (Positive Valence Systems), loneliness (Systems for Social Processes),
and neurocognitive functioning across a comprehensive, standardised test battery (Cognitive
Systems). The expected interrelationship between these variables and the ABT-anxiety link,
conceptualised based on relevant literature, is detailed in literature reviews presented in
Chapters 4, 5, and 6.



The rationale for examining multiple domains of neurocognitive functioning for their potential role in the
ABT-anxiety link draws on the claim that functioning within Cognitive Systems (by definition of the domain) is
not likely to be captured by a single global measure (Morris & Cuthbert, 2012), but also coincides with earliermentioned recommendations for furthering research on neurocognitive functioning in anxiety (Leonard &
Abramovitch, 2019).
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Chapter 3: Methodological Considerations in the Assessment of ABT - A Protocol
Study*

*

The manuscript presented in this chapter (Section 3.2) is published as:

Wei, M., Roodenrys, S., Miller, L., & Barkus, E. (2020). Complex Scenes From the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS): Agreement-Based Emotional
Categories. Experimental Psychology, 67(3), 194-201. doi: 10.1027/16183169/a000488
The PDF version of the manuscript as it has been published is presented in Appendix E.

58
3.1. Preface
ABT, the primary independent variable of interest in the current thesis, is commonly
measured using behavioural paradigms designed more broadly to comparatively assess
differential patterns of attentional processing with regards to emotionally-salient and nonemotional stimuli. One behavioural paradigm developed for this purpose is the visual dot
probe task (described in more detail shortly). Within the anxiety-related literature, the dot
probe task has not only been used extensively for the assessment of ABT, but also represents
the most commonly adapted behavioural paradigm for therapeutic purposes (i.e. the
modification of ABT through behavioural training methods; see Bar-Haim, 2010; Mogg,
Waters, & Bradley, 2017 for reviews). Although alternative procedures are available to assess
ABT (some with possible advantages over the dot probe task), the dot probe task was used in
present efforts to extend research on the ABT-anxiety link to facilitate the comparability and
translatability of findings.
On each trial in a typical dot probe task, a pair of stimuli (one emotionally-salient and
one non-emotional) are presented side-by-side on the computer screen. A probe (i.e. a dot)
then quickly replaces either the emotionally-salient or non-emotional stimulus, doing so
equally frequently across trials. Participants are tasked to indicate via keyboard press (e.g. ‘E’
for left and ‘I’ for right) the location of this probe as quickly as possible †. A more extreme
attentional bias for the emotionally-salient class of stimuli is typically inferred from a more
extreme difference score when mean reaction times on congruent trials (probe replaces
emotionally-salient stimulus) are subtracted from mean reaction times on incongruent trials
(probe replaces non-emotional stimulus). Applied to the assessment of ABT, negativelyvalenced stimuli are employed as representations of threat to be presented alongside non-

†

In therapeutic variants of the task, participants are tasked to indicate the location of probes which consistently
replace the non-emotional stimulus across trials. The end goal is to reduce facilitated orientation towards the
emotionally-salient class of stimuli.
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emotional or neutral counterparts across trials. While earlier versions of dot probe tasks
developed to assess ABT have used stimuli in the form of words or faces, there is growing
acceptance that naturalistic scenes may offer a more ecologically-valid way to represent realworld threat (Sagliano, Trojano, Amoriello, Migliozzi, & D’Olimpio, 2014; Zvielli,
Bernstein, & Koster, 2014).
Concerning the employment of negatively-valenced scenes to measure ABT, there are
two identifiable caveats within the anxiety-related literature. First, negatively-valenced
scenes commonly used to represent threat are such as those which portray danger (e.g.
predatory animals, an aimed gun) and those which portray loss (e.g. injury, grieving persons).
While often treated as a homogenous class of “threat” stimuli, scenes which portray danger
arguably relate more closely to the emotion of fear, while scenes which portray loss relate
more closely to the emotion of sadness. Fear- and sadness-related scenes likely differ in the
immediacy and likelihood of threat they convey (Kveraga et al., 2015), which may in turn
have implications for measuring (and understanding) ABT in anxiety which have yet to be
explored. Second, it is common practice for negatively-valenced scenes employed to assess
ABT to be selected at discretion of the research team. However, emotional judgements of the
same scene can vary markedly from one person to the next (Mikels et al., 2005), and more
objective ways are needed to ensure that the experimental manipulation is successful (i.e. that
selected images elicit their intended emotions).
In collective light of these two caveats, a protocol study (presented as a manuscript in
the next section) was conducted to identify scenes which elicit the discrete emotions of fear
and sadness, as validated by a wider panel of judges (N =103) beyond the research team.
Besides allowing for indices of attentional bias for fear- and sadness-related scenes to be
computed separately, this protocol study was also set up towards the development of a dot
probe task that would support some of the main investigations of the present thesis. First, it
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was of interest to examine the role of positive attentional bias in the association between
ABT and anxiety. To this end, scenes validated for the emotion of happiness were also
targeted in this protocol study to create trials which could be used to compute indices of
positive attentional bias. Second, the role of loneliness in the association between ABT and
anxiety was also among present interests. In anticipation of the specificity of ABT in
loneliness to social stimuli (Cacioppo et al., 2016), emotional categorical data on scenes
collected in this protocol study was further organised along the dimension of social content
(i.e. whether human subjects were present/absent) to allow for indices of attentional bias for
social/non-social stimuli to be computed separately. The targeted end product was a dot probe
task that would support a more parsimonious research design where behavioural data from
trials within the same task can be selectively analysed to answer different research questions.
The manuscript presented in the next section contains in-text references to externally
hosted supplementary material, which can be accessed within the manuscript itself or by
following this link: https://osf.io/z75kj
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3.2. Manuscript
Abstract
Complex scenes from standardised stimuli databases such as the International
Affective Pictures System (IAPS) are organised dimensionally rather than discretely. Further,
the potentially unique function of socially-relevant scenes is often overlooked. This study
sought to identify discrete categories of complex scenes from the IAPS, and to explore if
there were qualitative features which make the emotional content of some social scenes
identifiable with higher levels of agreement. 103 participants (53.4% Female, Mean Age
24.4) judged 118 IAPS scenes as reflecting Fear, Happy, Sad, or Neutral. A second
judgement study was conducted with a separate group of participants (N = 117; 79.2%
Female; Mean Age 30.41) to further characterise valid affective scenes across the full range
of basic emotions. Sixty images received agreement on their emotional category from > 70%
of judges, and were considered valid. IAPS identifier codes for these images are available for
reference (along with supplementary data from the second judgement study), organised by
emotional and social content. An incidental observation was such that compared to non-social
scenes, lower agreement rates were observed for social scenes across the board. Qualitative
features of social scenes which were classified into emotional categories based on higher
levels of agreement are discussed.

Introduction
Experiments involving the elicitation of emotions have been integral to our
understanding of complex interactions between emotional and cognitive processes. Several
modalities have been employed to elicit emotions in the laboratory, one commonly used
method being that involving the presentation of static visual stimuli. Two types of stimuli are
frequently used within this paradigm: Photographs of human faces presented in isolation, and
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of naturalistic complex scenes which present a visual array of contextually-embedded reallife objects (including people). The latter embodies a movement towards ecological validity,
in which the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
2008) represents a key instrument. It offers a database of over a thousand photographs
depicting a range of naturalistic complex scenes, from inanimate objects to persons
embedded in various situations. Slides are tagged with standardised valence values1, so that
experimental stimuli may then be selected based on normative indicators according to
whether they are negative, neutral, or positive in emotional content.
In recognition that a single valence scale (i.e. negative to positive) does not capture
the range of emotions experienced in day-to-day life, a growing body of researchers have
opted to study emotions from a categorical perspective (Finucane, 2011; Francesca et al.,
2015; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Pistoia et al., 2018; Pistoia et al., 2010; von
Muhlenen, Bellaera, Singh, & Srinivasan, 2018). This position holds that emotions are better
characterised as discrete entities (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011). For instance, fear and sadness
may both be ‘negative’ emotions but are distinct in the unique subjective experiences and
psychological consequences they produce (Zadra & Clore, 2011). Given complex scenes in
the IAPS are not categorised according to the discrete emotion they elicit, these images are
often qualitatively grouped or ascribed emotional meaning at the discretion of the research
team. However, while facial expressions of basic emotions are more likely to be categorised
homogeneously among healthy individuals (Wegrzyn, Vogt, Kireclioglu, Schneider, &
Kissler, 2017), qualitative judgements of the same scene can vary markedly from one person
to the next (Mikels et al., 2005). To ensure more precise experimental manipulation, some
1

Each IAPS slide also comes with standardised ratings of arousal (how calming or alerting an image is) and
dominance (extent of viewer’s perceived control relative to displayed stimulus). While the latter dimension has
not been well-explored, the former is often used as a control variable in investigations (including the present) on
the effects of other stimulus properties.
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investigators have highlighted the need for a panel of judges beyond the research team to
validate the emotional content of experimental stimuli (Barke, Stahl, & Kröner-Herwig,
2011; Moreno, Vanetza, & Antivilo, 2016; Xu et al., 2017).
In a related line of work, research has highlighted the functional distinction between
affective visual stimuli which portray humans and those which do not (Colden, Bruder, &
Manstead, 2008; Peterman, Bekele, Bian, Sarkar, & Park, 2015; Silva et al., 2017). These
studies are situated within a broader movement towards the study of emotion from an
embodied perspective (Colden et al., 2008; Peterman et al., 2015; Rubo & Gamer, 2018;
Rutherford, Maupin, & Mayes, 2018; Silva et al., 2017). This perspective recognises that
images which feature people convey unique social information and hold interpersonal
relevance (Colden et al., 2008). Such images are attended (Rubo & Gamer, 2018), perceived
(Birmingham & Kingstone, 2009) and neurally processed (Rutherford et al., 2018) distinctly
from those without humans present. Although affective stimuli based on faces incidentally
limits all presented information to those which are socially relevant, complex scenes in the
IAPS comprise a mixture of images which portray human persons and those which do not.
Besides the discrete emotional category to which they belong, there is a need to further
delineate these images according to social (or human) content to enable systematic
experimental control.
In relation to socially-relevant stimuli, inherent prototypes exist to facilitate the
classification of facial expressions into emotional categories. For example, an open, smiling
mouth is a key feature of a happy face, while v-shaped brows are key features which
distinguish an angry face (Aronoff, Woike, & Hyman, 1992). In turn, faces where
prototypical features are present are more likely to be identified consistently among healthy
observers, with minimal dispute over their emotional categories (Wegrzyn et al., 2017).
However, for socially-relevant stimuli in the form of emotionally-loaded complex scenes,
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little is known about stimulus-specific properties which may modulate categorisation
processes.
The first aim of this study was to identify an agreement-based set of discretely
categorised complex scenes from the IAPS, presenting this data in a way that will support the
study of emotion from an embodied perspective. The following emotions were targeted in a
judgement task: Fear, Happy, Sad, and Neutral2. Secondly, this study also sought to explore if
there were qualitative features which make the emotional content of some social scenes
identifiable with higher levels of agreement.
Methods
Judgement Study 1
Participants
103 (53.4% female) individuals (judges) aged between 18 and 60 (M = 24.40, SD =
9.99) participated in the current study. The sample was dominantly an Australian
undergraduate population (N = 85; 82.5%) recruited from the University of Wollongong
(NSW, Australia), School of Psychology research participation scheme, and also included
other members of public within Australia. Where applicable, participants received course
credit points for their time. Sample size was selected to match that used in the main IAPS
study, where N = 100 (Lang et al., 2008). 14 of the 103 participants reported the current use
of antidepressants. Along with gender, medication status was tested for effects on the
judgement task before data was collapsed across participants, and images were made the
main unit of observation (described in detail below).

2

Besides fear and sadness, the full range of basic negative emotions includes anger and disgust. The former was
not presently targeted as static visual stimuli are poorly suited for eliciting anger (Mikels et al., 2005; GerrardsHesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Gross & Levenson, 1995). Further, disgust was not targeted due to ethical
concerns associated with the presentation of offensive or emotionally-distressing images. However, for
comprehensiveness, a second judgement study was presently conducted to characterise valid affective scenes
across the full range of basic emotions (described in detail under “Judgement Study 2” in the Methods and
Results sections).
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Procedures
118 images were selected from the IAPS (63 Social, 55 Non-Social) with the end goal
of reducing these images to a smaller set of discrete emotion-eliciting stimuli (based on
agreement rates) in the categories of Fear, Happy, Sad and Neutral. Images targeting the
emotional categories (Fear, Happy, Sad) were selected thematically based on conceptual
items in an established affective word list with categorical norms (Affective Norms for
English Words; Stevenson, Mikels, & James, 2007), e.g. “danger” or “assault” for Fear;
“achievement” or “affection” for Happy; “tragedy” or “grief” for Sad by the first author.
Images targeting the Neutral category were selected on the basis of valence ratings close to
the midpoint of 5 as normed in the original IAPS study (Lang et al., 2008). Social images
were defined as scenes with at least one clearly visible human form, while images were
considered Non-Social only if they did not contain people (or body parts). Exemplars of
targeted images for the Social subgroup depicted scenes such as: Man abducting a woman
(Fear), medal recipients at sports events (Happy), people in mourning (Sad), and persons
engaged in mundane activities such as clerical work (Neutral). Exemplars of targeted images
for the Non-Social subgroup depicted scenes such as: Violently capsizing boats (Fear),
desserts (Happy), injured animals (Sad), and buildings (Neutral).
All data collection took place online at the time of the participants’ choosing, in selfpaced questionnaire format using Psytoolkit (http://www.psytoolkit.org). In forced-choice
decision format, participants identified the 118 IAPS images (resized to 410px x 307px) as
either Fear, Happy, Sad, or Neutral, in response to the question “Select the category which
best corresponds to the image above.” Images were presented until the participant responded
and then were replaced by the next image. They were presented in the same pseudo-random
order, avoiding clustering of images from the same social content dimension and likely
emotional category, as judged by the first author.

66
All analyses described as follows, including the generation of descriptives and
comparisons of group means, were processed with SPSS (Version 25). In total, 12154 votes
were received across 118 images and 103 participants. Before collapsing the dataset across
participants to probe emotional categorical data for the 118 images, preliminary checks were
performed to ensure that gender and medication status did not influence the proportion of
votes across the four labels in the judgement task. To this end, a MANOVA was conducted
with gender and medication status as predictors of vote frequency in each of the four labels.
Neither gender (Wilk's Λ = 0.988, p = .889), medication status (Wilk's Λ = .978, p = .705)
nor their interactive effects (Wilk's Λ = .985, p = .830) affected the composite multivariate
score, suggesting that the proportion of votes across the four labels did not vary as a function
of gender or medication status. Henceforth, images were treated as the main unit of
observation.
Main Data Analyses
The first aim of this study was to identify an agreement-based set of discretely
categorised complex scenes from the IAPS (Fear, Happy, Sad, Neutral), presenting this data
in a way that will support the study of emotion from an embodied perspective. All 118
images were first grouped according to majority vote, or their most frequently occurring
label. Following previously used selection criteria to identify valid emotional stimuli (Dailey,
Cottrell, & Padgett, 2003; Francesca et al., 2015; Pistoia et al., 2018; Pistoia et al., 2010), this
battery of images was then reduced to those with rates of agreement exceeding 70%. It has
been highlighted that pictures with more arousing properties produce emotions of greater
intensity (Bernat, Patrick, Benning, & Tellegen, 2006; Xu et al., 2017), which may in turn
favour higher agreement rates on their emotional content. To ensure that differences in
agreement rates across the image groups (if any are observed) were not better explained by
differences in arousal, a 4 x 2 Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA; Emotional x Social
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content) was conducted on agreement rates with arousal ratings from the original IAPS
norming study as a covariate before the selection criterion was applied.
The second aim of this study was to explore if there were qualitative features which
make the emotional content of some social scenes identifiable with higher levels of
agreement. To this end, social scenes assigned to emotional categories with rates of
agreement exceeding 70% were visually scanned for common features. While there is limited
literature to draw from regarding specific qualitative features that may potentially reduce
ambiguity in the emotional content of social scenes, clarity of facial expressions was used as
a starting point of this visual analysis.
Judgement Study 2
Judgement Study 1 employs a forced-choice decision format with constrained
response options to identify affective scenes which are assigned the same emotional label
more consistently than other scenes (i.e. with > 70% agreement rates on their emotional
content). However, affective scenes often elicit multiple discrete emotions (Bradley,
Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001), and it may be useful to have this information on hand
during stimuli selection procedures. To this end, a second judgement task was run in a
separate follow-up study to characterise the profile of emotions (across the full range of basic
emotions) elicited by each affective scene which met the selection criterion in Judgement
Study 1 (i.e. images classed as Fear, Happy, or Sad with agreement rates above 70%).
Participants
A call for participants was placed on the sub-Reddit r/SampleSize, an online
international platform designed to connect researchers and voluntary respondents. Responses
from 3 participants were not analysed as they did not meet the minimum age requirement for
adulthood (18 years). The final participant pool comprised of 117 (79.2% female) aged
between 18 and 65 (M = 30.41, SD = 10.25), across the following countries: USA (N = 62),
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United Kingdom (N = 19), Canada (N = 15), Australia (N = 9), Germany (N = 6), Netherlands
(N = 3), and Sweden (N =3).
Procedures and Data Analyses
Images which were identified as Fear, Happy, or Sad (with agreement rates above
70%) in Judgement Study 1 were presented sequentially in a page-by-page survey format,
with six emotional labels (Happy, Surprise, Sad, Anger, Disgust, and Fear) appearing below
each image. Participants were tasked to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 10, how intensely they felt
each of these six emotions when viewing a given image. As per Judgement Task 1, gender
and medication status (26 of 117 participants reported current use of antidepressants) were
tested for effects on the judgement task before data was collapsed across participants, and
images were made the main unit of observation. Intensity ratings across all six labels did not
vary by gender or medication status (mixed model analyses with Country modelled as
random effects produced the same pattern of findings). Mean intensity ratings for the six
emotional labels were thus generated for each rated image using responses from the full
sample.
Results
Judgement Study 1
Based on their most frequently occurring labels, the initial 118 images (63 or 53.4%
Social) were classified as follows: 15 Fear (8 Social), 21 Happy (15 Social), 14 Sad (9
Social), and 68 Neutral (31 Social). The excess of Neutral images was as intended to
minimise viewing fatigue. The 4 x 2 ANCOVA showed that arousal did not predict
agreement rates, F(1, 109) = 2.13, p = .147. Unexpectedly however, Emotional content did
not predict agreement rates [F(3, 109) = .714, p = .546], nor did the interaction term [F(3,
109) = .757, p = .521], although there was a significant main effect of Social content [F(1,
109) = 6.90, p = .010]. Precisely, lower agreement rates were obtained for Social scenes (M =

69
68.17%, SE = 3.50) compared to Non-Social scenes (M = 75.52%, SE = 3.39) across the
board3.Figure 1 illustrates the dispersion of Social and Non-Social images across the full
range of agreement rates for each of the four Emotional categories.
After the selection criterion was applied (agreement rates exceeding 70%; reference
line added in Figure 1), the initial battery was reduced to sixty images: 7 Fear (3 Social), 12
Happy (7 Social), 9 Sad (5 Social), and 32 Neutral (8 Social). Since group differences in
agreement rates were earlier observed, the same 4 x 2 ANCOVA was repeated to ensure that
Social and Non-Social scenes in the reduced battery were classified with equal levels of
agreement. None of the parameters in this analysis were significant, indicating that agreement
rates were comparable across Emotional by Social content groups and relatively unaffected
by arousal ratings. Table 3.1 presents the IAPS identifier codes, mean agreement rates, and
arousal ratings for these sixty images, grouped according to Emotional and Social content.
For comprehensiveness, mean valence ratings from the original IAPS norming study are also
given. For IAPS identifier codes of all 118 rated scenes, their exact agreement rates, and
arousal/valence ratings, please see supplementary material.
Towards the second aim, social scenes assigned to emotional categories with rates of
agreement exceeding 70% were visually scanned for common features. Within the above
70% range, faces were clearly distinguishable in most scenes as would be expected for clarity
of facial cues to modulate agreement rates. In addition, social scenes in the Neutral (8
images) and Fear (3 images) categories consistently featured a single person, with one
exception in the Neutral category (#2396 – two strangers in commute at a train station). Sad
(4 images) and Happy (7 images) social scenes in the above 70% range consistently featured
two or more interacting persons, with one exception in the Happy category (#8465 – man

3

When Social and Non-Social scenes were compared for differences in JPEG-compressed file size (i.e. an index
of visual complexity), group means did not differ significantly, t(116) = .10, p = .921.
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running alone on the beach). Where social scenes in the Fear, Happy, Sad and Neutral
categories failed to meet the 70% agreement rate mark, their most commonly occurring
competing labels were Sad, Neutral, Fear and Happy respectively (see supplementary
material for supporting data). Possible implications for research are presented in the
Discussion section below.
Judgement Study 2
28 images were classified into an emotional category with agreement rates above 70%
in Judgement Study 1 (7 Fear, 12 Happy, 9 Sad). These images were rated on intensity scales
(1 to 10) on six emotional labels (Happy, Surprise, Sad, Anger, Disgust, and Fear). Mean
intensity ratings on the six emotional labels for all 28 images individually (organised by
emotional and social content) are made available in a second datasheet within the
supplementary material. There were two images which had intensity ratings on other basic
emotions (Surprise, Anger, Disgust) which exceeded intensity ratings for the emotion they
were validated for in Judgement Study 1. These images are marked with an asterisk in the
second datasheet within the supplementary material, and in Table 3.1 below.
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Figure 3.1. Dispersion of Social/Non-Social images across the full range of agreement rates
for each of the four Emotional categories based on Judgement Study 1.

Table 3.1. IAPS Identifier Codes and Mean Agreement Rates for Images with Agreement
Rates > 70% based on Judgement Study 1
Fear

Happy

Sad

Neutral
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Social

IAPS
identifier

2770*,

2209, 2340,

2141, 2205,

2383, 2393,

6250.1, 6370

2347, 2398,

2455,

2396, 2411,

8461, 8465,

2900.1, 9530

2440, 2575,

codes

8540
Mean

2745, 7550

3.30 [.92]

7.06 [.57]

2.34 [.26]

5.01 [.33]

6.03 [.79]

4.86 [.46]

4.98 [.43]

3.32 [.53]

Nimages

3

7

5

8

Mean

82.15, [8.19]

87.38 [6.01]

82.72 [8.19]

77.69 [6.34]

IAPS

1120, 1930,

1463, 1710,

9180, 9184,

5395, 5471,

identifier

5971, 9620

7330, 7405,

9340*, 9561

5533, 7000,

Valence
Mean
Arousal

agreement
rates (%)
[SD]
Non-Social

codes

7492

7001, 7014,
7021, 7026,
7036, 7041,
7050, 7061,
7080, 7140,
7185, 7187,
7242, 7490,
7491, 7500,
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7546, 7547,
7560, 7705
Mean

3.44 [.51]

7.49 [.36]

2.58 [.16]

5.18 [.22]

6.53 [.35]

5.33 [.66]

5.29 [.40]

3.06 [.60]

Nimages

4

5

4

24

Mean

80.58 [8.08]

82.16 [8.61]

83.98%

81.89 [7.27]

Valence
Mean
Arousal

agreement

[5.95]

rates (%)
[SD]
*Images which had intensity ratings on other basic emotions (surprise, anger, disgust)
exceeding intensity ratings for the emotion they were validated for in Judgment Study 1.

Discussion
The first aim of this study was to identify an agreement-based set of discretely
categorised complex scenes from the IAPS, presenting this data in a way that will support the
study of emotion from an embodied perspective. Selected complex scenes from the IAPS
were first grouped according to their most frequently occurring label, then reduced so that
each emotional category is represented only by images so assigned with more than 70%
agreement among judges. The end product is a battery of images more likely to be identified
consistently as either Fear, Happy Sad, or Neutral by different viewers. In an experimental
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context, these images may be better suited to capture the effects of targeted emotions than
images assigned to experimental conditions without empirical support. The IAPS identifier
codes of these images are made available in the Results section as a starting point of
reference to facilitate precise experimental manipulation and comparability across emotionelicitation studies. Adding to existing categorical data on the IAPS, where complex scenes
across thematic contents are treated as homogenous (Barke et al., 2011; Mikels et al., 2005;
Moreno et al., 2016), the current study presents emotional image groups delineated by
whether or not they portrayed human persons. In an experimental context, this will support
systematic control to account for the functional distinction between stimuli which convey
socially-relevant information and those which do not (Colden et al., 2008; Peterman et al.,
2015; Silva et al., 2017). A strength of the present study is that it used a similarly-sized panel
of judges to that used to standardise ratings in the IAPS, with comparable gender
distributions (NParticipants = 103 and NParticipants = 100 in the current and IAPS study
respectively; 53.4% and 50% Female in the current and IAPS study respectively). A second
judgement study also served to provide data on the multiple emotion-eliciting properties of
scenes presently validated as Fear, Happy, or Sad, which may be useful supplementary
information for researchers to have on hand during stimuli selection procedures.
In relation to the second aim, it is worth first noting that lower agreement rates were
obtained for social scenes compared to non-social scenes across the board. That is, prior to
applying the 70% selection criterion to isolate images with high agreement rates, social
scenes (relative to non-social counterparts) were rated less consistently across judges with
regards to their emotional content4. Although this observation was incidental to the main aims

4

While this finding prevailed even after controlling for the effects for arousal, it should be noted that arousal
ratings from the original IAPS study (external norms) were used in analyses. Perceptions of stimuli properties
can vary between individuals (Mikels et al., 2005), and by extension, samples. It is possible that the true effects
of arousal on agreement rates were not presently captured given that sample-specific norms were not
obtained/available.
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of the current study, this relative deficiency highlights the importance of better understanding
the qualitative features which may make the emotional content of some social scenes less
open to dispute. Researchers have previously cautioned that findings from experiments where
complex scenes are assigned to emotion-eliciting conditions without procedures to validate
their emotional content should be interpreted conservatively (Barke et al., 2011; Moreno et
al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017). Current findings suggest this caveat may apply in particular to
social scenes. It is also worth noting that although higher agreement rates
As may be expected, social scenes which depicted faces of featured persons more
clearly tended to generate higher rates of agreement. Besides clarity of facial cues, the
number of featured persons appeared to be an additional element which modulated the level
of agreement a given scene generated on its emotional content. Neutral and Fear social scenes
tended to receive agreement rates above 70% if they featured a single person. For Neutral and
Fear social scenes meeting the 70% agreement criterion, the presence of multiple persons
most commonly produced competing responses on Happy and Sad labels respectively. In
contrast, Sad and Happy scenes tended to receive agreement rates above 70% if they featured
at least two interacting persons. For Sad and Happy scenes, the depiction of a single isolated
person most commonly produced competing responses on Fear and Neutral labels
respectively. Tentatively, these observations suggest that social scenes for Neutral and Fear
categories may be better targeted through single embodiments of facial cues, while Sad and
Happy categories may be better targeted through multiple embodiments of facial cues.
Nonetheless, as the second aim was exploratory in nature, no a priori attempts to control for
any one feature were made. Thus, it cannot be said that these patterns of clustering were not
in part due to the nature of specific images selected for the present study until clarified in
further research.
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The phrasing of instructions given to participants may also be relevant in interpreting
the present observations. Across social and non-social scenes, participants received
instructions to “Select the category which best corresponds to the image above”. While less
of a concern for non-social scenes, responses tied to social scenes may capture a mixture of
how a given scene made the perceiver feel, and the perceiver’s judgement of the
protagonist(s)’ feelings. Clearer instructions framed to capture the former, as well as paying
closer attention to number of featured persons to enhance selectivity, may yield more
balanced social/non-social subgroups across emotional categories in endeavours to extend the
current study.
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3.3. Addendum
This section provides further detail on the development of the protocol and
methodology of the dot probe task used in the subsequent studies that were not included in
the manuscripts. In the protocol study (presented as a manuscript) in Section 3.2 above, a
subset of images from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS), a database of
naturalistic scenes with standardized valence and arousal ratings, were assigned to their best
fitting emotional category (Fear, Sad, Happy or Neutral) based on agreement rates among
103 judges. The end goal was a dot probe task which could produce indices of attentional
bias for fear-, sad-, and happiness-related stimuli, and also allow for indices of attentional
bias for social/non-social stimuli to be computed separately, where relevant. Not all images
which met the 70% agreement rate criterion were included in the targeted dot probe task;
rather, parameters for the dot probe task were chosen to favour precise emotion elicitation
(i.e. fewer unique stimuli were used). This means that target stimuli (Fear, Sad and Happy
scenes) must be repeated in the task so as to ensure an adequate number of trials per
emotional-neutral condition. Preventative measures against habituation to target stimuli were
hence also taken on board in the design of the present dot probe task (interspersion of neutralneutral trials among emotional-neutral trials; described in further detail shortly).
Based on outcomes from the protocol study just presented, images which met the 70%
agreement rate criterion were ranked in ascending order of agreement rates within their
emotional by social categories. The top three images were then selected from each emotional
by social category to be used as target stimuli in the designated dot probe task. Thus, there
were 3 social and 3 non-social images across the Fear, Sad and Happy categories, altogether
requiring 9 social and 9 non-social images in the Neutral category to be paired with. A caveat
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was encountered when target images in the social sub-category had to be paired with unique
neutral counterparts of the same social content. That is, while 9 social Neutral images were
required, only 8 social images were classified as Neutral with agreement rates above 70%
(see Table 3.1 in 3.2. Manuscript).
To compensate for this shortage, a follow-up study was conducted with a smaller pool
of participants (N = 21; university undergraduates with no history of psychiatric disorder).
This follow-up study involved a judgement task presenting ten potential candidate images for
the social Neutral category, where participants picked between the same four labels (Neutral,
Fear, Happy, Sad) for each image. These candidate images were naturalistic scenes sourced
from free, online stock photo databases (e.g. www.flickr.com), and were selected based on
having similar features to the social images which achieved the highest agreement rates on
Neutral in the protocol study just presented (e.g non-interacting people in commute, people
working independently, people shopping for groceries). Among these images, the highest rate
of agreement on Neutral was 90.5%, with the next highest being 85.7% (please see Appendix
F for actual images and their full descriptives+). As two social images classified as Neutral
with fairly high rates of agreement were presently available to compensate for a shortage of
only one, a decision was made to replace the social image with the lowest agreement rate on
Neutral in the initial protocol study (IAPS #2411 – 71.43% agreement on Neutral).
Table 3.2 below gives the IAPS identifier codes (where applicable) for images as they
were paired and used to create test trials in the dot probe task. Images in a given pair were
sized at 307px x 230px and placed 200px apart. In keeping with trial-level parameters
optimized in previous anxiety-related studies using pictorial dot probe tasks (e.g. Zvielli,



The pairing of target stimuli with unique neutral stimuli is conventional for dot probe tasks, in order to retain
as far as possible the capacity for detecting any potential stimuli-specific effects at trial-level.
+
Clerical note: Where experimental stimuli are described within manuscripts in subsequent chapters (4 to 6), the
following phrase recurs: “two neutral images were sourced from free online stock photo databases and are
available upon request”. The two neutral images refer to Stock Photo 1 and Stock Photo 2 in Appendix F.
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Bernstein, & Koster, 2014; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004), each trial on the current dot
probe task began with a fixation cross (500ms) followed by the presentation of a stimulus
pair (500ms). A probe (i.e. a dot) then quickly replaced either the stimulus on the left or right
(see Figure 2 below for an illustration of a trial-level sequence). Each emotional-neutral
stimulus pair was repeated 4 times across the current dot probe task, so that there were 24
trials per emotional-neutral condition (12 social, 12 non-social), and 72 emotional-neutral
trials summed across fear-neutral, sad-neutral, and happy-neutral conditions. Emotionalneutral trials were fully counterbalanced with regards to the position of the emotional
stimulus (left or right), and whether the probe replaced the emotional or neutral stimulus (i.e.
equal number of congruent and incongruent trials).
Additionally, there were 8 training trials and 40 neutral-neutral trials. The 8 training
trials were created using pairs of non-social stimuli identified as Neutral with agreement rates
above 70% in the protocol study presented in Section 3.2, but did not appear in the main dot
probe task. The 40 neutral-neutral filler trials were created with ten unique stimulus pairs:
Five of the ten stimulus pairs were cross-pairings of the 9 non-social neutral images which
appeared in the main task, and the other five were cross-pairings of the 9 neutral social
images which appeared in the main task (see Table 3.2; note that the “Target” heading carries
no meaning for neutral-neutral stimulus pairs). These trials were interspersed among
emotional-neutral trials as a means of minimizing the risk of habituation to target stimuli, as
mentioned in the first paragraph of this section (see Klein, de Voogd, Wiers, & Salemink,
2018; Lisk, Pile, Haller, Kumari, & Lau, 2018 for similar procedures). The four types of trials
in the main task (24 fear-neutral, 24 sad-neutral, 24-happy-neutral, and 40 neutral-neutral
filler trials) appeared in completely randomised order in each session.
The dot probe task was programmed using Psytoolkit (www.psytoolkit.org), a data
collection platform which allows for questionnaires and behavioural measures (e.g. reaction
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time-based tasks) to be administered within the same web browser in a single survey.

Table 3.2. IAPS identifier codes (where applicable) for images as they were paired and used
to create dot probe trials. Each stimulus pair was repeated 4 times across the task, so there
were 112 trials in total (72 emotional-neutral and 40 neutral-neutral).
Stimulus Pair

IAPS Identifier Code
Target

Fear-Neutral

Social

Non-Social

Sad-Neutral

Social

Non-Social

Happy-Neutral

Social

Non-Social

Neutral

2770

Stock Photo 1

6250

Stock Photo 2

6370

7550

1120

7185

1930

7500

5971

7705

2141

2440

2205

2575

2900

2745.1

9184

7050

9340

7080

9561

7187

2340

2383

2347

2393

8461

2396

1463

7036

1710

5471
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Neutral-Neutral

Social

Non-social

7492

7041

Stock Photo 1

Stock Photo 2

2440

2396

2575

2745.1

2383

2393

7550

Stock Photo 2

5471

7500

7185

7187

7050

7080

7036

7041

7705

7500

Figure 3.2. Illustration of a trial-level sequence. A congruent trial is shown here (probe
replaces the emotional stimulus).
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Foreword to Empirical Chapters: Overview of Data Collection and Allocation
The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link in the context of a research
program extending from that of the information-processing approach. Specifically, one where
the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by considering ABT as an
indirect or component predictor of anxiety. The following third variables were targeted in
three separate studies centred around the ABT-anxiety link: attentional bias for positive
information (Study 1, Chapter 4), loneliness (Study 2, Chapter 5), and neurocognitive
functioning across a comprehensive, standardised test battery (Study 3, Chapter 6).
Data collection for the three targeted empirical studies (approved by the institution’s
human research ethics committee) occurred in two phases, with data collected in the second
phase intended to address research questions pertaining specifically to Study 3. The presently
employed sampling strategy was aligned with guidelines for research specified as part of the
RDoC initiative, namely that “sampling should be designed to ensure a broad range of scores
in each dimension of theoretical and experimental interest” (Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016). In
keeping with these guidelines, convenience (i.e. unselective) sampling methods were applied
in recruitment procedures across both data collection phases. The first phase was an online
study (conducted via Psytoolkit; www.psytoolkit.org), where participants completed the dot
probe task described in Section 3.3, the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, 1996), and the
Depression, Stress, and Anxiety Scales (DASS-21; S. Lovibond, S. & P. Lovibond, 1995a).
Thus, measures of ABT, positive attentional bias, loneliness and anxiety (i.e. the DASS-21
Anxiety subscale)* were obtained in this online study. Beyond basic demographics, measures

*

The present thesis focuses on mechanisms which underpin features common across the range of formally
recognised anxiety-spectrum disorders (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2). The DASS-21 Anxiety subscale was
developed to capture the core symptoms of anxiety (S. Lovibond & P. Lovibond, 1995b), and scores have been
shown to be elevated across anxiety diagnoses of all types (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998;
Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997). The DASS-21 Anxiety subscale was thus reasoned to be
appropriate for capturing the shared outcome variable of interest across the empirical studies of the current
thesis.
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which may be important to control for in investigations on the ABT-anxiety link were also
considered in the design of this online study, so that data on participants’ psychiatric history
(i.e. whether they had ever been diagnosed with an affective disorder) and drug use
(prescribed and recreational) was also obtained. There were two main sites where participants
were approached for this online study: (1) locally, via the University of Wollongong, School
of Psychology research participant scheme, and (2) remotely, via the online platform Reddit
using the r/SampleSize channel (or “sub-reddit”) designated to connect researchers and
research volunteers†. In total, 647 participants (471 local university students) completed the
online study (i.e. the first phase).
In the second phase primarily intended to collect data for Study 3 (i.e. measures of
neurocognitive functioning), participants who completed the first phase were invited via
email to attend an in-person laboratory testing session at the University of Wollongong. 100
individuals participated in this laboratory testing session, and received either course credit
points or a $20 shopping gift card for their time. Data linked to these 100 individuals were
removed casewise from the online dataset (N = 647) to uniquely inform Study 3. Data from
the remaining 547 participants was then broken up as they were ordered (according to
date/time of completion) to create the samples for Study 1 (N = 270) and Study 2 (N = 277)‡,
where relevant study variables were extracted to address separate research questions on the
ABT-anxiety link involving the role of positive attentional bias and loneliness respectively.
The measures and sub-samples mentioned in this section are characterised in detail within the
studies they inform in Chapters 4 to 6.

Based on previous research (Jamnik & Lane, 2017; Shatz, 2016) and the candidate’s own experience,
recruitment using this platform reliably produces quality data from individuals genuinely interested in making a
contribution to scientific progress.
‡
Data allocation procedures for the current thesis were selected to avoid feeding the same dataset through
multiple statistical analyses (i.e. to reduce the risk of Type I error inflation).
†
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Chapter 4: Positive Attentional Biases Moderate the Link between Attentional
Bias for Threat and Anxiety*

*

The manuscript presented in this chapter (Section 4.1) is published as:

Wei, M., Roodenrys, S., & Miller, L. (2020). Positive Attentional Biases Moderate the Link
between Attentional Bias for Threat and Anxiety. Current Psychology. doi:
10.1007/s12144-021-01448-6
The PDF version of the manuscript as it has been published is presented in Appendix G.
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4.1. Manuscript
Abstract
Attentional bias for threat (ABT) has been implicated as a central mechanism
underpinning anxiety. However, documented inconsistencies in the link between ABT and
anxiety do not support a purely psychopathological view of ABT. While ABT is thought to
be concomitant with the tendency to be less attentive to positive stimuli, neuroimaging
evidence for the functional independence of positive and negative information-processing
systems suggests this need not be the case. This may hold important implications for
understanding the inconsistently observed ABT-anxiety link. To this end, the current study
examined whether qualitative differences in positive attentional biases captured on a dot
probe task would moderate the association between ABT and anxiety (N = 232). Findings
indicated that ABT (indexed within the same task) was associated with self-reported anxiety
only among persons characterised by an attentional bias away from positive stimuli, but not
those characterised by an attentional bias towards positive stimuli. However, positive
attentional biases did not independently predict anxiety, suggesting this selective association
occurred against a backdrop of individuals experiencing similar levels of anxiety. Present
findings hold implications for the design of behavioural training programs which target
anxiety though the reduction of ABT, and emphasise the complex origins of anxiety.
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Introduction
Attentional bias for threat (ABT), or the tendency to orient more quickly towards cues
which convey potential threat in preference to more benign information in the environment
(Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016), has been implicated as a central
mechanism involved in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety-related conditions (BarHaim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Beck & Clark,
1997; Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews
& Mackintosh, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). This habitual pattern of
attentional deployment is thought to favour the encoding of negative information, resulting in
the cascade of cognitive, affective, and physiological symptoms at the core of anxiety-related
conditions (MacLeod et al., 1986). Research in experimental psychology has provided some
support for this theoretical link, demonstrating across a range of behavioural measures that
individuals with elevated levels of anxiety are indeed quicker to detect negatively-valenced
words (e.g. Clarke, Hart, & MacLeod, 2013), faces (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de
Bono, 1999; Staugaard, 2009), and scenes (e.g. Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2014) compared
to neutral counterparts (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007 for a seminal review). More recently,
selected behavioural measures have been adapted for use in clinical practice. Attentional bias
modification training (ABMT) programs seek to alleviate anxiety through the reduction of
ABT over multiple computerised training sessions (Mogg & Bradley, 2016), and are
prominent in efforts to improve the efficacy of extant interventions for anxiety (Bar-Haim et
al., 2007; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015; Mogg, Waters, & Bradley, 2017).
Yet, inconsistencies in the association between ABT and anxiety have also been
highlighted in the empirical literature that do not seem readily explainable by a purely
psychopathological view of ABT. Although such complexities are evident across various
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measures of ABT, the current study is framed in terms of the visual probe detection task
(often used interchangeably with dot probe task).While alternative procedures are available to
assess ABT (some with advantages over the dot probe task), ABMT relies heavily on
therapeutic variants of this instrument (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Koster & Bernstein, 2015;
MacLeod & Clarke, 2015; Mogg & Bradley, 2016; Stout, Shackman, & Larson, 2013), and
research conducted witihn this paradigm can help to facilitate the comparability and
translability of findings. Each trial on the dot probe task involves the brief presentation
(typically 500 ms) of an emotional stimulus alongside a competing neutral stimulus, where
either the emotional or neutral stimulus is then replaced by a dot (i.e. a probe). Participants
are tasked to indicate via keyboard press the location of this probe (left or right) as quickly as
possible.1 Studies using the dot probe task typically find that anxious individuals are on
average faster to indicate the location of probes which replace negatively-valenced stimuli
than those which replace neutral stimuli (Barry, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2015; Bradley et al.,
1999; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992; Staugaard, 2009; Wirth & Wentura, 2017; Zvielli
et al., 2014), a pattern of behavioural responding thought to represent the expression of ABT.
However, where group-comparison designs have been utilised, results indicate that anxious
individuals do not always differ in ABT from healthy controls (Mogg et al., 1992; Staugaard,
2009; Wirth &Wentura, 2017). Although such results are often interpreted as null findings of
ABT in anxiety, they may just as plausibly be taken to suggest that ABT can sometimes
manifest among healthy individuals. That is, ABT can also occur in the relative absence of
psychopathology, and so do not always indicate the presence of underlying psychological
conditions including anxiety. Further, correlational analyses have yielded mixed findings on
whether indices of ABT vary dose-dependently with anxiety severity. Inconsistent

1

Assessment and therapeutic variants of the dot probe task differ primarily in the frequency with which the
probe replaces the competing, non-emotional stimulus.
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associations between ABT and anxiety have been observed in subclinical samples (Fox,
Cahill, & Zougkou, 2010; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), and do not
appear to be better explained by issues of range restriction with inconsistent associations
persisting in clinical samples (Abend et al., 2018; Miloff, Savva, & Carlbring, 2015) range of
anxiety. Thus, the psychopathological status of ABT seems to vary even among individuals
with elevated levels of anxiety.
The emergent notion that ABT can exist in an individual without contributing to
anxiety makes sense from an evolutionary point of view, which acknowledges that ABT can
also be expressed as a benign, adaptive function (Barry et al., 2015; Wirth & Wentura, 2017).
In keeping with this line of thought, several studies have examined circumstantial or
situational moderators of the association between ABT and anxiety, including the role of
cognitive load (Berggren, Richards, Taylor, & Derakshan, 2013; MacNamara & Proudfit,
2014) and controllability of experimentally-manipulated danger (Notebaert, Tilbrook, Clarke,
& MacLeod, 2017; Notebaert et al., 2020). The association between indices of ABT and
anxiety seems to be apparent only at high but not low cognitive load (Berggren et al., 2013;
MacNamara & Proudfit, 2014), suggesting that the anxiogenic effects of ABT may act
conditionally upon heightened states of arousal arising from increased task demands. In a
series of experiments by Notebaert and co-authors (Notebaert et al., 2017; Notebaert et al.,
2020), participants performed a digit identification task accompanied by threat of unexpected
noise bursts, under conditions where they were offered strategies they could use to offset the
noise burst (mitigation condition) or were not (no-mitigation condition). The association
between ABT and anxiety was attenuated in the latter condition compared to the former,
suggesting that ABT under conditions where aversive stimuli cannot be removed may be
adaptive more so than anxiogenic. To date however, little work has been done to understand
the individual-difference factors which may moderate the psychopathological status of ABT,
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or the relationship between ABT and anxiety. Relative to circumstantial or situational factors,
a better understanding of individual-level factors which moderate the ABT-anxiety link offers
leverage in helping to develop ways of optimising treatment protocol and screening
procedures in ABMT. The current study represents a starting point in filling this gap in
research.
A common assumption across theoretical models of the ABT-anxiety link is such that
ABT operates within an attentional system with limited resources, and thus at the expense of
processing more positive information in the environment (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck &
Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988).
However, findings from brain imaging studies do not seem to support such a bipolar
conceptualisation of human emotional attention. That is, dissociable brain regions are
recruited during the visual processing of unpleasant compared to pleasant words (Kensinger
& Schacter, 2006; Kuchinke et al., 2005), faces (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Tatham,
Schmidt, Beaton, Schulkin, & Hall, 2013), or scenes (Gerdes et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2015),
suggesting that processing capacities for negative and positive information may be distinctly
modulated. Thus, an individual who habitually orients to negative information (i.e. expresses
ABT) is not necessarily more likely to ignore positive stimuli which may be present in the
environment. This notion may hold important implications for understanding inconsistencies
documented of the ABT-anxiety link as previously described. According to the broaden-andbuild theory of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001), persons with a broader scope of visual
attention also experience more positive emotions, which in turn serves to undo or correct the
lingering effects of aversive emotional experiences (undoing hypothesis; Fredrickson,
Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000). By extension, it is possible that persons who do not
discount positive stimuli in their environment (i.e. persons with a more inclusive scope of
visual attention) may be buffered against the potential anxiogenic consequences of ABT. In
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support of this notion, studies have found that training individuals to attend to positive stimuli
produces decreases in self-reported anxiety (Taylor, Bomyea, & Amir, 2011; Li, Tan, Qian,
& Liu, 2008), although the hypothesis that positive attentional bias may moderate the
association between ABT and anxiety has yet to be explicitly tested. Within the context of a
probe detection task, the current study examined the role of positive attentional bias in the
ABT-anxiety link. It was hypothesised that the association between ABT and anxiety would
be stronger among persons characterised by diminished attention to positive stimuli
(attentional bias away from positive stimuli), relative to those characterised by intact
attentional processing of positive stimuli (attentional bias towards positive stimuli).
One methodological consideration worth noting in the present study relates to the
increasing acceptance that naturalistic scenes may offer more ecologically valid ways to
represent threat, compared to words and disembodied faces (Sagliano, Trojano, Amoriello,
Migliozzi, & D’Olimpio, 2014; Zvielli et al., 2014), with danger- (e.g. snakes, an aimed gun)
and loss-related pictures (e.g. injured animals, grieving persons) emerging as commonly
used themes in the emotion-elicitation literature. Although these negatively-valenced scenes
are often undifferentiated in terms of threat value, the two classes of stimuli relate more
closely to qualitatively different emotions of fear and sadness, and differ in the immediacy
and likelihood of threat they convey (Kveraga et al., 2015). Given most theories of the ABTanxiety link propose that psychopathological expressions of ABT have their roots in
exaggerated perceptions of threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley et al.,
1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988), it is possible that attentional
biases for sadness- and fear-related scenes may not be equally apparent at higher levels of
anxiety. Specifically, stimuli which portray mild threat (e.g. sadness-related scenes) may
offer greater sensitivity to anxiety in measures of attentional bias, relative to stimuli which
portray high threat (e.g. fear-related scenes) (Mogg et al., 2000). In light of these
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considerations, emotional-neutral trials presenting fear-neutral and sad-neutral stimulus pairs
were treated as separate experimental conditions, and used to derive separate indices of ABT.

Methods
Participants
Participants were 270 individuals (207 Female; Mean Age = 22.0, SD = 6.80)
unselected for anxiety, recruited from an undergraduate student population (65.4%) as well as
several community forums on the online platform Reddit designated for connecting
researchers and voluntary respondents (34.6%). Recruitment site (university vs. Reddit) did
not alter the pattern of findings as presented in the Results section. All data collection took
place remotely via the online platform Psytoolkit (www.psytoolkit.org). Informed consent to
participate was obtained using an online consent form.
Measures
Anxiety
Participants completed the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress scales (DASS-21)
(Lovibond, S. H., & Lovibond, P. F., 1995a). Scores on the Anxiety subscale of the DASS-21
were the main outcome variable of interest in the present study. This subscale was developed
to capture the range of core symptoms of anxiety (Lovibond, S. H., & Lovibond, P. F.,
1995b), and responses have been shown to be temporally stable and suitable for capturing
trait-like syndromes (Gomez, Summers, Summers, Wolf, & Summers, 2014; Jafari, Nozari,
Ahrari, & Bagheri, 2017; Lovibond, 1998; Lu et al., 2018). On a scale of 0 (did not apply to
me) to 3 (applied to me much or most of the time), participants responded to items such as “I
was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself”. Scores on
the DASS-21 Anxiety subscale can range from 0 to 21. Participants also completed the
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Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a brief
questionnaire which asks participants to “Indicate [on a scale of 1-5] to what extent you feel
this way right now, that is, at the present moment” for 20 emotional adjectives (10 positive
emotions and 10 negative emotions). The PANAS contains 4 anxiety-related adjectives
(Scared, Nervous, Jittery, Afraid); these ratings were used to examine the characteristics of
outliers in the main analyses of the current study. Previous research has highlighted that
mechanisms of psychopathology may differ between clinically and non-clinically anxious
individuals (Yiend et al., 2015; Unterrainer et al., 2018). As an intended control variable to
ensure observed findings from main analyses were generalizable across the severity
continuum of anxiety, participants also reported on whether they had been clinically
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder.
Attentional bias
An extended dot probe task, presented after measures of anxiety were completed, was
used to assess attentional biases for negative/threat-related stimuli (Fear and Sad scenes) and
positive stimuli (Happy scenes). Each trial on the dot probe task began with a fixation cross
(500 ms) followed by the presentation of an emotional-neutral stimulus pair on opposite sides
of the screen (500 ms). A probe (i.e. a dot) then quickly replaced either the emotional or
neutral scene. Participants were tasked to indicate the location of the probe as quickly as
possible via a keyboard press (‘E’ for left, and ‘I’ for right). Trials where responses were not
received within 2000 ms were automatically considered incorrect and excluded from further
analyses. Figure 4.1 presents an illustration of a trial-level sequence.
There were four types of trials, appearing in a completely randomised order for each
participant: 24 fear-neutral, 24 sad-neutral, 24-happy-neutral, and 40 neutral-neutral filler
trials. The current study examined the emotional-neutral trials. Emotional-neutral trials were
fully counterbalanced with regards to the position of the emotional stimulus (left of right),
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and whether the probe replaced the emotional or neutral stimulus. The 24 trials for each
emotional-neutral condition were created using six unique image pairs repeated four times
across the experiment. Images used (resized to approx. 307 x 230 px) were predominantly
drawn from the International Affective Pictures System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
2008) and pre-validated for their emotional content in a pilot study (Wei, Roodenrys, Miller,
& Barkus, 2020)2. Content featured in exemplars from each image category was as follows:
Fear – predatory animals, person holding an aimed gun; Sad – injured animals, grieving
persons; Happy – enticing desserts, celebratory events; Neutral – furniture, buildings. For
each emotional-neutral stimulus pairing, both images either consistently featured human
persons or did not. Standardised valence ratings from the IAPS norming study for emotional
images (Fear: M = 3.50, SD = .63; Sad: M = 2.40, SD = .24; Happy: M = 7.30, SD = .45)
significantly differed from that of neutral images (M = 5.03, SD = 26) and from each other, p
< .001 for all pairwise comparisons. Standardised arousal ratings from the IAPS norming
study for emotional images (Fear: M = 6.35, SD = .63; Sad: M = 5.05, SD = .41; Happy: M =
5.07, SD = ..39) significantly differed from that of neutral images (M = 3.05, SD = .54). At pthreshold of .05, pairwise comparisons were significant for Fear-Sad and Fear-Happy
comparisons, but not the Happy-Sad comparison.

Figure 4.1. Illustration of a trial-level sequence. A congruent trial is shown here (probe
replaces the emotional stimulus).

IAPS identification codes for images used in emotional-neutral trials: Fear – 1120, 1930, 5971, 2770, 6250,
6370; Sad – 9184, 9340, 9561, 2141, 2205, 2900; Happy – 1463, 1710, 7492, 8461, 2340, 2347; Neutral – 5471,
7036, 7041, 7185, 7500, 7705, 7550, 7050, 7080, 7187, 2440, 2575, 2745.1, 2383, 2393, 2396. Two neutral
images were sourced from free online stock photo databases and are available upon request. All pictures used
were assigned a common emotional label by > 75% of raters (Wei et al., 2020).
2
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Data Preparation and Analyses
Fear, Sad, and Happy bias scores were derived by subtracting mean reaction times
(RTs) for correct responses on congruent trials (probe replaces emotional stimulus) from
mean RTs for correct responses on incongruent trials (probe replaces neutral stimulus).
Within the dot probe paradigm, diminished attention for positive information is thought to
manifest in an attentional bias away from positive stimuli, or overall faster responses to
probes replacing neutral stimuli (Winer & Salem, 2016). In contrast, an attentional bias
towards positive stimuli (overall faster responses to positive compared to neutral stimuli) is
considered the normative response pattern to naturally rewarding stimuli (i.e. indicative of
intact attentional processing of positive stimuli; Winer & Salem, 2016). To form the two
groups of individuals characterised by attentional biases towards and away from positive
stimuli (i.e. Positive bias group, the moderating variable of interest), participants were
classified according to whether they had Happy bias scores above and below zero
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respectively3. Fear and Sad bias scores were used as continuous indices of ABT. A three-step
hierarchical regression was conducted with diagnostic history entered in the first step, Fear
bias score, Sad bias score, and Positive bias group in the second step, and the interaction
terms between the two ABT indices and Positive bias group in the third step4. Sad and Fear
bias scores were mean-centred prior to being entered in the analysis or used to compute
interaction terms. Significant interaction effects were followed up with simple slope analyses
in the two Positive bias groups.

Results
Ten participants achieved less than 75% accuracy on the dot probe task and were
removed from further analyses, in keeping with first-line exclusion criterion used in previous
studies (Britton et al., 2015; White et al., 2016). Accuracy rates on the dot probe task among
the remaining 260 participants were high (M = 97.6%, SD = 2.64). 118 participants were
characterised by an attentional bias towards positive stimuli (Happy bias score > 0; M =
26.33, SD = 31.47) while 142 participants were characterised by an attentional bias away
from positive stimuli (Happy bias score < 0; M = -27.81, SD = 35.60).
Outliers for the hierarchical regression analysis to predict DASS-21 Anxiety were
classified at a threshold of Cook’s distance values of 4/n, separately in the two Positive bias
groups as recommended for predictive analyses with categorical moderators (Tay, Parrigon,
Huang, & LeBreton, 2016; Wang & Ware, 2013). This criterion identified 28 participants as

3

Although continuous data for Happy bias score was presently available, a decision was made to treat the
moderating variable as categorical (i.e. qualitatively different Positive bias groups; towards and away) to
facilitate ease of interpretation and integration with extant literature (Bradley et al., 1999; Ioannou, Mogg, &
Bradley, 2004; Bradley et al., 1998; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004).
4
This model was also tested with an extreme groups approach to Positive bias group (i.e. with persons with
Happy bias scores between -5 and +5 removed from analyses). Results did not differ from that observed with
Positive bias group as presently demarcated.
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extreme influencers of model parameters. Removal of these outliers affected results of the
planned regression analysis; specifically, the statistical significance of the Sad bias score x
Positive bias group interaction term in Step 3 was altered from non-significant to significant
at p-threshold of .05. Excluded participants had higher DASS-21 Anxiety (MDifference = 5.94)
and Fear bias scores (MDifference = 19.02) than the final sample, t(258) = -8.11, p = .000 and
t(258) = -2.38, p = .018 respectively.5 Results based on data with outliers removed (final
sample N = 232) are subsequently reported. Mean RT for the emotional-neutral trials which
were used to calculate bias indices (RTincongruent – RTcongruent) are presented in Table 4.1. For
each trial type, reaction times on trials where probes were presented on the left and where
probes were presented on the right were consolidated separately. Cronbach’s alpha for
reaction times on left- and right-replacing probes was > .7 across trial types (see Table 4.1),
suggesting that probe location did not confound congruency effects. Descriptives for study
variables are presented in Table 2.
Multicollinearity did not present an issue for the targeted hierarchical regression
analysis (see Table 4.2). Of note, only the Sad bias score but not the Fear bias score was
independently correlated with DASS-21 Anxiety6. The inverse nature of the association
between Sad bias score and DASS-21 Anxiety (r = -.135, p = .04) suggests that increasing
attentional avoidance of sadness-related scenes (i.e. faster reaction times to probes replacing
competing neutral scenes) was associated with higher levels of anxiety (see Applehans &

5

The following variables were also tested and did not yield significant group differences between retained and
excluded participants: Age, Gender, Diagnostic history, Positive bias group, and Sad bias score. However, on
the PANAS, excluded participants (compared to retained participants) did indicate higher current-state ratings
on all anxiety-related items: Scared, t(258) = 6.09, MDifference = 1.11; Nervous, t(258) = 4.62, MDifference = 1.07;
Jittery, t(258) = 2.62, MDifference = .53, and Afraid, t(258) = 4.35, MDifference = .81, p < .001 for all tests.
6
Given known relationships between attentional biases for sadness-related information and depressive
syndromes, the correlation between the Sad bias score and DASS-21 Depression scores available on hand was
also examined. The null finding (r = -.04, p = .51) supports the specificity of the Sad bias score association with
anxiety, and corroborates the broader literature on the distinct time course of attentional biases in anxiety and
depression (see Mogg & Bradley, 2005 for a review).
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Luecken, 2006; Putman, 2011 for similar findings). Upon initial consideration, these findings
appear to contradict the understanding that anxiety is associated with facilitated orienting of
attention towards threat-related stimuli (Cisler et al., 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016).
However, according to one model of ABT in anxiety (Vigilance-Avoidance Hypothesis;
Mogg et al., 2004), anxious individuals may first orient quickly to a threat stimulus during
initial exposure but after detection, avoid it. When eye movements of anxious individuals are
tracked during dot probe task performance, findings have indicated a pattern of gaze aversion
following initial gaze fixation on the threat stimulus when supraliminal presentation times (>
200 ms) are used (Rinck & Becker, 2006; Wieser., Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Mühlberger,
2009). These findings support the possibility that facilitated attentional orientation towards
threat stimuli may be implicit within attentional avoidance of threat stimuli as observed on
behavioural indices using the dot probe task (Barry et al., 2015; Booth, 2014; Williams et al.,
1988). Accordingly, the presently observed inverse association between Sad bias score and
DASS-21 Anxiety does not necessarily contradict the understanding that anxiety is associated
with facilitated orienting of attention towards threat-related stimuli, although more definitive
conclusions cannot be drawn without the availability of eye-tracking measures in the current
study7. This point is relevant to keep in mind for subsequent discourse on outcomes (nature
of β coefficients) of the planned hierarchical regression analysis (results in Table 4.3). After
controlling for the presence of a clinically diagnosed anxiety disorder (diagnostic history),
Sad bias score significantly predicted DASS-21 Anxiety in the second step of the hierarchical
regression analysis (β = -.147, p = .020) but Fear bias score (β = -.022, p = .73) and Positive
bias group (β = .003, p = .97) did not. When the interaction terms for Fear bias score x

7

Readers should be aware that the current interpretation of absolute correlation coefficients (rather than
direction of the relationship) represents a post-hoc solution for understanding the presently observed association
between indices of ABT and anxiety, and that not all researchers agree that the direction of association between
indices of ABT and anxiety can be discounted (e.g. Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2014; Morales, Pérez-Edgar, &
Buss, K. A., 2015).
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Positive bias group and Sad bias score x Positive bias group were included in the model in
Step 3, Sad bias score remained a significant predictor of DASS-21 Anxiety, β = -.523, p =
.006. Additionally, the Sad bias score x Positive bias group interaction was significant, β =
.399, p = .035.
To follow up this interaction effect, Sad bias score was regressed on DASS-21
Anxiety separately in the two Positive bias subgroups, retaining diagnostic history as a
control variable. As illustrated by different steepness of slopes in Figure 4.2, Sad bias score
predicted DASS-21 Anxiety in those characterised by an attentional bias away from positive
stimuli [β = -.259, t(129) = -3.03, p = .003], but not those characterised by an attentional bias
towards positive stimuli [β = .058, t(103) = 0.582, p = .562].
Table 4.1. Mean RTs [SD] and Reliability Estimates for Emotional-Neutral Trials Used to
Calculate Bias Indices
Mean [SD]

Cronbach’s Alpha

Sad-Neutral

413.99 [74.28]

.724

Fear-Neutral

417.78 [75.38]

.816

Happy-Neutral

414.28 [69.98]

.824

Sad-Neutral

416.70 [72.31]

.826

Fear-Neutral

418.62 [68.54]

.838

Happy-Neutral

418.51 [69.55]

.751

Incongruent

Congruent

Table 4.2. Means and Correlations (r) of Study Variables
Mean [SD]

1

2

3

4

5
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DASS-21
1

3.49 [3.04]

-

.315**

-.135*

-.045

.005

-

-

-

.044

-.050

-.029

-2.70 [37.96]

-

-

-

.050

-.093

-0.840 [35.99]

-

-

-

-

.084

-

-

-

-

-

Anxiety
Diagnostic
History
2
[NPositive =
55 (23.7%)]
Sad bias
3
score
Fear bias
4
score
Happy bias score

Positive bias

Overall

Bias

Bias

sample

Towards

Away

5
group

(N=232)

(N=103) (N=129)

-4.24

24.25

-26.98

[41.47]

[29.79]

[34.97]
*p < .05; **p < .01

Table 4.3. Moderated Regression Analysis Predicting DASS-21 Anxiety
Variable

β

Step 1
Diagnostic history

ΔR2

F

.099

-

25.25**

.121

.022

7.85**

.315**

Step 2
Diagnostic history

R2

.320**
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Fear bias score

-.022

Sad bias score

-.147*

Positive bias group

.003

Step 3
Diagnostic history

.139

.017

6.05**

.311**

Fear bias score

-.049

Sad bias score

-.523**

Positive bias group

.008

Fear bias score x Positive bias group

.018

Sad bias score x Positive bias group

.399*
β = Standardised coefficients
*p < .05; **p < .01

Figure 4.2. Simple slope analyses for interactive effects between Sad bias score and Positive
bias group on DASS-21 Anxiety. Sad bias score significantly predicted DASS-21 Anxiety
only for the Bias Away group. The inverse nature of this association should not be
understood as counterintuitive (see narrative in Results section)
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Discussion
Within the context of an extended dot probe task involving both negative-neutral and
positive-neutral trials, the current study examined whether attentional biases towards and
away from positive stimuli would moderate the association between ABT and anxiety.
Several observations secondary to the main investigation are worth noting upfront. First, the
number of outliers identified in the main analysis of interest was unusually high (N = 28)
despite the use of standard diagnostic criteria. Participants identified as outliers (and removed
from analyses) were characterised by higher levels of self-reported anxiety and bias scores
for fear-related scenes relative to the final sample. As supported by elevated ratings on
anxiety-related items on the PANAS (see Footnote 5), this profile may point to a subgroup of
individuals experiencing acute anxiety (Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994; Ortega, Jiménez
Solanilla, & Acosta, 2015), to whom current findings may not generalise. Second, between
the two bias scores (Fear and Sad) which were tested as indices of ABT, only the Sad bias
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score yielded significant associations with anxiety. In the remainder of the discussion, ABT
denotes patterns of attentional deployment to sadness-related scenes. Fear-related scenes,
including those presently employed, typically features situations which arguably convey
information about actual, unambiguous sources of danger (e.g. person wielding a gun).
Heightened attentional responding to such information may represent an adaptive process
which occurs independently of anxiety. Conversely, sadness-related scenes (including those
presently employed) typically feature situations where harm has ostensibly already occurred
(e.g. grieving persons, injured animals). Heightened attentional responding to such
information may favour the encoding of threat which may not be immediately or personally
relevant, setting the individual up to experience the world as an inherently unsafe place (i.e. a
key feature of anxiety; Hazlett-Stevens, 2008). Thus, the present observation appears in line
with theoretical reasoning that psychopathological expressions of ABT are rooted in
exaggerated perceptions of ambiguous threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997;
Bradley et al., 1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988). It has previously
been highlighted that qualitative differences between classes of negatively-valenced material
may be important to consider in research on the association between ABT and anxiety (Calvo
& Avero, 2005; Calvo & Lang, 2004), a sentiment echoed by current findings.
In relation to the main investigation, it was observed that the association between
ABT and anxiety was not equivalent between persons characterised by attentional biases
towards and away from positive stimuli. Inconsistencies in the ABT-anxiety link have been
documented in previous research (Abend et al., 2018; Bradley et al., 1999; Fox et al., 2010;
Koster et al., 2004; Miloff et al., 2015; Mogg et al., 1992; Staugaard, 2009; Wirth &
Wentura, 2017; Zvielli et al., 2014), collectively giving reason to suggest that the
psychopathological status of ABT may not be homogeneous across all individuals. Present
findings support this notion, and further add that positive attentional biases may be one factor
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which unmasks inter-individual differences in the association between ABT and anxiety.
More specifically, ABT predicted anxiety for persons characterised by an attentional bias
away from positive stimuli, but not those characterised by an attentional bias towards positive
stimuli. Current findings can be understood in light of the undoing hypothesis (Fredrickson et
al., 2000) within the broaden-and-build framework (Fredrickson, 2001), which gives rise to
the notion that persons with a broader scope of visual attention are better equipped at
regulating aversive emotional experiences. Specifically, current findings suggest that the
benefits of a scope of visual attention inclusive of positive stimuli may operate as a protective
factor against the potential anxiogenic consequences of heightened attentional responding to
negative stimuli.
It is also possible that persons characterised by an attentional bias towards positive
stimuli represent a subgroup of individuals for whom experiences of anxiety are less heavily
driven by external events. Laboratory-based measures of ABT such as the dot probe task are
thought to capture habitual patterns of attentional deployment towards classes of negative
stimuli as they occur in the physical world. However, many aspects of anxiety tend to
manifest in the absence of identifiable triggers in the immediate external environment (Stout
et al., 2013). Indeed, although ABT did not operate the same way in persons characterised by
attentional biases towards and away from positive stimuli, it was also presently observed that
Positive bias group did not independently predict differences in self-reported anxiety. That is,
the differential association between ABT and anxiety seems to have occurred against a
backdrop of individuals experiencing similar levels of anxiety. Rather than contradict the
information presented earlier, these observations serve to reinforce the notion that ABT is
neither necessary nor sufficient for symptoms of anxiety to occur (Van Bockstaele et al.,
2014). Relatedly, concerns have been raised over whether the near-exclusive focus on ABT
in efforts to improve the efficacy of extant interventions for anxiety may be too narrow a
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scope relative to the complex origins of the condition (Barry et al., 2015; Heeren & McNally,
2016; Roy, Dennis, & Warner, 2015; Staugaard, 2009). While the end goal in research and
practice should be to extend the range of clinically relevant variables which may be targeted
in the treatment and prevention of anxiety, present findings nonetheless have several
implications worth noting for the design of behavioural training programs which seek to
alleviate anxiety through the reduction of ABT (i.e. ABMT).
First, to discourage speeded orientation towards threat, most ABMT programs employ
dot probe tasks where attention is repeatedly cued away from negative stimuli. Specifically,
probes consistently replace the competing stimulus paired alongside a negative stimulus
across trials (Mogg et al., 2017). Such a procedure also simultaneously increases attention for
the competing class of stimuli being used (Klosowska, Blaut, & Paulewicz, 2015). Treatment
protocols using neutral competing stimuli (e.g. Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Britton
et al., 2015; Carleton et al., 2015; de Voogd et al., 2016; Klosowska et al., 2015) and positive
competing stimuli (e.g. Boettcher, Hasselrot, Sund, Andersson, & Carlbring, 2014; Boettcher
et al., 2013; Lisk, Pile, Haller, Kumari, & Lau, 2018; Yang et al., 2017) have been employed
to this end. Current findings suggest that increasing attention for positive information may
not directly reduce anxiety but may help reduce the potential anxiogenic consequences of
ABT, and thus support the use of the latter protocol in favour of the former. Second, where
the presence of ABT and/or anxiety at baseline may not suffice to identify individuals more
likely to benefit from ABMT, present results suggest that positive attentional biases may
represent a useful tertiary variable by which suitable candidates may be discerned in
treatment selection procedures.
Findings of the present study should be interpreted in light of several limitations.
Firstly, as earlier mentioned, outliers removed from present analyses were characterised by
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higher levels of self-reported anxiety and bias scores for fear-related scenes. Although this
profile corresponds to that of individuals experiencing acute, transient, anxiety (Mogg et al.,
1994; Ortega et al., 2015; see also Footnote 5), the same indices have also been shown to
differentiate clinically anxious individuals in more severe stages of the disorder from
counterparts in remission (Mogg et al., 1992). Although present analyses were controlled for
presence of a clinically diagnosed affective disorder, this does not preclude the possibility
that current findings may not generalise to the full clinical population of anxious individuals
in various stages of the disorder. Treatment/clinical status should be considered as an
additional control variable in future research. Secondly, data collection occurred remotely, so
that participants completed the dot probe task within an environment of their own choosing.
While such a procedure may be advantageous where ecological validity is the end goal, it
may also limit the comparability of present findings with studies where dot probe data was
collected within controlled laboratory settings. Thirdly, the cross-sectional nature of the
present study limits causal inferences, and also meant that attentional biases were measured at
a single time-point. Repeated assessments over several measurement sessions may provide a
clearer picture of stable individual differences in patterns of attentional deployment to classes
of emotional stimuli. Finally, while the current study relied on the traditional computational
formula for dot probe bias scores (i.e. RTincongruent – RTcongruent), recent developments in
research have highlighted reliability advantages of novel computational methods (e.g.
Attention Bias Variability and Trial Level Bias Score; Kruijt, Field. & Fox, 2016; Zvielli,
Bernstein, & Koster, 2015). Where negative associations were presently observed between
indices of ABT and anxiety, the claim that the association reflects a relationship between
heightened attentional orientation and anxiety had to be drawn based on assumptions about
underlying processes which had elapsed (i.e. that faster responses to probes replacing neutral
stimuli also entail that attention for threat-related stimuli was captured more quickly). Novel
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computational methods, bearing the advantage of segmenting between temporal expressions
of ABT, may help circumvent the need for such assumptions and should be considered in
future research.
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Chapter 5: The Role of Loneliness in the Association Between Attentional Bias for
Threat and Anxiety*
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5.1. Manuscript

Abstract
Objective: There is literature to suggest that anxious individuals may be lonely. Attentional
bias for threat (ABT), a mechanism implicated in the core symptoms of anxiety, has been
linked to loneliness in a separate line of work. The primary aim of this study was to examine
the role of loneliness in the association between ABT and anxiety.
Method: An unselected sample of 260 individuals (196 Female; Mean Age = 22.43)
completed measures of loneliness, ABT (a dot probe task), and anxiety. Two possible models
of the role of loneliness in the ABT-anxiety link were tested using hierarchical regression
analysis: (1) A moderation model (the ABT-anxiety link is moderated by loneliness), and (2)
A proxy model (the ABT-anxiety link is better explained by loneliness).
Results: In support of the latter model, ABT no longer predicted anxiety after the effects of
loneliness had been accounted for. Additionally, ABT was associated with anxiety only when
indexed using sadness-related scenes (but not fear-related scenes).
Conclusions: Loneliness may be one important source of exaggerated threat appraisals which
underpin the association between ABT and anxiety. Different classes of negative stimuli may
be differentially sensitive to anxiety and should be a point of consideration in future research.
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Introduction
Anxiety-related conditions represent one of the most commonly encountered forms of
psychopathology in mental health practice (Douglas & James, 2013). While formal
classification systems for mental disorders put forward distinct diagnostic categories for
different clusters of anxiety-related symptoms, there also exist core features and hence shared
mechanistic underpinnings across the range of formally recognized anxiety-spectrum
disorders (Bystritsky et al., 2013; Lang & McTeague, 2009). Attentional bias for threat
(ABT), or the tendency to orient more quickly to negative compared to neutral or more
positive stimuli (Cisler et al., 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016), is thought to favor the encoding
of threatening information and represents one mechanism which has been centrally
implicated in the core symptoms of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997;
Bradley et al., 1998; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al.,
1988). Research has indicated that traditional psychological interventions (e.g., cognitivebehavioral therapy) for anxiety-related issues produce only modest benefits (Carpenter et al.,
2018; Gould et al., 1997). These outcomes have in part been attributed to the implicit nature
of ABT, so that the heightened encoding of threatening information occurs on a level of
awareness below that required for talking therapies to be effective (Beard, 2011; MacLeod &
Mathews, 2012). Yet, contrary to expectations, novel interventions for anxiety which directly
target ABT through behavioral training methods have only been partially successful in
improving therapeutic outcomes (Mogg & Bradley, 2018; Mogg et al., 2017; Mogoaşe et al.,
2014). Collectively, these circumstances point to complexities beyond ABT in the
development and maintenance of anxiety, and the need for such complexities to be
recognized in research (Heeren & McNally, 2016). Specifically, these circumstances
highlight the need for research beyond investigations based on theoretical models of anxiety
which account solely for ABT.
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Studies on the cognitive and behavioral correlates of anxiety have highlighted several
ways in which interpersonal relations may be affected among anxious individuals. For
example, chronic worrying about a broad range of topics, a defining feature of anxiety
(Hirsch et al., 2013), has been associated with extended decision-making times (Masi et al.,
2004), heightened needs for reassurance (Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012), and a tendency to
interpret events in the worst possible light (Hayes et al., 2010). These behavioral dispositions
can make being in the presence of an anxious individual unpleasant (Newman & Erickson,
2010), and result in the attrition of social networks overtime. Indeed, anxious individuals
report having fewer friends than their non-anxious counterparts (Rapee & Melville, 1997;
Whisman et al., 2000). There is also evidence to suggest that subjective experiences of
interpersonal relations may be altered in anxiety. For example, anxious individuals report a
sense of being exploitable and helpless in the context of friendships (Eng & Heimberg, 2006),
and report lower levels of intimacy in their close relationships compared to non-anxious
counterparts (McLeod, 1994).
Loneliness describes a state of being where one’s needs for social connectedness are
not met (Perlman & Peplau, 1982). Given the evidence to suggest that both quantity and
quality of social connections may be compromised in anxiety, it stands to reason that anxious
individuals are also more likely to be lonely. To date however, no studies have examined
anxiety with a specific focus on loneliness, although anxiety has more broadly been identified
as one among the range of mental health conditions where symptom severity is positively
associated with loneliness (Richardson et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018). This paucity in
research is particularly surprising considering that lonely individuals also appear to be
characterized by habitual patterns of attentional deployment similar to that observed among
anxious individuals (Cacioppo et al., 2016, 2009; Shintel et al., 2006). For example, on a
modified Stroop task, lonely individuals were slower to name the color of negative words
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compared to positive words, and compared to their non-lonely counterparts (Shintel et al.,
2006). Further, during a simple viewing task, lonely individuals (compared to non-lonely
individuals) were characterized by greater brain activity when presented with unpleasant
images, and reduced brain activity in response to pleasant images (Cacioppo et al., 2009).
These findings suggest that negative information may capture attention more saliently among
lonely individuals, consistent with the definition of ABT as the tendency to orient more
quickly to negative compared to neutral or more positive stimuli. It is thought that loneliness
unwittingly increases one’s focus on self-preservation, which in turn entails an enhanced
perception of threat in the external world. Among lonely individuals, this enhanced
perception of threat is expressed in ABT (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; Cacioppo &
Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven et al., 2017).
The study of loneliness in anxiety has been limited, despite 1) evidence suggesting
that anxious individuals are more likely to be lonely and 2) ABT, an assumed core
mechanism involved in anxiety, being linked to loneliness in a separate line of work. To date,
ABT, loneliness, and anxiety have not been examined within the scope of the same study,
which the current research sought to do. Specifically, the current study sought to test two
conceptual models of the role of loneliness in the ABT-anxiety link.
First, loneliness may moderate the association between ABT and anxiety. As
described above, theoretical accounts of ABT observed among lonely individuals propose
that ABT is expressed as a secondary effect of loneliness (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018;
Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven et al., 2017). Thus, ABT is also likely to be more
extreme at higher levels of loneliness. By enhancing the magnitude of a qualitatively similar
mechanism, it is possible that the presence of loneliness may enhance the effects of ABT on
anxiety. Statistically, an association between ABT and anxiety might be more apparent at
higher levels of loneliness. If supported, this model could also lend insight to inconsistent
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findings on the association between ABT and anxiety which have been observed in previous
research (e.g., Abend et al., 2018; Fox et al., 2010; Koster et al., 2004; Miloff et al., 2015).
Alternatively, loneliness may play an explanatory role in the association between
ABT and anxiety. A proxy model (Kraemer et al., 2001) describes a third variable effect
where the relationship between a predictor variable A (ABT) and an outcome variable Y
(anxiety) is better explained by a third variable B (loneliness). Proxy models are statistically
similar to mediation models, but differentiated on conceptual grounds. While statistical
support for both models is inferred when the relationship between A and Y is reduced after
accounting for the effects of B on Y, proxy models do not assume causal precedence between
variables A and B (i.e. ABT need not causally precede loneliness). The notion that the
association between ABT and anxiety may not entirely reflect the direct effects of ABT is
first raised when ABT is considered from an evolutionary point of view. From this
perspective, being quicker to orient toward threats in the environment should serve an
adaptive function in the short-term, rather than result in anxiety over the long-term (Öhman,
2005; Öhman et al., 2001, 2012). Many theories of the ABT-anxiety link recognize this,
albeit tacitly, in proposing that anxiogenic effects of ABT are rooted in exaggerated
appraisals of threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 1998;
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988). Given that loneliness enhances
subjective perceptions of threat (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009;
Spithoven et al., 2017), and that anxiogenic effects of ABT may be rooted in exaggerated
appraisals of threat, it is possible that loneliness may exacerbate a driving mechanism in and
(at least in part) account for the relationship between ABT and anxiety. As existing literature
could theoretically support either of the two models just described, both were examined
without an a priori hypothesis favoring one model over the other.
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Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited via the research participation scheme at the School of
Psychology, University of Wollongong (New South Wales, Australia; N = 209), as well as
several community forums on the online Platform Reddit which connect researchers and
voluntary survey respondents (N = 68). Recruitment site (university vs. Reddit) did not alter
the pattern of findings as presented in the Results section. All data collection took place
remotely via the online platform Psytoolkit (www.psytoolkit.org). A total of 277 participants
(196 Female; Mean Age = 22.43, SD = 8.35) completed a behavioral measure of ABT (a dot
probe task), and self-report measures of loneliness and anxiety (described below).
Participants who did not achieve at least 75% accuracy on the dot probe task (N = 17) were
removed from further analyses. The final sample constituted 260 participants (183 Female;
Mean Age = 22.34, SD = 7.76).

Measures
Attentional Bias for Threat (ABT)
ABT was assessed using a dot probe paradigm. Within a standard dot probe task, each
trial begins with a fixation cross (500 ms) followed by the presentation of an emotionalneutral stimulus pair on opposite sides of the screen (500 ms). A probe (i.e. a dot) then
quickly replaces either the emotional or neutral stimulus. Emotional-neutral trials are fully
counterbalanced with regards to the position of the emotional stimulus (left or right), and
whether the probe replaced the emotional or neutral stimulus. Participants are tasked to
indicate the location of the probe as quickly as possible via a keyboard press (“E” for left, “I”
for right). An attentional bias for the given class of emotional stimuli is typically inferred
from the magnitude of the difference score between mean reaction times on incongruent trials
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(probes replace the emotional stimulus) and mean reaction times on congruent trials (probes
replace the neutral stimulus).
The current dot probe task was configured with standard parameters described above,
but differs from earlier versions of the task in that it presents stimuli in the form of
naturalistic scenes instead of words or isolated faces. Compared to words or isolated faces,
naturalistic scenes may provide an advantage in ecological validity in the assessment of ABT
(Heitmann et al., 2017; Sagliano et al., 2014; Zvielli et al., 2014). Commonly used scenes to
represent threat in the assessment of ABT include scenes which portray loss (e.g., grieving
persons) and danger (e.g., person holding an aimed gun). Although typically undifferentiated
when implemented in behavioral measures of ABT, the two classes of stimuli relate more
closely to the emotions of sadness and fear, and likely differ in the likelihood and immediacy
of threat they convey (Kveraga et al., 2015), Given that many theories of the ABT-anxiety
link propose that anxiogenic effects of ABT are rooted in exaggerated perceptions of
ambiguous threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 1998; Mathews
& Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988), it is possible that attentional biases for sadnessand fear-related scenes may not be equally apparent at higher levels of anxiety. Thus,
emotional-neutral trials presenting fear-neutral and sad-neutral stimulus pairs were treated as
separate experimental conditions, and used to derive separate indices of ABT. The index
which returned a stronger correlation with anxiety was used to denote ABT in analyses to
address the main aims of the present study (described shortly).
There were 24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-neutral trials in the current dot probe task, as
well as 24 happy-neutral and 40 neutral-neutral filler trials which were not presently
examined. Trials across the task appeared in complete randomised order for each participant.
In anticipation that ABT in loneliness may be specific to negative stimuli conveying sociallyrelevant information (Cacioppo et al., 2016), indices of ABT were computed based on fear-
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neutral and sad-neutral trials presenting scenes which featured human persons (12 trials for
each condition).The 12 fear-neutral and 12 sad-neutral (social) trials were created using three
unique image pairs repeated four times across the experiment. Fear- and sadness-related
images (resized to approx. 307 x 230 px) were scenes drawn from the International Affective
Pictures System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), and pre-validated for their
emotional content in a pilot study (N =103; under review). IAPS identification codes for these
images are as follows: Fear – 2770 (tribal member in an aggressive stance), 6250 (man
wielding an aimed gun), 6370 (masked man captured on cctv footage); Sad –2141 (woman
grieving over deceased man), 2205 (old man at bedside of dying wife), 2900 (boy in tears)1.
Standardised valence ratings (Fear: M = 3.30, SD = .92; Sad: M = 2.28, SD = .29) and arousal
ratings (Fear: M = 6.03, SD = .79; Sad: M = 4.87, SD = .30) from the IAPS norming study
did not differ between the two classes of negative stimuli, t(4) = 2.35, p = .12 and t(4) = 1.82,
p = .19 respectively.
Loneliness
The UCLA Loneliness Scale (Version 3) (Russell, 1996) was used to measure
loneliness. The instrument is composed of 20 items (e.g., “How often do you feel left out?”),
where responses vary on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (always). Nine of the 20 items
are positively worded and reverse-scored (e.g., “How often do you feel that there are people
you can turn to?”). Possible scores range from 20–80, with higher scores reflecting higher
loneliness. Cronbach’s alpha was .93 in the current sample.
Anxiety

1

These images were paired with neutral images matched for social content. Four of these images were drawn
from the IAPS and have the following identifier codes: 7550, 2440, 2575, 2745.1. Two neutral images were
sourced from free online stock photo databases and are available upon request. All pictures used were assigned a
common emotional label by > 75% of viewers (N = 103).
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The Anxiety subscale of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; (S.
Lovibond & P. Lovibond, 1995a) was used to measure self-reported anxiety. This subscale
was developed to capture the range of core symptoms of anxiety (S. Lovibond & P.
Lovibond, 1995b). Participants completed the full questionnaire so as not to alter the order of
presented items. Responses on the DASS-21 have been shown to be temporally stable and
suitable for capturing trait-like syndromes (Gomez et al., 2014; Jafari et al., 2017; Lu et al.,
2018). On a scale of 0 (did not apply to me) to 3 (applied to me much or most of the time),
participants responded to items such as “I was worried about situations in which I might
panic and make a fool of myself”. Scores on the DASS-21 Anxiety subscale can range from 0
to 21. Cronbach’s alpha for the DASS-21 Anxiety subscale was .87 in the current sample.
DASS-21 Anxiety scores were positively skewed in the current sample (when
participants were classified according to specified DASS-21 Anxiety severity ranges,
proportions were: 63% Normal, 12% Mild, 7.3% Moderate, 5% Severe, and 12.7%
Extremely Severe). However, exploratory analyses using log-transformed scores produced
the same pattern of findings as that using untransformed scores. Results using the latter are
subsequently presented for ease of interpretation.
Previous research has highlighted that mechanisms of psychopathology may differ
between clinically and non-clinically anxious individuals (Yiend et al., 2015; Unterrainer et
al., 2018). As an intended control variable to ensure observed findings were generalizable
across the severity continuum of anxiety, participants also reported on whether they had been
clinically diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (N = 69). Although data for depression severity
was available (DASS-21 Depression subscale), we chose not to control for depression
severity for several reasons. First, anxious symptoms most commonly precede depression
(e.g., Fava et al., 2000; Starr & Davila, 2012), while the current study had interests in anxiety
as an outcome variable. Second, given that there is high overlap between depression and
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loneliness, including depression as a covariate might result in an overadjusted statistical
model and underestimation of relevant associations of interest (i.e. the effects of loneliness;
Hom et al., 2017).

Data Analyses
Within a dot probe paradigm, attentional bias for a given class of emotional stimuli is
typically indexed by subtracting mean reaction times on congruent trials (probe replaces
emotional stimulus) from mean reaction times on incongruent trials (probe replaces neutral
stimulus) where correct responses are made. This was done separately for fear-neutral and
sad-neutral trials to yield two bias scores (Fear and Sad; i.e. two indices of ABT).
The two possible models of the interrelationship between ABT, loneliness, and
anxiety were simultaneously tested in a single hierarchical regression analysis predicting
DASS-21 Anxiety. Preliminary correlations were performed between study variables to
determine the bias score (Fear or Sad) to be used to denote ABT (i.e. the bias score which
yielded a higher correlation with DASS-21 Anxiety). Diagnostic history was entered in the
first step as a control variable, ABT in the second step, Loneliness in the third step, and the
interaction term between ABT and Loneliness in the fourth step2. If the association between
ABT and anxiety is moderated by loneliness, the interaction term in Step 4 should return
statistically significant. If the association between ABT and anxiety is at least in part
explained by loneliness (i.e. a proxy model), statistical support would be seen in the reduced
effects of ABT moving from step 2 to 3, after accounting for the effects of Loneliness on
DASS-21 Anxiety [see Behar et al. (2010), Bujarski et al. (2017), and Spinhoven et al. (2016)
for similar approaches].

2

Mean-centred Sad bias and Loneliness scores were entered in the analysis and used to calculate the interaction
term. For hierarchical regression analyses with 4 predictors, the minimum sample size is 39 based on anticipated
f2 of 0.35 and desired power of 0.8 (p = .05). The current sample size met this criterion.
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Results

Table 5.1 presents the means and correlations between study variables. Mean
accuracy rates on the dot probe task were high (M = 97.27%, SD = 2.78%). For fear-neutral
trials, mean RTs (SDs) used to calculate bias scores are as follows: incongruent – 428.54
(88.43), congruent – 423.67 (83.66). For sad-neutral trials, mean RTs (SDs) used to calculate
bias scores are as follows: incongruent – 417.70 (80.62), congruent – 417.37 (79.35).

Loneliness correlated positively with DASS-21 Anxiety, a finding in keeping with
predictions that would be made based on existing literature on how interpersonal relations
might be affected among anxious individuals (Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012; Ellis, 2016; Eng &
Heimberg, 2006; Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2013; G. Masi et al., 2004; McLeod, 1994;
Newman & Erickson, 2010). As seen in Table 5.1, between the two potential indices of ABT,
only the Sad bias score yielded a significant correlation with DASS-21 Anxiety (analyses
excluding bias scores +/- 3 SD from the mean removed produced the same pattern of
findings). Thus, the Sad bias score3 was used to denote ABT in the subsequent hierarchical
regression analysis to predict DASS-21 Anxiety.

Table 5.2 presents outcomes of the hierarchical regression analysis predicting DASS21 Anxiety. Results did not support a moderating role of loneliness in the association

3

Of note, the relationships between the Sad bias score and both DASS-21 Anxiety and UCLA Loneliness were
inverse in nature. Upon initial consideration, these findings appear to contradict the understanding that anxiety
and loneliness are associated with facilitated orienting of attention towards threat-related stimuli (Cisler et al.,
2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016). However, according to one model developed to describe ABT in anxiety
(Vigilance-Avoidance Hypothesis; Mogg et al., 2004), anxious individuals may first orient quickly to a threat
stimulus during initial exposure but after detection, avoid it. When eye movements of anxious individuals are
tracked during dot probe task performance, findings have indicated a pattern of gaze aversion following initial
gaze fixation on the threat stimulus when supraliminal presentation times (> 200 ms) are used (Rinck & Becker,
2006; Wieser., Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009). These findings support the possibility that
facilitated attentional orientation towards threat stimuli may be implicit within attentional avoidance of threat
stimuli as observed on behavioural indices using the dot probe task (Barry et al., 2015; Booth, 2014; Williams et
al., 1988).. Thus, current results do not necessarily contradict the understanding that anxiety and loneliness are
associated with facilitated orienting of attention towards threat-related stimuli.
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between ABT and anxiety, in that the interaction term between ABT and Loneliness (Step 4)
was not significant, β = -.050, p = .38. However, in support of a proxy account of the
relationship between ABT, loneliness, and anxiety, the initial predictive significance of ABT
in Step 2 (β = -.139, p = .02) was no longer observed when Loneliness was entered in the
model in Step 3 (β = -.089, p = .12 for ABT; β = .360, p = .00 for Loneliness).

Table 5.1. Means and Correlations (r) of Study Variables
1. DASS-21

2. Diagnostic

3. Sad bias

4. Fear bias
5. Loneliness

Anxiety

history

score

score

5

.399**

.172**

-.129*

-.108

-

4

-.046

-.046

.045

-

-

3

-.127*

.056

-

-

-

2

.217**

-

-

-

-

3.38 [4.01]

No history (0):

0.32 [65.29]

4.87 [83.48]

43.46 [10.39]

Mean

N = 191

[SD]

Positive history
(1): N = 69
*p < .05; **p < .01
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Table 5.2. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting DASS-21 Anxiety
Variable

β

Step 1
Diagnostic history

Diagnostic history

.224 **

ABT (Sad bias score)

-.139*

Step 3
Diagnostic history

.160*

ABT (Sad bias score)

-.089

Diagnostic history

.158*

ABT (Sad bias score)

-.082

ABT (Sad bias score) x Loneliness

F

.047

-

12.70**

.066

.019*

9.11**

.189

.123**

19.95**

.192

.002

15.14**

.360**

Step 4

Loneliness

ΔR2

.217 **

Step 2

Loneliness

R2

.362**
-.050
β = Standardised coefficients
*p < .05; **p < .01

121
Discussion
Extant literature on the quantity and quality of social connections in anxiety has given
reason to suggest that loneliness may be more likely to occur among anxious individuals
(Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012; Eng & Heimberg, 2006; Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2013;
Masi et al., 2004; McLeod, 1994; Newman & Erickson, 2010). ABT, an assumed core
mechanism involved in anxiety, has been linked to loneliness in a separate line of work
(Cacioppo et al., 2016, 2009; Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009;
Shintel et al., 2006; Spithoven et al., 2017). As part of a movement in research
acknowledging complexities beyond ABT in the development and maintenance of anxiety,
the current study examined two possible models of the ABT-anxiety link inclusive of a third
variable, namely loneliness. The first model examined whether loneliness would
moderate/strengthen the association between ABT and anxiety. The second (proxy) model
examined whether loneliness might (at least in part) account for the association between ABT
and anxiety. Present findings favor the latter conceptualization of the role of loneliness in the
ABT-anxiety link. That is, the strength of the association between ABT and anxiety did not
vary as a function of loneliness. However, loneliness did make a unique contribution to
predicting anxiety, and ABT no longer uniquely predicted anxiety after the effects of
loneliness were accounted for.
The rationale for investigating the proxy model was that, from an evolutionary
viewpoint, faster orientation to threats in the environment should serve an adaptive function
in the short-term rather than result in anxiety over the long term (Öhman, 2005; Öhman et al.,
2001, 2012). The finding that ABT was no longer associated with anxiety in the presence of a
third variable per se suggests that ABT may not inherently produce anxiogenic effects, and is
in keeping with this notion. Additional support for the normative aspects of ABT comes from
the presently observed selective association between indices of ABT and anxiety. ABT was
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associated with anxiety only where defined by patterns of attentional deployment for sadnessrelated scenes, but not fear-related scenes. Fear-related scenes, including those presently
employed, typically feature situations which arguably convey information about actual,
unambiguous sources of danger (e.g., person wielding an aimed gun). Heightened attentional
responding to such information may represent an adaptive process which occurs
independently of anxiety. Conversely, sadness-related scenes typically feature situations
where harm has ostensibly passed (e.g., grieving persons). Heightened attentional responding
to such information may favor the encoding of threat which may not be immediately or
personally relevant, setting the individual up to experience the world as an inherently unsafe
place [i.e. a key feature of anxiety; Hazlett-Stevens (2008)]. While further research is
necessary to verify these speculations, present observations serve to echo previous sentiments
on the importance of drawing qualitative distinctions in negatively-valenced material used to
assess ABT in anxiety (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Calvo & Lang, 2004).
In tacit acknowledgment that ABT is fundamentally adaptive, many theories of the
ABT-anxiety link propose that anxiogenic effects of ABT are rooted in exaggerated
appraisals of threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 1998;
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988). Relatedly, ABT documented among
lonely individuals is thought to be a function of enhanced threat perception in loneliness
(Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven et al., 2017). It was
presently observed that ABT no longer uniquely predicted anxiety in the presence of
loneliness, supporting a proxy model of the interrelationship between loneliness, ABT and
anxiety in which the association between ABT and anxiety is better explained by loneliness.
These results (along with the earlier described finding on the selective association between
indices of ABT and anxiety) are consistent with the notion that the anxiogenic effects of ABT
are rooted in exaggerated appraisals of threat. Further, the current results suggest that
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loneliness may be one important source of exaggerated threat appraisals which underpin the
association between ABT and anxiety. These findings serve to reiterate the need for more
complex models of anxiety beyond ABT (Heeren & McNally, 2016), and add a voice to the
growing movement away from investigating ABT as an isolated process in anxiety-related
research.
The present findings hold implications for clinical practice. The limited efficacy of
both traditional (i.e. cognitive-behavioral therapy) and novel interventions for anxiety (i.e.
behavioral training to reduce ABT) highlight the need to extend the range of therapeutic
methods which can be implemented to effectively manage anxiety. Present [and previous:
(Richardson et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018)] findings suggest that loneliness may contribute
to anxiety, so that anxious individuals may also stand to benefit from interventions which
seek to reduce loneliness (and thus enhanced perceptions of threat). It should be noted,
however, that although present findings favor the clinical utility of reducing loneliness over
ABT where anxiety is concerned, several caveats have been highlighted pertaining to
interventions for loneliness. Efforts to reduce loneliness often involve the training of social
skills and provision of opportunities to develop social relationships (Cacioppo et al., 2015;
Masi et al., 2011; Ypsilanti, 2018). Such interventions may help expand the social network of
an individual, but do not necessarily alleviate subjective feelings of social isolation
(Cacioppo et al., 2015; Masi et al., 2011; Ypsilanti, 2018). Although reductive effects on
anxiety may be modest (Mogg & Bradley, 2018; Mogg et al., 2017; Mogoaşe et al., 2014),
studies and clinical trials which have sought to modify ABT via behavioral training methods
have indicated that ABT is at least amendable to change [see (Mogg et al. (2017) and
Mogoaşe et al. (2014) for reviews]. Where challenges to reducing loneliness prevail, reducing
ABT may still retain its clinical utility as the comparative next-best option in interventions to
target enhanced threat perceptions associated with anxiety.
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Current findings should be interpreted in light of several constraints. First, to account
for the specificity of ABT in loneliness (Cacioppo et al., 2016), ABT was indexed based on
social stimuli (i.e. scenes which featured human persons). Although ABT based solely on
social stimuli (e.g., faces) has been documented among anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007), heightened attentional orienting in anxiety appears to extend to nonsocial pictorial
stimuli which convey threat (e.g., scenes portraying snakes, natural disasters, injured animals)
(Sagliano et al., 2014; Zvielli et al., 2014). While present findings suggest loneliness may
play an explanatory role in the association between ABT and anxiety, it is unclear if the
explanatory value of loneliness holds for the association between attentional bias for
nonsocial threat and anxiety4. Second, the direction of influence from loneliness to anxiety
was assumed based on self-report measures at a single timepoint in the present crosssectional study. However, as described in the Introduction, anxiety-related related behaviours
can indirectly influence loneliness, so that a bidirectional relationship between the two
variables is possible. Previous studies have shown that loneliness can be experimentally
manipulated under laboratory settings through the use of social exclusion paradigms [e.g.,
Hames et al. (2018) and Stillman et al. (2009)], and should be considered in future research.
Third, the presently observed correlation between Sad bias score (used to index ABT) and
self-reported anxiety was small (r = − .127). Although previous studies have found
associations between indices of ABT and anxiety of similar magnitude (Abend et al., 2018;
Campbell & Kertz, 2019; Ho et al., 2017), it remains possible that this may have influenced
the current main findings (i.e. ABT no longer predicted anxiety in the presence of loneliness).
Last, while the convenience sampling method used in the present study yielded a participant
pool with adequate variability in self-reported anxiety, mean anxiety levels were low (Mean

4

In supplementary analyses using available data from non-social trials, presently reported findings on the
association between loneliness, ABT, and anxiety were not replicated.
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DASS-21 Anxiety = 3.38, SD = 4.01). Although current findings on the role of loneliness in
the ABT-anxiety link were observed after accounting for diagnostic history (i.e.
presence/absence of a clinically diagnosed anxiety disorder), further research is necessary to
verify that these findings also apply to individuals experiencing more severe anxiety.
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5.2. Addendum
In the manuscript just presented, a reasoned decision was made not to control for
depression severity in analyses predicting anxiety based on loneliness and ABT (denoted
using bias indices for sadness-related scenes). While not stated in the manuscript, the
availability of DASS-21 Depression subscale scores on hand was utilised for a separate
purpose. Specifically, the correlation between Sad bias score and scores on the DASS-21
Depression subscale was also examined, given known relationships between attentional
biases for sadness-related information and depressive syndromes. This correlation was not
significant (r = -.043, p = .493), supporting the specificity of the observed attentional bias to
anxiety.
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Chapter 6 – Cognitive Correlates of Anxiety: A Study on Attentional Bias for Mild/High
Threat and Neurocognitive Functioning*

*

The manuscript presented in this chapter (Section 6.2) is published as:

Wei, M., Roodenrys, S., & Miller, L. (2020). Cognitive Correlates of Anxiety: A Study on
Attentional Bias for Mild/High Threat and Neurocognitive Functioning. Journal of
Articles in Support of the Null Hypothesis. https://www.jasnh.com/pdf/Vol17-No2article4.pdf
The PDF version of the manuscript as it has been published is presented in Appendix I.
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6.1. Preface
Although framed as a methodological consideration of the present thesis thus far, the
decision to consider fear- and sadness-related scenes as separate classes of stimuli in the
assessment of ABT has produced findings which raise important questions about the nature
of the anxiety-related attentional bias. Specifically, a recurring finding across the two
previous empirical studies (Chapters 4 and 5) was such that ABT was associated with anxiety
only when indexed by responses to sad images- and not fear-related scenes. The study
presented (as a manuscript) in the next section sought to investigate the cognitive profile
associated with anxiety, and potential mediating effects of neurocognitive functioning on the
association between ABT and anxiety, as part of the overarching aims of the present thesis.
Rather than a methodological consideration adjunctive to the primary research questions, the
potential selectivity of the anxiety-related attentional bias was explicitly examined as part of
the study’s main aims, within the context of a relevant theoretical framework. As implied in
the chapter title, the framework places sadness- and fear-related stimuli on a continuum of
threat from mild to high.
While described in full in the manuscript presented below, a preliminary description
of additional statistical techniques which were applied in the processing of dot probe data is
presently given for better context. Carrying forward analyses used in the previous empirical
chapters of this thesis, indices of attentional bias for fear- and sadness-related scenes were
examined separately for their correlations with DASS-21 Anxiety. However, the previously
observed selective association between indices of ABT and self-reported anxiety was not
seen. Preferential associations aside, relationships between traditionally-computed indices of
ABT and self-reported anxiety could not be established on the whole. These initial outcomes
prompted a probe into the literature on how indices of ABT based on reaction times might be
differently processed to be more sensitive to anxious psychopathology. This search returned
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recent (successful) efforts when drift diffusion modelling techniques were applied to dot
probe data (Price et al., 2019), allowing for indices of ABT to be computed based on reaction
times with irrelevant components of task performance removed. Drift diffusion modelling
techniques were also applied in the present study to provide supplementary indices of
attentional bias.
Finally, it is worth noting that towards the end goal of the present thesis to identify
theoretically-relevant moderators and mediators of the ABT-anxiety link, the study
encompassed in the present chapter had limited success compared to those in the two
previous chapters. Specifically, correlations could not be established between cognitive
measures (both indices of ABT and neurocognitive functioning) and anxiety in data collected
via the laboratory testing session allocated specifically for the current study, so that mediation
analyses could not be pursued. Possible theoretical and methodological accounts are explored
in the Discussion of the manuscript presented below, while broader implications are
discussed in Chapter 8 (General Discussion).
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6.2. Manuscript
Abstract
The current study extended investigations on anxiety-related cognitive processes.
There were two testing phases: an online study, and a laboratory session. Emotional
attentional bias was assessed on both counts using an extended dot probe task. A
neurocognitive test battery was administered in the laboratory session with the end goal of
examining whether neurocognitive impairments would mediate the association between
attentional bias and anxiety. Results showed attentional bias was associated with anxiety only
when indexed based on sadness- (mild threat) but not fear-related (high threat) scenes.
However, this selective association was apparent only in online data. As further
contraindication against pursuing mediation analyses, laboratory-based neurocognitive
performance did not correlate with anxiety. Implications for the measurement of anxietyrelated cognitive processes are discussed.
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Introduction
There are two broadly identifiable areas of work within existing research on cognitive
processes associated with anxiety: “hot” cognitive processes (emotional informational
processing) and “cold” cognitive processes (non-emotional information processing, or basic
neurocognitive functioning). The leading subject in the former, dominant body of work is
represented in the attentional bias for threat phenomenon, or the tendency to orient more
quickly to negative compared to neutral stimuli (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Mogg &
Bradley, 2016). This habitual pattern of attentional deployment is not seen as mere
epiphenomena of anxiety, but has been conceptualised to play a causal role in the
development and maintenance of anxiety (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, BakermansKranenburg, & van, 2007; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; MacLeod, Mathews,
& Tata, 1986; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts,
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). While plausible, the notion appears under-detailed when
considered from an evolutionary perspective. From an evolutionary standpoint, being quicker
to detect negative stimuli in the environment prepares the organism to respond swiftly to
potential danger, and serves to facilitate survival in the short term (Ohman, 2005; Ohman,
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Öhman, Soares, Juth, Lindström, & Esteves, 2012). As such, a purely
psychopathological view may not suffice to account for the adaptive aspects of attentional
bias for threat.
One account of attentional processes in anxiety to have acknowledged the adaptive
aspects of attentional bias for threat within its theoretical postulates is the cognitivemotivational framework (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2018). Within this
framework, the anxiety-related attentional bias (and anxiety more generally) is rooted in
exaggerated appraisals of stimulus threat value. Thus, while attentional bias for highly
threatening stimuli may be expected across individuals, regardless of anxiety severity (i.e.
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represents a normative function), attentional bias for mildly threatening stimuli may be
evident only among individuals with higher levels of anxiety. In a series of experiments led
by the same theorists (Mogg et al., 2000), it was demonstrated that anxious individuals
indeed only outperformed their non-anxious counterparts on a behavioural measure of
attentional bias in response to mildly threatening scenes (e.g. soldier holding a gun), but not
highly threatening scenes (mutilated bodies, murder victims). Although these findings have
important implications for the fundamental nature of the anxiety-related attentional bias,
replication studies have been few1. The first aim of the current study was to extend
investigations on the specificity of the anxiety-related attentional bias to mildly threatening
(but not highly threatening) stimuli, using an alternative approach to manipulate the threat
value of stimuli employed to capture attention. In Mogg et al.’s (2000) study, mildly and
highly threatening stimuli were represented using negative scenes varying primarily in
arousal, and thus the emotional distress they elicit. As a possible means to the same end (and
the approach adopted in the current study), scenes could be selected by the discrete negative
emotion they elicit. Specifically, sadness- and fear-related scenes, in conveying signals of
elapsed and potential danger respectively (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Kveraga et al., 2015), could
be thematically used to represent threat on a continuum of mild to high in a way which does
not raise ethical concerns associated with the presentation of highly arousing or emotionally
distressing stimuli.
The second aim of this study pertains to addressing a gap within anxiety-related
research where “cold” cognitive processes have received limited attention relative to “hot”
cognitive processes (see Leonard & Abramovitch, 2019 for similar sentiments). “Cold”

To the authors’ knowledge, there is only one other study to have pursued similar
investigations (Li, Wang, Poliakoff, & Luo, 2007). This study found that attentional bias for
highly threatening stimuli was not modulated by anxiety, in keeping with findings from the
study by Mogg et al. (2000).
1
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cognitive processes, or basic neurocognitive functioning, have been shown to vary with
symptom severity in many mental health conditions (Harvey, Koren, Reichenberg, & Bowie,
2006; Kleim et al., 2013; McGurk et al., 2000; Zuckerman et al., 2018). Establishing the key
neurocognitive impairments associated with specific disorders thus represents a clinically
relevant goal in research. In addition to being limited by a relatively small number of studies,
forming conclusions on the neurocognitive profile associated with anxiety is further
hampered by challenges in integrating findings across different studies. As highlighted in
contemporary literature, studies on cognitive functioning in anxiety tend to examine only a
select few cognitive domains (Hallion, Tolin, Assaf, Goethe, & Diefenbach, 2017; Leonard &
Abramovitch, 2019; Muller, Torquato, Manfro, & Trentini, 2015), and this selected range
varies from one study to the next. Where cognitive domains of interest overlap between
anxiety-related studies, cross-study comparisons are complicated by the use of different tests
(Leonard & Abramovitch, 2019).
Beyond descriptive purposes, the theoretical importance of understanding the
neurocognitive profile associated with anxiety is enhanced by the suggestion that a purely
psychopathological view on attentional bias for threat may be incomplete. Relatedly, several
mechanistic accounts of the association between attentional processes and anxiety propose
that biased attention for threat operates indirectly, via impairments in basic cognitive
functions, to perpetuate anxiety. Such impairments have been articulated using varied terms
across different models, including resource allocation mechanisms (Bar-Haim et al., 2007;
Williams et al., 1988), goal-engagement systems (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley,
1998), inhibitory skills (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), and attentional control (Eysenck et
al., 2007). Thus, the second aim of this study comprises of two related parts: (a) First, to add
to the limited literature on the neurocognitive profile associated with anxiety, using a
comprehensive, standardised neurocognitive test battery (CogState; www.cogstate.com) as a
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step towards addressing challenges in the integration of previous findings; and, (b) If
neurocognitive impairments are established, whether these impairments would mediate the
association between attentional bias and self-reported anxiety measured in the same
laboratory testing session.
Although detailed in the Methods section below, several methodological aspects of
the current study are worth introducing here. First, there were two testing phases in the
current study: an online study, and a laboratory testing session. In both these phases,
measures of attentional bias and anxiety were administered, with the laboratory testing
session further involving the administration of the CogState test battery. While data from the
laboratory testing session specifically informed the second aim, data from both testing phases
were used to address the first aim of the current study (i.e. specificity of the anxiety-related
attentional bias to mildly threatening stimuli/sadness-related scenes) for comprehensiveness.
Second, traditionally-computed indices of attentional bias were supplemented with indices
derived from a computational modelling technique known as drift-diffusion modelling. These
indices are described in full below, within the context of their supporting behavioural
paradigm.
Methods
Participants and Procedures
Data collection for the current study occurred in two phases. The first testing phase
occurred online (i.e. data was collected remotely). In this testing phase, participants
completed measures of anxiety, attentional bias, and several other psychological variables as
part of a larger project to understand psychological factors involved in the link between
biased attention for threat and anxiety. Cognitive functioning (i.e. the current research) sits
within this project as one psychological factor of interest.
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Participants who completed the online study (N = 647) were invited to attend a
laboratory testing session at the institution where the current research occurred (University
of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia). The same measures of anxiety and attentional
bias, along with measures of neurocognitive functioning (i.e. the CogState test battery) were
administered in this session. Participants were offered either university course credit points
(where applicable) or a $20 shopping gift card for their time. 100 individuals (66 Female,
Mean Age = 24.80, SD = 9.38) who completed the online study signed up to participate in
the laboratory testing session. As recruitment emails specified an in-person testing session at
the University of Wollongong, individuals who signed up were predominantly enrolled
undergraduate students (N = 87). The remaining 13 sign-ups were members of the local
Wollongong community. 14 participants, of which 11 were undergraduate students, reported
the current use of antidepressants. To account for potential effects of educational differences
and pharmaceutical influences on cognitive functioning, both entry site (university vs.
community) and medication status (currently using vs. not using antidepressants) were coded
for control purposes in analyses involving CogState tests.
Measures
Anxiety
The Anxiety subscale from the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21;
(S. Lovibond & P. Lovibond, 1995a) was used to measure self-reported anxiety. Reliability
and validity of the DASS-21 Anxiety subscale has previously been established in both
clinical (Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997; Clara, Cox & Enns, 2001; Antony,
Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998) and nonclinical samples (Antony et al., 1998;
Crawford & Henry, 2003; Sinclair et al., 2011). Although only the Anxiety subscale was of
interest in the current study, participants completed the full DASS-21 questionnaire so as not
to alter the order of presented items. On a scale of 0 to 3, participants reported on the extent
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to which a series of statements applied to them over the past week. The Anxiety subscale
includes statements such as “I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make
a fool of myself”. Scores are summed across seven items and range from 0 to 21. Participants
completed the DASS-21 in both the online study and laboratory testing session. The DASS21 has been shown to be temporally stable and suitable for capturing individual differences in
baseline anxiety (Gomez, Summers, Summers, Wolf, & Summers, 2014; Jafari, Nozari,
Ahrari, & Bagheri, 2017; P. Lovibond, 1998; Lu et al., 2018).
DASS-21 Anxiety scores were positively skewed for both testing phases (when
participants were classified according to specified DASS-21 Anxiety severity ranges,
proportions were: Online study – 53% Normal, 22% Mild, 8% Moderate, 5% Severe, and
12% Exremely Severe; Laboratory testing session – 46% Normal, 24% Mild, 10% Moderate,
7% Severe, and 13% Extremely Severe. However, exploratory analyses using logtransformed scores produced the same patterns of findings as that using untransformed
scores. Results using the latter are subsequently presented for ease of interpretation.
Attentional Bias for Fear- and Sadness-Related Scenes
A dot probe task was used to assess attentional biases for fear- and sadness-related
scenes. This task was programmed and administered within a web-based browser using
Psytoolkit (www.psytoolkit.org). Each trial began with a fixation cross (500 ms) followed by
the presentation of a pictorial stimulus pair on opposite sides of the screen (500 ms). A probe
(i.e. a dot) then quickly replaced one of the stimuli. Participants were tasked to indicate the
location of the probe as quickly as possible via a keyboard press (‘E’ for left, and ‘I’ for
right). Trials with incorrect responses were excluded from analyses, and trials where
responses were not received within 2000 ms were automatically considered incorrect and
excluded from further analyses (see (Britton et al., 2015; Zhang, Dong, & Zhou, 2018) for
similar data pre-processing procedures).
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There were four types of trials, appearing in a randomised order for each participant:
24 fear-neutral, 24 sad-neutral, 24 happy-neutral and 40 neutral-neutral filler trials. The
current study examined the negative-neutral (i.e. fear-neutral and sad-neutral) trials. Whether
the negative stimulus appeared on the left or right of the screen, and whether the probe
replaced the negative or neutral stimulus was counterbalanced across trials. The 24 trials for
each negative-neutral condition were created using six unique image pairs repeated four times
across the experiment. Images used (resized to approx. 307 x 230 px) were predominantly
scenes drawn from the International Affective Pictures System; (IAPS; (Bradley & Lang,
2007) and pre-validated for their emotional content in a pilot study (N = 103, in press)2.
Negative and neutral images were paired so that both scenes in a given negative-neutral
stimulus pair either consistently featured human persons or did not. Standardized valence
ratings (Fear: M = 3.30, SD =.92; Sad: M = 2.28, SD = .29) and arousal ratings
(Fear: M = 6.03, SD = .79; Sad: M = 4.87, SD = .30) from the IAPS norming study did not
differ between the two classes of negative stimuli, t(4) = 2.35, p = .12 and t(4) = 1.82, p = .19
respectively.
Indices of attentional bias for fear- and sadness-related scenes were computed by
traditional means, i.e. by subtracting mean reaction times on incongruent trials (probe
replaces neutral stimulus) from mean reaction times on congruent trials (probe replaces
emotional stimulus). More extreme bias scores (i.e. differences scores) denote more extreme
attentional biases for the given class of emotional stimuli.
Additionally, these traditional bias scores were complemented with bias scores
computed based on extra-decisional reaction times. Extra-decisional reaction times are

IAPS identification codes for images used in negative-neutral trials: Fear – 1120, 1930,
5971, 2770, 6250, 6370; Sad – 9184, 9340, 9561, 2141, 2205, 2900; Neutral – 7185, 7500,
7705, 7550, 7050, 7080, 7187, 2440, 2575, 2745.1. Two neutral images were sourced from
free online stock photo databases and are available upon request. All pictures used were
assigned a common emotional label by > 75% of viewers (N = 103).
2
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derived from drift-diffusion modelling of trial-level reaction time data. (see Ratcliff &
McKoon, 2008 for theory and origin, and Voss, A. & Voss, J., 2007 for processing software
used). Drift-diffusion modelling techniques have their origins in computational cognitive
psychology, or the field of research which applies computational methods to observational
data with the goal of quantifying mental processes underlying human information processing
more precisely (Palmeri, Love, & Turner, 2016). On reaction-time-based measures involving
simple two-choice perceptual decisions (such as the dot probe task), drift-diffusion modelling
techniques allow for trial-level data to be broken down into their component cognitive
processes (parameters) for analysis: Namely, decision-related components (e.g. amount and
rate of information accumulation before a decision/motor response is executed) and the extradecisional component. At trial-level, the extra-decisional component (or extra-decisional
time) partials out the time taken to encode the evidence from a stimulus that will drive the
decision process (Ratcliff & MacKoon, 2008; Ratcliff et al., 2016). In the case of the dot
probe task where speed of attentional orientation is of interest, modelling trial-level extradecisional time in isolation may provide aggregate reaction times which can be used to derive
more refined indices of attentional bias (Price, Brown, & Siegle, 2019).
Cognitive Functioning
The CogState computerised test battery (www.cogstate.com) was used to index
neurocognitive functioning across several domains. The full test battery comprises 13 tests
(full test descriptions are available for public access on the CogState website) assessing
neurocognitive functioning across eight unique domains: International Shopping List Test
(verbal learning), Groton Maze Chase Test (processing speed), Groton Maze Learning Test
(executive function), Detection Test (processing speed), Identification Test (attention), One
Card Learning Test (visual memory), One-Back Test (working memory), Two-Back Test
(working memory), Set-Shifting Test (executive function), Continuous Paired Associate
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Learning Test (visual memory), Socio-Emotional Cognition Test (emotional recognition),
Groton Maze Learning Test – Delayed Recall (visual memory), International Shopping List
Test – Delayed Recall (verbal memory). Tests are stated in the order of administration
recommended by CogState guidelines. Test re-retest reliability estimates for CogState tests
range between .84 and .91 (Collie, Maruff, Darby, & McStephen, 2003; Falleti, Maruff,
Collie, & Darby, 2006), where practice effects have been demonstrated to be negligible
(Falleti et al., 2006).
Results

Correlations Between Indices of Attentional Bias and Anxiety
Table 6.1 gives accuracy rates and mean reaction times used to calculate bias scores
and extra-decisional bias scores based on dot probe task performance, as well as mean
DASS-21 Anxiety scores, for both testing phases in the current study3.
Correlations between bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety were performed separately
for the online study and laboratory testing session. Mean Fear and Sad bias scores are given
in Table 6.2, along with their correlations with DASS-21 Anxiety scores obtained at each
testing phase. There was a selective association between bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety,
such that only Sad bias score but not Fear bias score was significantly correlated with DASS21 Anxiety. However, as shown in Table 6.2, this selective association was apparent only

3

There was an overall upward shift in means for both DASS-21 Anxiety scores and reaction
times on the dot probe task (shorter response latencies) moving from the online to laboratory
testing session. Influxes in baseline anxiety (Purves et al., 2019) and decreases in response
latencies (Hilbig, 2016; Semmelmann & Weigelt, 2017) moving from online to laboratory
test settings have been previously documented, and are likely to reflect normative shifts from
baseline due to increased contextual demands.
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when bias scores were computed using extra-decisional reaction times, when measures of
attentional bias and anxiety were obtained via remote data collection methods (i.e. online)4.
Correlations Between Neurocognitive Functioning and Anxiety
Mean performance outcomes on CogState tests and their correlations with DASS-21
are also given in Table 6.2. As seen, none of the test scores correlated with DASS-21
Anxiety. The inclusion of entry site (university vs. community) and medication status
(currently using vs. not using antidepressants) as control variables did not alter this pattern of
findings.
In the present case, targeted mediator variables (performance outcomes on CogState
tests) and independent variables (in-lab bias scores) were not associated with the dependent
variable (in-lab DASS-21 Anxiety scores). Since basic assumptions for mediation analyses
were not met (Baron & Kenny, 1986; James & Brett, 1984; Judd & Kenny, 1981), further
tests were not conducted. For comprehensiveness, correlations between possible mediator and
independent variables (i.e. CogState outcomes and in-lab bias scores) are given in the
Appendix J.

Table 6.1. Mean reaction times used to calculate bias scores and extra-decisional bias scores
based on dot probe task performance, and mean DASS-21 Anxiety scores for both testing
phases (N = 100).
Online Study

Laboratory Testing
Session

4

Given known relationships between attentional biases for sadness-related information and
depressive syndromes (and the availability of DASS-21 Depression subscale scores on hand),
the correlation between the extra-decisional Sad bias score and DASS-21 Depression was
also examined within the online dataset. This association was not significant, r = .026, p =
.801, supporting the specificity of the presently observed attentional bias to anxiety.
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Acccuracy (%)

97.86 [3.06]

98.06 [2.56]

Mean in ms [SD]

Mean in ms [SD]

Reaction Time

Trial Type

Traditional

Sad – Congruent

430.21 [83.11]

397.11 [63.95]

Sad – Incongruent

426.32 [67.92]

396.59 [65.32]

Fear – Congruent

435.58 [78.07]

394.82 [63.84]

Fear – Incongruent

432.03 [73.06]

396.82 [69.70]

Extra-

Sad – Congruent

363.34 [57.41]

337.13 [50.37]

decisional

Sad – Incongruent

373.38 [68.60]

336.82 [54.71]

Fear – Congruent

367.75 [65.92]

343.03 [53.06]

Fear – Incongruent

366.36 [61.96]

339.54 [53.08]

3.90 [4.05]

4.62 [4.22]

DASS-21 Anxiety

Table 6.2. Mean Fear and Sad bias scores, performance outcomes on CogState tests, and their
correlations with DASS-21 Anxiety. Outliers for bias scores and CogState test scores were
identified as data points +/- 3 SD from the mean, where N below denotes the number of
observations after outliers were removed. Initial N = 100 unless otherwise stated.
Online Study
N

Bias Scores

Mean

Correlation (r)

[SD]

with DASS-21

Laboratory Testing Session
N

Mean

Correlation (r)

[SD]

with DASS-21

Anxiety [p-

Anxiety [p-

value]

value]
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Traditional – Fear

93

-1.37

.127 [.224]

92

[28.85]
Traditional – Sad

92

-2.19

97

-2.31

.044 [.647]

90

97

5.01

0.81

-.005 [.961]

[26.23]
.116 [.260]

94

[36.22]
ED - Sad

-.054 [.607]

[31.70]

[28.72]
ED – Fear

-0.59

1.17

-.100 [.335]

[34.19]
.205* [.044]

95

[33.14]

2.82

-.026 [.803]

[32.54]

CogState tests
[Outcome Variable]
Continuous Paired

-

-

-

97

Associate Learning

59.14

-.067 [.516]

[42.52]

Test [err]
Detection Test [lmn]

-

-

-

93

2.58

.077 [.462]

[.089]
Groton Maze Chase

-

-

-

93

Test [mps]
Groton Maze

-.100 [.339]

[.53]
-

-

-

93

Learning Test [err]
Groton Maze

1.36

49.10

.007 [.950]

[17.29]
-

-

-

93

Learning Test –

5.78

.077 [.464]

[4.80]

Delayed Recall [err]
Identification Test
[lmn]

-

-

-

93

2.71
[.06]

-.003 [.976]
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International

-

-

-

92

Shopping List Test

27.48

-.168 [.110]

[3.86]

[cor]
International

-

-

-

91

Shopping List Test –

9.95

-.089 [.400]

[1.73]

Delayed Recall [cor]
One Card Learning

-

-

-

100

Test [acc]
One-Back Test [lmn]

.967

.018 [.859]

[.13]
-

-

-

98

2.87

-.070 [.494]

[.09]
Socio-Emotional

-

-

-

78a

Cognition Test [acc]
Two-Back Test [acc]

1.13

-.098 [.394]

[.12]
-

-

-

73a

1.14

.015 [.897]

[.10]
Set-Shifting Test [err]

-

-

-

71a

28.43

-.207 [.083]

[15.11]
*p < .05.
a

Initial N for these variables was 79 due to errors in data saving.

lmn = Speed of performance, log10 milliseconds; acc = Accuracy of performance, arsine
proportion; err = Error count; cor = Number of correct responses; mps = Moves per second.
Discussion
The present study sought to address two aims. The first aim was to examine whether
previous findings on the specificity of the anxiety-related attentional bias to mildly
threatening stimuli (Mogg et al., 2000) would be replicated, when sadness- and fear-related
scenes (i.e. scenes which convey signals of elapsed and potential danger) are used to
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thematically represent mild and high threat respectively. The second aim was two-fold: (a) to
examine the neurocognitive profile associated with anxiety, and (b) if neurocognitive
impairments are established, whether they would mediate the association between attentional
bias and self-reported anxiety measured in the same laboratory testing session.
Pertaining to the first aim, a selective association between indices of attentional bias
and self-reported anxiety was presently observed, such that attentional bias was associated
with anxiety only when indexed based on sadness- but not fear-related scenes. These findings
support and extend on previously established empirical evidence (Mogg et al., 2000) for
predictions made based on the cognitive-motivational framework (Mogg & Bradley, 1998;
Mogg & Bradley, 2018): Namely, that the anxiety-related attentional bias is specific to mildly
threatening stimuli, while attentional bias for highly threatening stimuli may represent a
normative function that is not modulated by anxiety. However, this selective association was
apparent only when indices of attentional bias were computed using extra-decisional reaction
times derived from drift-diffusion modelling, when measure of attentional bias and anxiety
were obtained via web-based data collection methods (i.e. in the online study, but not the
laboratory testing session). Besides adding to previously established support for the utility of
applying drift-diffusion modelling techniques to dot probe data in anxiety-related research
(Price et al., 2019), the current pattern of findings have other methodological implications for
the measurement of the anxiety-related attentional bias, which has been documented with
notable inconsistency across studies (see Van Bockstaele et al., 2014 for a review).
First, negative stimuli of differing threat value may not be equally sensitive to anxiety
when implemented in behavioural measures of attentional bias, and should be systematically
controlled for in the study of attentional bias in anxiety. To this end, current findings point to
sadness- and fear-related stimuli as a plausible thematic approach to represent threat on a
continuum of mild to high, without evoking ethical concerns associated with the presentation
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of highly arousing or emotionally distressing stimuli. Second, although incidental to the
main aim, the association between attentional bias and anxiety was presently observed only
within web- but not lab-collected data for the same participants. Where findings from webbased experiments and their laboratory counterparts do not corroborate, possible explanations
include technical and situational variation (Hilbig, 2016; Semmelmann & Weigelt, 2017).
The latter seems more likely in the present case, since the same browser-based dot probe task
was administered in both the online study and laboratory testing session. It has previously
been suggested that undertaking experiments in unfamiliar environments (and with unfamiliar
equipment) adds a cognitive load to the task at hand (Kim, Gabriel, & Gygax, 2019).
Relatedly, studies have shown that differences between anxious and non-anxious individuals
in the processing of emotional information taper off with increasing task demands (Vytal,
Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillion, 2012; Vytal, Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin & Grillion, 2013).
There are several potential accounts (not mutually exclusive) for these findings, including
that increased cognitive load may inhibit anxiety-related mechanisms from operating (Vytal
et al., 2012), or reduce emotional influences on attention and cognition more generally
(Pessoa, 2010). It is possible that the different patterns of association between dot probe task
performance and anxiety as presently observed between web- and lab-collected data may in
part be explained by different cognitive loads in the two settings (lower vs. higher
respectively). In addition to systematic control over the threat value of stimuli, current
findings suggest that thoughtful consideration should be given to the experimental setting in
endeavours to capture attentional bias associated with anxiety.
Pertaining to the second aim, performance across all CogState tests did not correlate
with anxiety, indicating that neurocognitive functioning did not vary with anxiety on the
whole. The finding that neurocognitive impairments are not more extreme at the higher end
of anxiety severity is not novel, but rather adds to the count of null findings [e.g. (Castaneda
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et al., 2011; Jarros et al., 2011; Leonard & Abramovitch, 2019; Troller-Renfree, Barker, Pine,
& Fox, 2015)] which sit within a larger body of inconsistent findings on neurocognitive
functioning in anxiety. One possible account for such null findings, is that cognitive
impairments in anxiety are more readily apparent on less conventionally-used neurocognitive
tests. According to a corollary in one prominent account of cognitive functioning in the ABTanxiety link (Attentional Control Theory; Eysenck et al., 2007), anxiety promotes enhanced
cognitive effort to ensure performance effectiveness is maintained on a given task, often at
the cost of processing speed. Thus, anxiety-related impairments are more likely to be
observed on cognitively-demanding tasks where processing speed is assessed (Derakshan &
Eysenck, 2009). While the CogState test battery has its merits in comprehensiveness and
standardisation, composite tests are predominantly accuracy-based, where tests which
evaluate processing speed only entail minimal cognitive load. Chiaravalloti et al. (2003) draw
a distinction between neurocognitive tasks which assess simple and complex processing
speed: While the former requires only a simple motor response to a single presented stimulus,
the latter requires the simultaneous and continuous manipulation of information in mind. It is
possible that tasks which tap complex processing speed might be better able to differentiate
anxious from non-anxious individuals (see (Zainal & Newman, 2018) for a similar
proposition), and should be considered in the prospective search for neurocognitive domains
associated with anxiety.
Alternatively, but not mutually exclusively, the experimental setting may also
partially explain the lack of correlations between CogState tests and anxiety as presently
observed. Pertaining to the current study’s second aim, mediation analyses were not pursued
partly on the grounds that correlations could not be established between targeted independent
variables and the dependent variable. That is, bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety measured
during the laboratory testing session were not correlated, although significant associations

147
were observed (albeit selectively) between the two measures when obtained within the online
setting. It is possible that the association between cognitive performance and anxiety may
also vary according to context (Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013). The current
study lacks an online counterpart to speak to this speculative hypothesis, which may be worth
incorporating in the design of future studies.
Other limitations of the present study include its sampling methods, which favoured
the recruitment of university students among whom the association between cognitive
functioning and anxiety might be unique. Although the inclusion of entry site (university vs.
community) did not alter the current pattern of findings, this might in part be explained by the
modest sample size. This sample size was compromised for some CogState tests due to
technology failures. A more demographically diverse and larger sample would help offset
doubts in the generalizability of study findings in future research. Additionally, although
anxiety was presently treated as a unitary construct, separate measures of trait and state
anxiety would have been helpful to partition situationally-driven effects (a notion of
particularly relevance to the current study) and should be considered in future investigations.
The discrepant direction of association between indices of ABT observed in the
current study and studies in previous chapters (Chapter 4 and 5) also warrants mention.
While inverse associations were observed in previous chapters, ABT was positively
associated with anxiety (for web-collected data) in the current study. It is possible that this
may be explained by differences in the nature of reaction times used to compute indices of
ABT. In the current study, indices of ABT were computed based on extra-decisional reaction
times derived from drift-diffusion modelling (thought to capture attentional processes with
irrelevant features of task performance removed), while traditional reaction times were used
in previous studies. However, findings from the next chapter cast doubt on this, with an
inverse association observed between indices of ABT computed using extra-decisional
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reaction times and anxiety. The reliance on assumptions about underlying visual processes
which have elapsed for the interpretation of observed associations between ABT and anxiety
represents a running limitation of this thesis, and is discussed in the General Discussion
chapter (Chapter 8).
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Chapter 7: Is the Anxiety-Related Attentional Bias Preferential to Sadness- Over FearRelated Stimuli? A Conceptual Replication Study
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7.1. Contextual Statement
Towards the main aims of the present thesis, a number of factors were examined for
their potential role in the association between ABT and anxiety across three empirical studies
spanning Chapters 4 to 6. Associated findings are summarised and evaluated in the next
chapter (Chapter 8: General Discussion). The current chapter presents a follow-up
exploratory investigation on the nature of the anxiety-related attentional bias, in light of
associative patterns incidentally observed between indices of ABT and self-reported anxiety
when fear- and sadness-related scenes were considered as separate classes of target images in
a dot probe task. Specifically, findings across the three main empirical studies presented thus
far (collective N = 620) appear to point to a preferential association between an ABT index
based on sadness-related scenes and self-reported anxiety, relative to an ABT index based on
fear-related scenes.
Although this preferential association was demonstrated with relative consistency
(barring boundary conditions in Study 3, Chapter 6), this finding was reproduced using the
same dot probe task, and thus the same set of fear- and sadness-related scenes. Many scholars
(e.g. Laws, 2016; Schmidt, 2009) draw a distinction between direct replications (reproduction
of a previous finding using the exact same procedure) and conceptual replications
(reproduction of a previous finding even after modifying a critical element of the procedure),
and emphasize the latter in order to determine the true implications of the original finding. In
the present case, it would be important to support the claim that the anxiety-related
attentional bias is preferential to sadness- over fear-related stimuli by demonstrating the
robustness of the phenomenon across different target images of the same class (i.e. that the
finding was not specific to the particular set of fear- and sadness-related scenes employed
thus far). The present study was conducted to meet this aim.
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7.2. Study
Methods
Participants
234 participants (154 Female; Mean Age = 25.91, SD = 10.37) were recruited via two
sources: the research participation scheme at the School of Psychology, University of
Wollongong (N = 121) and invitations placed on the online platform Reddit on relevant
forums designed to connect researchers and voluntary research participants (N = 113). These
participants were individuals who had not previously been involved in any research
pertaining to the present thesis. Data collection took place remotely via Psytoolkit
(www.psytookit.org). Recruitment site (university vs. Reddit) did not alter the pattern of
findings as presented in the Results section, nor did diagnostic history (N = 56 reported a
positive history of an anxiety disorder).

Measures and Procedures
The present study was conducted as an effort to conceptually replicate the finding that
the anxiety-related attentional bias is preferential to sadness- over fear-related stimuli, using a
dot probe task presenting a different set of target stimuli (i.e. different fear- and sadnessrelated scenes). All aspects of previously used measures were kept constant, including the
outcome measure of anxiety (DASS-21 Anxiety subscale), and configurations of the initial
dot probe task (specifics presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.3). Changes between the initial
and current dot probe task were only with regards to target images in stimulus pairs appearing
in the 24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-neutral trials (6 unique stimulus pairs repeated 4 times for
each condition). These replacement images were selected based on the categorical norming
study on IAPS images by Libkuman et al. (2007). All selected images had an intensity rating
of at least 6 (on a scale with a maximum of 10) on their targeted emotions. Social and non-
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social scenes were selected in equal parts, and matched to existing neutral counterparts of the
same social content. Target images in the initial six sad-neutral stimulus pairs were replaced
with scenes of the following IAPS codes: 9000, 9181, 9415, 9421, 9910, 9911. Target images
in the initial six fear-neutral stimulus pairs were replaced with scenes of the following IAPS
codes: 1052, 2751, 5972, 6230, 6300, 9620.
Participants completed the three main measures in the following order: 1) the DASS21; 2) the modified dot probe task; and, 3) as part of the manipulation check procedures for
the current study, participants also rated each of the six sadness- and fear-related scenes (12
images in total) on Fear and Sad intensity rating scales ranging from 1 to 10 following
completion of the dot probe task.
Results
The following participants were excluded from analyses: participants who did not
meet the minimum age requirement for adulthood (i.e. 18 years; N = 4), participants who did
not perform the dot probe task correctly (< 75% accuracy; N = 3), and participants who did
not respond thoughtfully on the intensity ratings task, as suggested in default responses of “1”
across all items (N = 7). The final participant pool consisted of 220 individuals (147 Female;
Mean Age = 25.76, SD = 10.21; Mean DASS-21 Anxiety Score = 5.44; SD = 4.18). Mean
accuracy rates on the dot probe were high, M = 97.82% (SD = 2.82%). Table 7.1 gives fear
and sad intensity ratings for target images averaged across these 220 individuals. Fear target
images were rated more highly on Fear (M = 5.27, SD = 2.51) than Sad (M = 2.87, SD =
1.67), t(219) = 18.59, p < .001, while Sad target images were rated more highly on Sad (M =
5.99, SD = 2.46) than Fear (M = 3.24, SD = 1.88), t(219) = 21.05, p < .001.
Fear and Sad bias scores were computed by subtracting mean reaction times on
congruent trials from mean reaction times on incongruent trials for fear-neutral and sadneutral trials respectively. As per the preceding empirical chapter (Study 3), drift-diffusion
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modelling techniques were also presently applied (using Fast-DM; A. Voss & J. Voss, 2007),
so that traditionally-computed bias scores were supplemented with bias scores computed
based on extra-decisional reaction times. Mean reaction times on trials and mean bias scores
they were used to compute these can be found in Table 7.2. These bias scores were examined
for their correlations with DASS-21 Anxiety. Results showed that traditionally-computed
bias scores were not associated with DASS-21 Anxiety, for both Fear (r = .040, p = .554) and
Sad bias score (r = .007, p = .912). Correlations (absolute magnitudes) with DASS-21
Anxiety were improved with the use of bias scores computed based on extra-decisional
reaction times (r = .120, p = .076 for Fear bias score; r = -.117, p = .085 for Sad bias score),
but did not unmask any selectivity in the association between indices of attentional bias and
self-reported anxiety.

Additional Analyses
Given the availability of intensity ratings for target stimuli on hand, additional
analyses were conducted to ascertain that poorly differentiated correlations between bias
scores and anxiety were not better explained by innappropriate stimulus selection.
Specifically, maximising the function of intensity ratings which were collected for target
images in the current dot probe task, correlational analyses between bias scores and DASS-21
Anxiety were repeated with two subsets of the original dataset created to maximise
qualitative differences between Fear and Sad target images. Table 7.1 is extended to also
include mean fear and sad intensity ratings for target images in these subsets.
For the first subset, intensity ratings were used to identify target images which were
least well-distinguished on their assigned negative emotion based on mean ratings across 220
participants. For Fear target images, the two images with the lowest difference score when
sad intensity ratings were subtracted from fear intensity ratings were IAPS no. 2751 (social)
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and IAPS no. 9620 (non-social), MDifference = 0.40, and 1.03 respectively. For Sad target
images, the two images with the lowest difference score when fear intensity ratings were
subtracted from sad intensity ratings were IAPS no. 9910 (social) and IAPS no. 9911 (nonsocial), MDifference = 1.59 and 1.85 respectively. For complete descriptives on intensity ratings
across all target images, please see Appendix K. The 8 fear-neutral and 8 sad-neutral trials
presenting the mentioned target images were removed1. Thus, instead of computing bias
scores using 24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-neutral trials across 220 participants, bias scores were
computed using 16 fear-neutral and 16 sad-neutral trials across 220 participants.
For the second subset, intensity data was used to identify participants who did not
perceive the current set of negative scenes as discretely as they were normed. To be included
in this subset, participants had to rate Fear and Sad target images dissimilarly on fear and
sadness intensity scales with a difference score of at least 1. This criterion excluded 83
participants2. Thus, bias scores were computed using 24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-neutral trials
across 137 (instead of 220) participants.
Besides mean reaction times on trials and bias scores computed across the full dataset,
Table 7.2 also gives the equivalent for the two data subsets, along with correlations between
bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety. While the pattern of associations between bias scores and
DASS-21 Anxiety observed in the full dataset was not altered in the first data subset3,
findings differed in the second data subset. Specifically, the extra-decisional Sad bias score

1

The option to exclude images (and the trials they appear in) on the basis of a specified cut off difference score
was available. However, participants were presented with two response scales (Fear and Sad intensity) for each
image they were tasked to rate. This comparative mode of presentation made it a challenge to objectively
quantify the distance between units of intensity, and to assert whether they are equal. For example, one
participant may have used ratings of 8 and 4 for Fear and Sad intensity to indicate that a picture was more fearthan sad-eliciting, while another participant may have used ratings of 2 and 1 to indicate the same pattern of
information processing. A decision was made to use ranked difference scores as a means of overcoming
anticipated inter-individual differences in internal scaling.
2
Excluded participants did not differ from included participants on demographics (age, gender, diagnostic
history) or study variables (all variants of bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety).
3
This may in part have been due to the number of trials being too small for robust parameter estimation in driftdiffusion modelling (A. Voss, J. Voss, & Lerche, 2015).
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showed a small but significant association with DASS-21 Anxiety (r = -.1854, p = .036) when
analyses were restricted to participants who perceived Fear and Sad target images as distinct
to a greater extent.

Table 7.1. Mean fear and sad intensity ratings for target images averaged across the full
dataset and two data subsets (created to maximise qualitative differences between Fear and
Sad target images).
Dataset

Target Image

Mean Fear

Mean Sad

Class

Intensity

Intensity Rating

Rating [SD]

[SD]

Full Dataset

Fear

5.27 [2.51]

2.87 [1.67]

(24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-

Sad

3.24 [1.88]

5.99 [2.46]

Data Subset 1

Fear (4

5.60 [2.67]

2.33 [1.67]

(16 fear-neutral and 16 sad-

images)

neutral trials, 220 participants)

Sad (4

2.76 [1.84]

6.03 [2.50]

neutral trials, 220 participants)

images)
Data Subset 2

Fear

6.23 [2.16]

2.98 [1.58]

(24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-

Sad

3.12 [1.57]

6.62 [2.19]

neutral trials, 137 participants)

4

As per the main empirical studies presented across Chapters 4 to 6, the absolute magnitude of the correlation is
presently interpreted (i.e. the direction of association is not considered meaningful). This is based on the
reasoning that heightened orientation to emotional stimuli on the dot probe task using a 500ms stimulus
exposure time can manifest in either increasing bias scores (faster reaction times to probes replacing emotional
stimuli) or decreasing bias scores (faster reaction times to probes replacing neutral stimuli due to facilitated
disengagement following initial attentional capture) (Barry, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2015; Booth, 2014).
Nonetheless, the reliance on assumptions about underlying visual processes which have elapsed for the
interpretation of observed associations between ABT and anxiety represents a running limitation of this thesis,
and is discussed in the General Discussion chapter (Chapter 8).
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Table 7.2. Mean reaction times on trials used to calculate traditional and extra-decisional bias
scores and correlations between bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety, across the full dataset and
two data subsets.
Reactio

Trial Type

n Time

Mean in

Bias

Correlation

ms [SD]

scores

s (r) with
DASS-21
Anxiety [pvalue]

Full

Traditio Sad – Congruent

412.09

Dataset

nal

[65.85]

(24 fear-

Sad –

409.30

neutral and

Incongruent

[71.03]

24 sad-

Fear – Congruent

408.87

neutral
Fear –

404.76

participants

Incongruent

[65.66]

Sad – Congruent

356.50

Extradecisio
nal

Fear

346.22

Incongruent

[58.25]

Fear – Congruent

348.06
[63.35]

.007 [.912]

-4.11

.040 [.554]

[35.86]

Sad

[59.53]
Sad –

-2.79
[36.03]

[70.37]

trials, 220

)

Sad

-10.28

-.117 [.085]

[36.52]

Fear

1.38
[45.00]

.120 [.076]
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Fear –

349.44

Incongruent

[60.93]

Data

Traditio Sad – Congruent

410.08

Subset 1

nal

[68.14]

(16 fear-

Sad –

409.21

neutral and

Incongruent

[86.28]

16 sad-

Fear – Congruent

409.40

neutral
Fear –

406.53

participants

Incongruent

[72.12]

Sad – Congruent

358.63

Extradecisio
nal

Fear

346.80

Incongruent

[62.38]

Fear – Congruent

346.52

Sad

347.27

Incongruent

[58.84]

Data

Traditio Sad – Congruent

409.79

Subset 2

nal

[67.89]

(24 fear-

Sad –

409.57

neutral and

Incongruent

[74.96]

24 sad-

Fear – Congruent

406.27

neutral

[74.76]

-2.87

-0.13 [.849]

-11.83

-.001 [.989]

[47.63]

Fear

[61.59]
Fear –

.008 [.904]

[43.79]

[59.22]
Sad –

-0.87
[48.69]

[72.27]

trials, 220

)

Sad

0.75

.043 [.530]

[44.51]

Sad

-0.22

.055 [.525]

[38.13]

Fear

-3.91
[35.74]

-.031 [.715]
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trials, 137

Fear –

402.36

participants

Incongruent

[69.14]

Sad – Congruent

352.63

)

Extradecisio
nal

Sad

[61.86]
Sad –

342.19

Incongruent

[59.48]

Fear – Congruent

342.99
[68.87]

Fear –

348.13

Incongruent

[65.64]

Fear

-10.44

-.185*

[39.68]

[.036]

5.14

.142 [.097]

[48.84]

*p < .05

Discussion
Across the three empirical studies in the previous chapters of the present thesis
(Chapters 4 – 6), fear- and sadness-related scenes were considered as separate classes of
target images in the assessment of ABT within a dot probe paradigm. Collective findings
point to a preferential association between an ABT index based on sadness-related scenes and
self-reported anxiety, relative to an ABT index based on fear-related scenes. The present
study explored whether the same associative pattern would be observed in the context of a
dot probe task presenting a different set of target images which have been normed for the
emotions of sadness and fear.
The previously observed associative pattern between indices of attentional bias and
self-reported anxiety was not replicated in initial analyses. However, replicative findings
were brought to the fore when several boundary conditions were imposed (discussed
shortly). The associative pattern between indices of attentional bias and anxiety as observed
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in secondary analyses of this study (and in previous chapters of this thesis) may in part be
explained by differences in threat value between fear and sad classes of stimuli, and are in
keeping with predictions from Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive-motivational
framework: Namely, that the anxiety-related attentional bias is specific to mildly threatening
stimuli (i.e. sadness-related scenes conveying elapsed danger), while attentional bias for
highly threatening stimuli (i.e. fear-related scenes conveying potential harm) may represent a
normative function which is relatively unmodulated by anxiety5.
As mentioned, the preferential association between the ABT index based on sadnessrelated scenes and self-reported anxiety (relative to ABT indexed by fear-related scenes) was
brought to the fore only when several boundary conditions were imposed. First, as per Study
3 (Chapter 6), the finding that the anxiety-related attentional bias was selective to sadnessbut not fear-related stimuli was observed only when correlational analyses were performed
with bias scores computed using extra-decisional reaction times derived from drift-diffusion
modelling techniques. Second, in the present study, this associative pattern was additionally
conditional on analyses being restricted to participants who perceived the current set of
negative stimuli more closely aligned with the discrete emotions for which they were normed.
Besides adding support for applying drift-diffusion modelling techniques to dot probe data in
research on the ABT-anxiety link, current findings also highlight the importance of subjective
responses to experimental stimuli, and the role that perceptual idiosyncrasies might play in
combination with stimulus features to influence associations between measures of (visual)
emotional attention and anxious pathology.
There are several aspects of the current findings which suggest the present conceptual
replication should be interpreted conservatively, pending further research. First, after

5

The potential selectivity of the anxiety-related attentional bias was examined as part of the main aims in Study
3 (Chapter 6) within the context of Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive-motivational framework. A more
detailed description of the framework can be found in within the manuscript presented in Chapter 6.
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restricting analyses to selected participants (i.e. Data Subset 2), correlation coefficients for
bias scores and self-reported anxiety did not differ greatly in absolute magnitude between
Fear bias score (r = |.142|) and Sad bias score (r = |.185|). Although only the latter coefficient
achieved statistical significance, the closely-matched magnitudes challenge conclusions on
the selectivity of the anxiety-related attentional bias. Second, the selection criterion for Data
Subset 2 (participants had to rate Fear and Sad target images dissimilarly on fear and sadness
intensity scales with a difference score of at least 1) excluded a substantial portion of the
sample (N = 83; 37.7%). This compromised the sample size from which conclusions were
drawn. Along with the second boundary condition described in the paragraph above, the
observed high exclusion rate contraindicates relying solely on external norms for the content
of visual stimuli (specifically, naturalistic scenes) in research involving measures of
emotional attention. Failure to record sample-specific norms for the emotional content of
target stimuli (i.e. homogeneity of stimulus perception was assumed when ABT was
assessed) may thus represent a potential running limitation across the empirical studies of the
present thesis, and will be further discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 8: General
Discussion).
As a way of prefacing the next chapter, it is worth noting that the present chapter
deviates from the central focus of the present thesis in its exploration of procedural
moderators of the ABT-anxiety link. In light of incidental findings observed across empirical
studies in Chapters 4 to 6, the present study further explored the experimental conditions
under which correlations between indices of ABT and anxiety might be more consistently
established. It is perhaps unsurprising that a few challenges were encountered to this end. As
described in the Introduction (Chapter 1), inconsistent findings on the association between
ABT and anxiety are likely to (at least in part) reflect actual phenomena, which in turn
motivated the central focus of this thesis on the role of stable individual differences in the
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ABT-anxiety link. The explanatory power of methodological accounts for inconsistent
associations in the ABT-anxiety link (and their limits) are further discussed in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8: General Discussion

8.1. Summary of Key Findings and Their Clinical Implications
The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link in the context of a research
program extending from that of the information-processing approach. Specifically, one where
the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by considering ABT as an
indirect or component predictor of anxiety, where stable individual differences are considered
for their role in the ABT-anxiety link. The end goal was to identify theoretically-relevant
moderators and mediators of the ABT-anxiety link which may ultimately be clinically useful,
or more precisely serve to refine the design of attentional bias modification programs. Three
empirical studies were conducted to investigate a number of factors (with conceptual ties to
RDoC domains) which may moderate or mediate the relationship between ABT and anxiety.
A follow-up study was also conducted in light of the pattern of association incidentally
observed between indices of attentional bias and anxiety, owing to methodological
considerations taken on board in the assessment of ABT within the present thesis. Figure 8.1
presents a graphical representation of the pattern of findings from investigations of the
current thesis.
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Figure 8.1. Graphical representation of the pattern of findings from investigations of the
present thesis. Arrows with dashed lines denote non-significant relationships. Note that
mediation models were intended but not tested in Chapter 6 (Study 3) as correlations could
not be established between targeted independent and dependent variables (in-lab bias scores
and DASS-21 Anixety ratings).

The first study (Chapter 4) examined whether attentional biases towards and away
from positive stimuli would moderate the association between attentional bias for threat and
anxiety. While attentional bias for positive stimuli did not independently predict anxiety, the
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association between attentional bias for threat and anxiety differed between participants
characterized by attentional biases towards and away from positive stimuli. Specifically,
attentional bias for threat was associated with anxiety only among persons characterised by
an attentional bias away from positive stimuli, who in turn may represent a subgroup of
individuals characterised by higher ruminative tendencies. While not stated as part of the
study’s aims in the manuscript presented in Chapter 4, findings from this study also
demonstrate that the separate constructs of ABT and positive attentional bias can be
simultaneously assessed by including a wider range of target stimuli in a single experiment
set up to capture patterns of attentional processing (the dot probe paradigm in this case).
Given that baseline measures of ABT are typically obtained as part of the pre-treatment
protocol in attentional bias modification programs (e.g. Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea,
2009; Chau, Tse, So, & Chan, 2019; Linke et al., 2019), incorporating positively valenced
target stimuli in baseline measures of ABT may offer a way of differentiating candidates
more or less likely to benefit from training sessions, without imposing major burdens of
effort or time on either the researcher/treatment provider or participant.
The second study (Chapter 5) examined two models of the role of loneliness in the
association between attentional bias for threat and anxiety: (1) A moderation model (the
ABT-anxiety link is moderated by loneliness), and (2) A proxy model (the ABT-anxiety link
is better explained by loneliness). Findings supported the latter model, and interpreted in light
of relevant theory (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley, Mogg, Falla &
Hamilton, 1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews,
1988; J. T. Cacioppo & S. Cacioppo, 2018; J. T. Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven,
Bijttebier, & Goossens, 2017), suggest that loneliness may be one driving source of
exaggerated threat appraisals which underpin the association between ABT and anxiety.
Within the manuscript presented in Chapter 5, it was noted that the observed pattern of
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findings should not be taken as support for targeting loneliness in favour of ABT among
anxious individuals given caveats associated with interventions for loneliness. Specifically,
existing interventions for loneliness tend to serve to provide opportunities for an individual to
extend their social network, which may not necessarily generalize to reductions in subjective
feelings of social isolation (S. Cacioppo, Grippo, London, Goossens, & J. T. Cacioppo, 2015;
Masi, Chen, Hawkley, & J. T. Cacioppo, 2011; Ypsilanti, 2018). Interestingly, while not
developed to target loneliness per se, studies have shown that mindfulness training programs
produce pre- to post-treatment decreases in self-reported loneliness or increases in social
connectedness (Cohen & Miller, 2009; Seppala, Hutcherson, Ngyuen, Doty, & Gross, 2014;
Aspy & Proeve, 2017). It has been suggested that mindfulness down-regulates the threat
system (Hickey, Nelson, & Meadows, 2017), a notion supported by research demonstrating
that higher levels of mindfulness are associated with the tendency to evaluate possible
sources of threat more benignly (Hoffman & Geisler, 2020; Weinstein, Brown, & Ryan,
2009). While loneliness is thought to increase one’s focus on self-preservation and an
enhanced perception of threat in the external world (J. T. Cacioppo & S. Cacioppo, 2018; J.
T. Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven et al., 2017), it has also been noted that being in a
state of constant vigilance for threat also, in a vicious cycle, increases the individual’s
feelings of social isolation (Hawkley & J. T. Cacioppo, 2010). It is possible that pre- to posttreatment decreases in self-reported loneliness observed in mindfulness training programs
(Cohen & Miller, 2009; Seppala et al., 2014; Aspy & Proeve, 2017) may in part be explained
by decreases in threat perception, thus interrupting the self-perpetuating loop just described.
If the association between ABT and anxiety is modulated by exaggerated threat appraisals,
which in turn is exacerbated by loneliness, providers of attentional bias modification
programs for anxiety may consider integrating mindfulness training practices to strengthen
therapeutic outcomes.
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Alternatively, it is possible that pre- to post-treatment decreases in loneliness
observed in mindfulness training programs may simply be explained by bonding processes or
feelings of solidarity, given many mindfulness training programs (including those cited
earlier; Cohen & Miller, 2009; Seppala et al., 2014; Aspy & Proeve, 2017) tend to be
interpersonally-oriented in that they are conducted in the context of interactive group settings.
This can be contrasted with the nature of computerised psychological interventions (including
attentional bias modification programs), which are largely self-administered and involve
minimal interaction between participants and therapist (Taylor & Luce, 2003; Davies,
Morriss, & Glazebrook, 2014). Regardless of which of the above accounts is preferred for
pre- to post-treatment decreases in loneliness observed in mindfulness training programs,
when considered alongside presently observed associations between loneliness and anxiety
(both independently and interactively with ABT), clinical implications are similar; namely,
that it would be important to integrate a psychosocial component in attentional bias
modification programs for anxiety.
Pertaining to Study 3 (Chapter 6), it is important for subsequent discussion to first note
that data collection was characterised by two phases: an online component preceding a
laboratory testing session. ABT was assessed on both counts. A neurocognitive test battery
(CogState; www.cogstate.com) was administered during the laboratory testing session, with
the end goal of examining whether neurocognitive impairments would mediate the
association between ABT and anxiety. ABT was associated with anxiety only in online data
(i.e. correlations could not be established between ABT and anxiety measured during the
laboratory testing session). Further contraindicating the pursuit of mediation analyses, indices
of performance across all CogState tests did not correlate with self-reported anxiety within
the laboratory testing session. As highlighted within the scoping review presented in Chapter
2 and the study presented in Chapter 6, there has been notable inconsistency in findings on
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whether neurocognitive impairments are associated with anxious pathology. In turn, these
inconsistent findings raise the question of whether neurocognitive functioning is weighted
less in anxious pathology, or whether neurocognitive impairments associated with anxiety are
localised in domains outside the range of assessment in previous studies. Current findings
appear to support the former notion, in that neurocognitive functioning was not associated
with anxious pathology even when assessed across a relatively wide range of domains (i.e.
using the CogState, a standardised, comprehensive neurocognitive test battery). While
research on other forms of psychopathology have demonstrated that neurocognitive training
(and neurocognitive improvements) can produce reductions in symptom severity (see Kim,
Bahk, W.H. Lee, J.S. Lee, & Choi, 2018 for a review), current findings do not seem to
support the clinical utility of neurocognitive training among anxious individuals (whether as
an adjunctive to attentional bias modification programs, or as an alternative for individuals
who may not be suitable candidates for attentional bias modification programs). This being
said, it must be noted the possibility remains that cognitive impairments associated with
anxiety are more readily apparent on less conventionally-used neurocognitive tests which
were not part of the CogState battery (described in more detail in the Discussion section of
the study presented in Chapter 6). Pending further research, implications from this study
should be drawn tentatively.
Across all three empirical studies described above, attentional bias for sadness- and
fear-related scenes were indexed using the same dot probe task, and considered separately
where associations between ABT and self-reported anxiety were examined. A follow-up
study (Chapter 7) was conducted to examine the associative pattern between indices of
attentional bias and anxiety using a dot probe task presenting a different set of target stimuli
(i.e. fear- and sadness-related scenes). Although the focus of the present thesis was not on the
procedural moderators of the ABT-anxiety link, results across all four studies indicated that
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an ABT index based on sadness-related scenes was preferentially associated with selfreported anxiety, relative to an ABT index based on fear-related scenes. It is possible that this
finding may be explained by differences in threat value between sadness- and fear-related
scenes (mild vs. high threat respectively), and that anxiety is characterised (and possibly
perpetuated) by exaggerated alarm responses to mild threat (i.e. benign objects or events;
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Beck, 1986). While it would appear logical to propose that
attentional bias modification programs should restrict training procedures to reduce
attentional allocation for mildly threatening stimuli, the clinical implications of these findings
are unlikely to be straightforward. That is, operating on “better-safe-than-sorry” heuristics
also serves a self-preserving function, in that detecting potential sources of danger which turn
out to be benign is more adaptive than overlooking them and having to face the consequences
in cases they bear actual harm (Gilbert, 1998; de Jong & Vroling, 2014). However, where
subjective threat value of stimuli is important to consider in the assessment of ABT in
anxiety, and by extension the reduction of ABT in anxiety, there is a (somewhat obscure) line
of work within efforts to develop attentional bias modification programs which has taken to
employing tailored, idiosyncratically-feared training stimuli (Thomas, Gonsalvez, &
Johnstone, 2013; Amir, Beard, Burns & Bomyea, 2009). More precisely, within this variant
of attentional bias modification programs, anxious individuals are trained over multiple
sessions to divert their attention from a subset of stimuli they personally rated as most
negative within a broader range of threat-related stimuli. Current findings suggest such
training procedures should be given more recognition than presently allocated1, although
further research is needed to determine if the cost of time and effort in tailoring each training

1

Other findings from the current thesis which support the use of idiosyncratic stimuli in attentional bias
modification programs are those from the follow-up study presented in Chapter 7, where sample-specific ratings
of negative stimuli normed externally for their emotional content were observed.
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task per participant produces therapeutic benefits exceeding that of training tasks built on a
one-size-fits-all approach.
Several other procedural moderators of the ABT-anxiety link were also identified in
the course of addressing the main aims of the present thesis. Specifically, where associations
were observed between an ABT index based on sadness-related scenes and anxiety, in some
cases these results were produced only within the constraints of additional boundary
conditions, as illustrated in Figure 8.1. These observations have implications for future
research more so than they bear clinical implications, and are so organised to be further
discussed in Section 8.3 (Collective Implications and Directions for Future Research)
following an explication of the limitations of the current thesis in 8.2 (Methodological
Limitations and Other Caveats).
An aspect of the overall findings to note is that correlations between indices of ABT
and anxiety were small where they were significant (r representing the relationship between
Sad bias score and DASS-21 Anxiety ranged from |.127| to |.205|, which in turn translates to
an r-square or explained variance range between 1.6% to 4.2%). This represents both a caveat
and possible theoretical contribution of the present thesis, as further discussed in the next two
subsections that follow.

8.2. Methodological Critique and Other Caveats
8.2.1. Methodological critique
8.2.1.1. Cross-sectional research design. A key assumption in the present thesis was
such that the direction of influence led from ABT to anxiety, and that this pathway might
potentially be modified or mediated by other study variables. However, single time-point
measures were used to address research questions across the empirical studies of the present
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thesis, and causal interpretations are constrained given the link between ABT and anxiety is
likely bidirectional in the long run (van Bockstaele, Verschuere, Tibboel, De Houwer,
Crombez, & Koster, 2014). Similarly, although the role of moderators and/or mediators in the
ABT-anxiety link were proposed on the basis of theoretical plausibility, inferences on the
nature and direction of these relationships cannot be conclusively drawn within the
constraints of cross-sectional data. For example, in Study 2 (Chapter 5), the statistical
relationship between ABT and anxiety was lost after loneliness was accounted for. While it
was concluded that the association between ABT and anxiety may be better explained by
loneliness, it remains possible that anxiety may play a precedent role over ABT in explaining
loneliness.
8.2.1.2. Outcome measures. One strength of the present thesis was that it was
designed to also capture depressive symptomatology where anxiety was the main outcome
variable of interest. Given the two clusters of symptoms frequently co-occur, research on
predictive models of either syndrome should include a measure of the other to demonstrate
the disorder-specificity of effects, which the present thesis was able to do across three (main)
empirical studies. However, in a related line of thought, only one outcome measure was used
in present endeavours to capture the core symptoms of anxiety (the DASS-21 Anxiety
subscale). As mentioned within the Introduction chapter (Section 1.1.1), other measures have
been developed for this purpose (e.g. Beck Anxiety Inventory; Beck & Steer, 1993).
Demonstrating the robustness of current findings across different measures of transdiagnostic
anxious pathology would have aided in determining their true implications.
8.2.1.3. Range restriction. A convenience sampling method was applied when
participants were recruited to address research questions in the three main empirical studies
of the present thesis, in keeping with the RDoC-given guideline that “sampling should be
designed to ensure a broad range of scores in each dimension of theoretical and experimental
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interest” (Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016). Although this sampling method provided for reasonable
numbers and adequate variability in self-reported anxiety within samples for each study,
mean anxiety levels were low [DASS-21 Anxiety = 3.49 and 3.38 in Study 1 and 2; 3.90
(online study) and 4.62 (laboratory testing session) in Study 3]2. Although controlling for
diagnostic history did not alter results as reported across all three empirical studies, this range
restriction makes it unclear whether presently observed findings would generalize to
individuals experiencing (or prone to experiencing) anxious pathology more severely.
8.2.1.4. Measurement of ABT: Reliance on external norms for target stimuli.
Across the main empirical studies of the present thesis, it was assumed that negative stimuli
used to capture ABT in the dot probe task were perceived as they were normed in the
judgement study presented in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2). Thus, manipulation checks were not
subsequently performed or considered. However, when intensity ratings for target stimuli
were obtained on a precautionary basis in the follow-up study presented in Chapter 7
(conducted to examine associations between indices of ABT and anxiety in the context of a
dot probe task presenting a different set of target images), several observations suggest this
may have been an oversight. First, it was observed that there was a significant proportion of
the sample who did not perceive externally-normed Fear and Sad target images dissimilarly
(37.7%). Second, excluding these individuals from analyses unmasked associations (and
patterns of associations) between indices of ABT and anxiety not otherwise observed with the
sample considered as a whole. These findings highlight that subjective responses to
emotional stimuli in a given sample may not necessarily concur with the emotions for which
they were normed in an external study, and that these perceptual idiosyncrasies may be
important to consider in the association between measures of (visual) emotional attention and

The DASS-21 classifies scores on the Anxiety subscale in the following ranges of severity: Normal – 0 to 3,
Mild – 4 to 5, Moderate – 6 to 7, Severe – 8 to 9, Extremely Severe – 10+.
2
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anxious pathology. Failing to record sample-specific norms for the emotional content of
target stimuli thus represents a running limitation across the main empirical studies of the
present thesis.
8.2.1.5. Measurement of ABT: Computation of bias indices. Drift-diffusion
modelling techniques were applied to dot probe data in the later empirical studies of the
current thesis (Chapters 6 and 7), representing a methodological strength in allowing for bias
scores to be computed using reaction times with irrelevant components of task performance
removed (i.e. extra-decisional reaction times). In turn, bias scores computed using extradecisional reaction times served to unmask associative patterns between indices of ABT and
anxiety not otherwise observed using traditionally-computed bias scores. It should be noted,
however, that drift-diffusion modelling techniques were applied only to later and not all
empirical studies of the current thesis, i.e. only where challenges in establishing correlations
between traditionally-computed indices of ABT and anxiety were encountered. Further, this
did not alleviate challenges associated with the traditional formula for bias score computation
based on dot probe task performance (subtracting mean reaction times on congruent trials
from mean reaction times on incongruent trials). Specifically, where negative associations
were observed between derivative bias scores and self-reported anxiety (Chapters 4, 5, and
7), the claim that the association reflects a relationship between heightened attentional
orientation and anxiety had to be drawn based on assumptions about underlying processes
which had elapsed (i.e. that faster responses to probes replacing neutral stimuli also entail that
attention for threat-related stimuli was captured more quickly).
8.2.3. Other caveats
8.2.3.1. Omissions. At the time of writing, a sixth major functional domain
(Sensorimotor Systems) has been proposed within the RDoC framework. However, given
that the domain is still in early stages in terms of theory and research, the initial five-domain
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RDoC framework was adopted in the current thesis. Moreover, based on research priorities
identified in the scoping review presented in Chapter 2, not all domains outside the Negative
Valence Systems (i.e. the domain to which ABT has been linked) were presently considered
in the selection of third variables to be examined in the ABT-anxiety link. The RDoC
framework additionally indicates two additional elements acting on all functional domains:
neurodevelopmental and environmental aspects (National Institute of Mental Health, 2020).
These elements were also not considered in the present thesis.
8.2.3.2. Small effect sizes. As mentioned earlier (end of Section 8.1), presently
observed correlations between indices of ABT and anxiety (and thus the variance in anxiety
explained by ABT) were small. Given the present thesis was centred around the ABT-anxiety
link, these small effect sizes have a negative impact on the overall clinical value of the
present thesis. However, presently observed small effect sizes may also serve to reinforce
previous discussion on the weighted role of ABT in anxiety (and in part the rationale
underpinning the current project): namely, that ABT is neither necessary nor sufficient for
anxious pathology to occur (Barry, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2015; van Bockstaele et al., 2014).
Alternate ways to conceive of presently observed small effect sizes are considered in the next
section, before drawing a more definitive conclusion.

8.3. Collective Implications and Directions for Future Research
Barring the methodological limitations and caveats detailed above, collective findings
from the present thesis have several implications for future research. First, individual
differences are not commonly considered a source of variance in the link between ABT and
anxiety within research led by the dominant information-processing approach. However,
findings from the present thesis suggest that psychological factors do modulate the
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association between ABT and anxiety, and highlight the utility of these factors towards the
development of theoretical models and clinical interventions for anxiety centred around ABT.
In future research on the ABT-anxiety link, findings from the present thesis support an
extended research program in relation to that of the information-processing approach;
specifically, one where the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by
considering ABT as an indirect or component predictor of anxiety.
Second, while not the focus of the present thesis, several procedural moderators of the
ABT-anxiety link were identified in the course of addressing the main aims of the present
thesis, which in turn may have implications for the assessment of ABT in future anxietyrelated research. In this regard, the content of negative stimuli used to capture attention
appears to be a primary moderator of the ABT-anxiety link. That is, findings from the present
thesis indicate that ABT indexed on sadness-related scenes was preferentially associated with
self-reported anxiety, relative to ABT indexed on fear-related scenes. As mentioned earlier, it
is possible that this finding may be explained by differences in threat value between sadnessand fear-related scenes (mild vs. high threat respectively), and that anxiety is characterised
(and possibly perpetuated) by exaggerated alarm responses to mild threat (Mogg & Bradley,
1998; Beck, 1986). Future research on the ABT-anxiety link should seek to systematically
control for the content (if not threat value) of negative stimuli used to capture attention in
measures of ABT. Secondary procedural moderators of the ABT-anxiety link (i.e. procedural
moderators conditional on the use of sadness-related stimuli to assess ABT) identified in the
present thesis were (see Figure 8.1 for an illustration): (1) The use of extra-decisional
reaction times derived from drift-diffusion modelling to compute bias scores (vs. traditional
reaction times; Study 3, Chapter 6 and Follow-Up Study, Chapter 7), (2) Remote data
collection methods (vs. in-lab testing; Study 3, Chapter 6), and (3) the restriction of analyses
to participants who perceived target stimuli more closely aligned with the discrete emotions
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for which they were normed (vs. full sample data; Follow-Up Study, Chapter 7). Tentatively,
these factors may also be important to consider in the assessment of ABT in anxiety (in
addition to systematic control over the content/threat value of negative stimuli used to capture
attention), although further confirmatory research is warranted in each aspect.
The implications and directions for future research presented above should be
evaluated, bearing in mind that presently observed correlations between indices of ABT and
anxiety were small overall (r representing the relationship between Sad bias score and DASS21 Anxiety ranged from |.127| to |.205|, which in turn translates to an r-square or explained
variance range between 1.6% to 4.2%). As earlier mentioned, despite ABT playing only a
limited role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety, there are alternate ways to conceive
of these small effect sizes. One possible account is that presently observed small effect sizes
reflect the inherent limited sensitivity of “noisy” reaction-time-based measures to self-report
measures of psychopathology (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018), the assumption of which
may in turn explain persistent research enthusiasm for the ABT-anxiety link despite relatively
weak associations. Indeed, small effect sizes similar to those reported in this thesis do not
appear to be uncommon in other anxiety-related studies using the dot probe task (e.g. Abend
et al., 2018; Campbell & Kertz, 2019; Ho, Yeung, & Mak, 2017; Klein, de Voogd, Wiers, &
Salemink, 2018; Miloff, Savva, & Carlbring, 2015) and other behavioural measures of ABT
(e.g. de Voogd, Wiers, & Salemink, 2017; Brown et al., 2014; Verkuil, Brosschot, Putman, &
Thayer, 2009).
Yet, statistical techniques employed in the present thesis to overcome precisionrelated issues associated with manual reaction-time-based measures only had limited success
in improving correlations between indices of ABT and anxiety. Specifically, drift-diffusion
modelling techniques employed to derive extra-decisional reaction times (and indices of
ABT) with irrelevant features of dot probe task performance removed, still did not produce
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correlations between ABT and anxiety beyond the low range (r = |.205| at ceiling). In other
studies beyond the present thesis which have complemented behavioural measures of ABT
(i.e. reaction-time-based measures) with eye-tracking (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, & Hyatt,
2013; Veerapa et al., 2020), neuroimaging (Price et al., 2014; Harrewjin et al., 2020), or
electroencephalography techniques (Kappenman, Farrens, Luck, & Proudfit, 2014),
supplementary indices of ABT derived from these more advanced (and assumedly more
precise) methodologies also tend to yield correlations with anxiety falling in the low (r <
|.300|) and/or non-significant range. It may be timely at this point to revisit the
Wittgensteinian quote laid out at outset of the Introduction (Chapter 1) in the present thesis:
“… the problems and the method pass each other by.”
In the Introduction, the quote was utilized to illustrate that inconsistent findings on the
association between ABT and anxiety cannot be explained fully by the lack of sensitivity of
measures of ABT to anxiety. Rather, inconsistent findings on the association between ABT
and anxiety reflect actual phenomena which make sense when the adaptive aspects of ABT
are considered (Section 1.2.1.1), a notion indirectly supported by findings of the present
thesis.
An integration of current and previous findings on the ABT-anxiety link suggests that the
implications of the quote extends to the associative magnitude between ABT and anxiety,
such that small effect sizes cannot fully be explained by limitations of methodology. As
research on ABT (and attentional bias modification programs) in relation to anxiety continues
to expand, it may be important to note that the volume of work elapsed on ABT in research
on the etiology and maintenance of anxiety should not be conflated with the centrality of
ABT in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety. Ideally, these considerations should be

177
taken on board in the design of studies on the ABT-anxiety link and of attentional bias
modification programs, to which end the present thesis represents a starting point.
In conclusion, it is important to highlight that the above discussion does not entail that
the Negative Valence Systems should be subsidiarised in the conceptualization of anxious
pathology. That is, the RDoC framework was used to guide the present thesis, and ABT was
treated as a proxy for the Negative Valence Systems for the purpose of having a backdrop to
work against. There is a wealth of evidence, both anecdotal and empirical, to suggest that
habitual patterns of responding to aversive situations or contexts (i.e. the primary function of
the Negative Valence Systems as defined in the RDoC framework) are key in differentiating
anxious individuals from their non-anxious counterparts. Although a simplified version of the
RDoC framework was applied in the present thesis, the RDoC framework additionally parses
each major functional domain into subsidiary functional systems termed “constructs”.
Outcomes of the present thesis suggest that future research on the ABT-anxiety link within
context of the RDoC framework may benefit from considering ABT as a sub-order construct
of the Negative Valance Systems, rather than constituent of the Negative Valence Systems.
Precisely, ABT may be best conceptualised as a component rather than central process
involved in anxiety.
8.4. Addendum
Through the empirical chapters (Chapter 4 to 6) that relied on the main dot probe task
of the present thesis (described in Section 3.3), sadness- and fear-related scenes (i.e. scenes
which convey signals of elapsed and potential danger) were assumed to thematically
represent mild and high threat respectively. However, this experimental manipulation was
never directly empirically validated, i.e. Sad and Fear scenes used the in dot probe task of this
thesis were never rated for their threatening properties, but were assumed to vary from mild
to high threat based on their content.
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Given the assumption that Sad and Fear scenes vary on a continuum of mild to high
threat runs across the empirical chapters of the present thesis (and is central to the
interpretation of findings from the present thesis), a post-hoc study was initiated at point of
revision (March 2021) to empirically test the assumption. A survey was set up to collect
threat ratings for each of the six Fear and Sad scenes (12 in total) which appeared in the main
dot probe task of the present thesis. Images were presented sequentially in alternate order of
Fear and Sad, with the following prompt for each image: “On a scale of 1 to 10, how
threatening do you find the content in this picture? A rating of 1 indicates you do not find it
threatening at all. A rating of 10 indicates you find it extremely threatening”. A call for
participants was placed on the sub-Reddit r/SampleSize.
An unexpectedly high number of responses were received. After removing incomplete
responses (N =24), there were 1319 participants who provided threat ratings for each of the
twelve experimental stimuli. These 1319 participants had a mean age of 26.07 (SD = 9.81),
were 50.5% (666) Male, and were distributed across the following countries: 52.4% (691)
United States, 9.1% (120) United Kingdom, 7.9% (104) Canada, 3.7% (49) Germany, 3.0%
(39) Australia (proportions for all other countries were < 2.5%).
Data was collapsed across 1319 participants, and images were made the main unit of
observation to allow for Fear and Sad images to be compared on threat ratings. Data for this
study, in pre-collapsed and collapsed forms, can be accessed via two separate sheets labelled
accordingly at https://osf.io/dbxpz. A t-test performed using SPSS indicated that threat
ratings were approximately twice as high for Fear images (M = 6.60, SD = .88) than Sad
images (M = 3.12, SD = .87), t(10) = 6.91, p < .001.
Given this post-hoc study was aimed at gaining a better of understanding of how
threatening Sad and Fear images were considered in the broader general public, individual

179
differences were not considered/controlled for. However, the strength in sample size (N =
1319) serves to alleviate some concerns on whether threat ratings obtained were specific to a
given psychological profile. Barring potential limitations of generalisability, findings from
this post-hoc study add empirical support for the assumption that Sad and Fear scenes vary on
a continuum of mild to high threat, and add strength to empirical chapters of this thesis by
supporting the validity of the employed experimental manipulation and interpretation of
emergent findings.
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Appendix A: Search terms entered in each database
Scopus:
( TITLE ( anxiety ) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "risk factor*" OR "contributing factor*"
OR "predisposing factor*" ) AND NOT TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "social phobia" ) AND NOT
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "social anxiety" ) AND NOT TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "phobia" ) AND
NOT TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "panic disorder" ) AND NOT TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ocd OR
"obsessive compulsive disorder" OR "obsessive-compulsive disorder" ) AND NOT
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ptsd OR "post-traumatic stress disorder" OR trauma ) AND NOT
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( depression ) )

PsycINFO:
TI anxiety AND ( risk factors or contributing factors or predisposing factors ) NOT ( ocd or
obsessive compulsive disorder ) NOT ( ptsd or post traumatic stress disorder or posttraumatic
stress disorder or post-traumatic stress disorder or trauma ) NOT ( social anxiety or social
phobia or social anxiety disorders ) NOT panic disorder NOT depression

PubMed:
“predisposing factor*” [All Fields] OR “contributing factor*” [All Fields] OR "correlat*”
[All Fields] OR "predict*"[All Fields] OR "associat*"[All Fields] OR "risk factor*"[All
Fields] AND "anxiety"[title] NOT "social anxiety"[All Fields] NOT "social phobia"[All
Fields] NOT "phobia"[All Fields] NOT "panic disorder"[All Fields] NOT "OCD"[All Fields]
NOT "obsessive-compulsive"[All Fields] NOT "PTSD"[All Fields] NOT "posttraumatic"[All Fields] NOT "depression"[All Fields]
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Appendix B: List of excluded cases
A total of 159 cases (across 84 studies) were excluded. In the table below, numbered reasons
for exclusion denote the following: 1 = Sociodemographics (40 cases), 2 = Health-risk
behaviours or lifestyle factors (19 cases), 3 = Family history of psychopathology (15 cases), 4
= Negative life events or life stressors (18 cases), 5 = Other mental health disorders or
chronic physical health conditions (26 cases), 6 = Parenting factors (27 cases), 7 = Physical
environmental factors (2), 8 = Variables too broad to be tied to an RDoC Domain (12 cases).

Case
no.

Cases
excluded
from
studies
which
appear in
main
review

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14



Reference

Cases Excluded

Breinholst et Paternal Rejection
al., 2018
Brice Lepiece Age
et al., 2019
Having a paid job
Gender
Urbanisation
Household income
Cannabis/Alcohol Use
Broeren et
Stressful life events
al., 2014
Brown et al., Anxiety diagnosis status of
2012
their co-twin
Brumariu &
Lower ability to manage
Kerns, 2012
intense emotions
Cassidy et
Childhood parenting
al., 2009
environment
Drake,
Lower ability for cognitive
Timko, &
defusion with respect to
Luoma, 2016 unpleasant private
experiences
Lower distress tolerance
Gagne et al.,
2017

Familial psychiatric history

Reason
for
Exclusion
(1-8)
6

Total No.
of
Excluded
Cases
1

1

6

1
1
1
1
2
4

1

3

1

8

1

6

1

8

2

8
3

1

Variables tagged with the superscript “” are emotion-regulatory factors which could potentially be classified
as NVS-related variables (i.e. responses to aversive stimuli). However, these factors were presently excluded in
light of ongoing discussion on whether emotional regulation may constitute an RDoC domain of its own
(Fernandez, Jazaieri, & Gross, 2016; Sun et al., 2017).
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15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

1

HazlettStephens et
al., 2012
Hudson &
Dodd, 2012

Thought-action fusion1

8

1

Maternal over-involvement

6

3

Maternal negativity
Maternal anxiety

6
3

Hudson et al., Overinvolved and negative
2011
parenting
Parental anxiety
Izadpanah et Maladaptive cognitiveal., 2016
emotion regulation
Kerns et al.,
Family negative life events
2011
Mother’s anxiety
Maternal sensitivity
Mount et al
Maternal sensitivity
2010
Owens et al
Age
2014
Roza et al.,
Externalizing
2003
problems/behaviours
Steiner et al
Frequency of religious
2017
attendance
Frequency of private
religious activity
Intrinsic religiosity
Stevens et al Parental control
2015
Parental intrusiveness
Parental rejection
Parental over-protection
Taylor & Del Recreational drug use
Pilar, 1992
Warren et al
Maternal anxiety
1997
Van Brakel et Parental control
al 2006
Viana et al.,
Lower perceived control
2013
over external events
Parental anxious rearing
Suveg et al
Family emotion
2010
socialization processes
Adult emotion regulation
skills2

6

2

3
8

1

4

3

3
6
6

1

1

1

8

1

2

3

2
2
6

4

6
6
6
2

1

3

1

6

2

8

2

6
6

2

8

Although a cognitive process by definition, the RDoC Cognitive Systems do not at present include metacognitive beliefs.
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42

Cases
excluded
from
studies
which do
not appear
in main
review

43
44
45
46
47
48

Wichstrom et
al 2013

Adibsereshki
et al 2018
Affrunti et
al., 2019
Brauer et al.,
2015
Calling et al.,
2017

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

De Graaf et
al., 2002

Douglas et
al., 2010
Eley et al.,
2015
Esbjorn et al.,
2016
Gada et al.,
2014
Garcia et al.,
2013
Ginsburg et
al., 2018

Gomes et al.,
2019

Attention‐
deficient/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD)
Parental anxiety
Peer victimization
Maternal parenting style

5

3

3
4
6

1

Parents’ perfectionistic
language
Air pollution

6

1

7

1

Education

1

7

Urbanization
Marital Status
Age
Smoking
Leisure time physical
activity
Body mass index
Gender

1
1
1
2
2
2
1

9

Age
Education
Urbanicity
Living with partner
Paid employment
Chronic somatic disorder
Parental psychiatric history
Childhood trauma
Childhood trauma

1
1
1
1
1
5
3
4
4

1

Twin/parent psychiatric
history
Maternal metacognitions

3

1

6

1

Asthma

5

1

Twin psychiatric history

3

1

Family conflict

4

3

Parental over-control
Parental psychopathology
Vocal risk factors (selfreported abnormality in
voice function)

6
3
5

1
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73
74

Gorka et al
2014
Grant et al.,
2005

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Grover et al
2005
Guo et al.,
2018
Helenius et al
2014

Hildingh &
Baigi, 2010
Jensen et al.,
2010
Jin et al.,
2014

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

100

2

Kendler et
al., 1994
Kender et al.,
2000
Kwok, Gu, &
Cheung,
2017
Lazarus et
al., 2016

Childhood trauma

4

1

Gender

1

7

Ethnicity
Low income
Marital status
Substance use disorders
Personality disorders
Other affective/mood
disorders
Childhood adverse events

1
1
1
5
5
5
4

1

Family dysfunction

4

1

Familial psychiatric history

3

4

Gender
Birth cohort
Area of residence
Hypertension

1
1
1
5

1

Work dissatisfaction

4

1

Gender

1

8

Education grade
Urbanization
Age
Number of siblings
Temper (mild, middle,
quick)
Disposition (introversion,
middle, extraversion)2
Diet
Twin psychiatric history

1
1
1
1
8

2
3

1

Parenting style

6

1

Parental aggressive
discipline

6

1

Challenging parenting
behaviour

6

1

8

Although Extraversion can be mapped within the RDoC framework, there is no mention of the measure used to
quantify the “Disposition” construct within the cited reference so it is unclear if the same psychological
phenomenon was being studied.
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101
102
103

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

115
116
117

118
119
120
121

122
123
124
125
126

Lee et al.,
2015
Leung et al.,
2010
Liang &
Chikritzhs,
2011
Liu et al.,
1997
Lofors et al.,
2006

Ma et al.,
2011
Mackintosh
et al., 2006
Merikangas,
Stevens, &
Fenton, 1996
Miloyan et
al., 2018
Moylan et al.,
2013
Muris &
Meesters,
2004
Nordahl et
al., 2007
Overgaard et
al., 2014
Pascual et al.,
2003
Platt,
Williams, &
Ginsburg,
2016
Raposo et al.,
2014
Remes et al
2017
Sanna et al.,
2013

Occupational stress

4

1

Academic stressors

4

1

Alcohol misuse/dependence

2

1

Stressful life events

4

1

Gender

1

7

Marital status
Immigrant status
Social networks
Housing tenure
Employment status
Income
Family dynamics

1
1
1
1
1
1
6

1

Twin psychiatric history

3

1

Alcoholism

5

1

Adverse life events

4

1

Smoking

2

1

Somatization symptoms

8

1

Maternal psychopathology

3

1

ADHD symptoms

5

1

Early adverse experiences

4

1

Stressful life events

4

1

Early adverse experiences

4

1

Area deprivation

1

1

Age

1

16

Body mass index (BMI)
Socioeconomic status

2
1

229
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

142
143
144

Sareen et al.,
2004
SaucedoUribe et al.,
2019
Schleider et
al., 2014
Shapiro et al.,
2014
Simon et al.,
2009

145
146
147
148
149
150
151

152
153
154

155

Sipos et al.,
2010
Smith et al.,
2008
Soenke et al.,
2010
Spada et al.,
2012
Sparkes &
Connett,
1999
Takemura et
al., 1999
Tambs et al.,
2012
Temple,
Driver, &
Brown, 2014
Vannucci et
al., 2017

Physical activity
Smoking status
Alcohol consumption
Musculoskeletal disease
Thyroid disorders
Metabolic disorders
Gastrointestinal disorders
Recurrent headaches
Syncope and seizures
Cardiovascular/pulmonary
disease
Liver disorders
Cancer
Psoriasis
Alcohol use

2
2
2
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
2

1

Season of the year

7

1

Parental control

6

1

Obstructive sleep apnea
symptoms
Mother’s pre-natal physical
health
Physical complications
during birth process
Cerebrovascular disorder

5

1

6

1

5

1

Dementia

5

1

Childhood abuse
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Appendix D: Additional details (further breakdown of variable classes)
Negative Valence Systems
The variable class “abnormalities in relation to the visual processing of threatening
stimuli” (16 cases) can be further broken down as follows: Abnormal neural activity during
the visual processing of threatening stimuli (8 cases), attentional avoidance of threatening
stimuli (2 cases), increased attention for threatening stimuli (2 cases), emotion recognition
bias for threatening facesNS, poorer attentional inhibition of threatening information, , and
greater encoding of untrustworthy faces (higher sustained posterior contralateral negativity
EEG amplitude). The variable class “abnormalities in relation to interoceptive processing” (5
cases) was composed of anxiety sensitivity (4 cases) and interoceptive sensitivity (1 case).
The variable class “early temperamental factors” (4 cases) was composed of the following
factors: Highly reactive (Infanthood), Negative emotionality/shyness, Negative
emotionality/fearful distress, and negative emotionality/irritable distress. The variable class
“avoidant-related variables” (4 cases) was composed of the following factors: Harmavoidance, experiential avoidance (self-report and behavioural measures), and harm
avoidance.
Arousal and Regulatory Systems
The variable class “irregularities in autonomic nervous system activity” (8 cases) was
composed of the following variables: lower resting vagal control, diminished heart rate
variability, lower respiratory sinus arrhythmia, systolic and diastolic blood pressureNS,
prolonged atrial electromechanical delay, increased QT variability (2 cases), and higher
baseline electrodermal activity. The variable class “impaired contextual regulation of
defensive responses” (2 cases) was composed of the following variables: Greater increase in
heart rate in the context of ambiguous threat (1 case), early express of excess fear in low
threat situations (1 case).
Multi-Domain
Within the variable class “abnormal baseline connectivity between amygdala and
other brain regions” (8 cases), implicated brain regions are as follows: anterior cingulate
cortex, inferior temporal gyrus/paracentral lobule, medial orbitofrontal cortex, posterior
cingulate cortex/parahippocampal gyrus, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (2 cases with opposite patterns of findings – see Cases #94 and #161). In
one case, lower strength of an axonal pathway between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex
was implicated in anxiety.
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Appendix F: Potential social-neutral images
Below presents the ten potential stock photos for the social Neutral category, and their rates
of agreement on each of the four emotional labels (Neutral, Fear, Happy, Sad) across 21
participants in the follow-up judgement task. Images are sorted from highest to lowest based
on rates of agreement on Neutral.
Stock
Photo
1

Neutral

Fear

Happy

Sad

19
(90.5%)

2 (9.5%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

2

18
(85.7%)

2 (9.5%)

0 (0%)

1 (4.8%)

3

17
(81.0%)

0 (0%)

3
(14.3%)

1 (4.8%)

4

17
(81.0%)

0 (0%)

2 (9.5%)

2 (9.5%)

5

16
(76.2%)

2 (9.5%)

2 (9.5%)

1 (4.8%)

253
6

15
(71.4%)

2 (9.5%)

4
(19.0%)

0 (0%)

7

14
(66.7%)

2 (9.5%)

5
(23.8%)

0 (0%)

8

14
(66.7%)

1 (4.8%)

5
(23.8%)

1 (4.8%)

9

12
(57.1%)

1 (4.8%)

6
(28.6%)

2 (9.5%)

10

11
(52.4%)

3
(14.3%)

1 (4.8%)

6 (28.6%)
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Appendix J: Correlations between possible mediator and independent variables
The table below gives correlations between possible mediator variables (performance
outcomes on CogState tests) and independent variables (in-lab bias scores), given in the
format r [p-value].
N
CogState tests [Outcome Variable]
Continuous Paired Associate Learning
Test [err]
Detection Test [lmn]

97
93

Groton Maze Chase Test [mps]

93

Groton Maze Learning Test [err]

93

Groton Maze Learning Test –
Delayed Recall [err]
Identification Test [lmn]

93

International Shopping List Test [cor]

92

International Shopping List Test –
Delayed Recall [cor]
One Card Learning Test [acc]

91
100

One-Back Test [lmn]

98

Socio-Emotional Cognition Test [acc]

78a

93

Traditional bias
score
Fear
Sad
.282*
.086
[.005]
[.392]
.052
.086
[.611]
[.392]
-.088
.103
[.385]
[.308]
.152
-.219*
[.132]
[.029]
.021
-.090
[.839]
[.378]
.174
-.061
[.083]
[.548]
-.120
-.002
[.233]
[.986]
-.067
-.007
[.512]
[.944]
-.206*
.177
[.040]
[.078]
.000
.124
[.999]
[.219]
.016
.133
[.892]
[.243]

Extra-decisional
bias score
Fear
Sad
-.005
.050
[.962]
[.622]
-.117
.053
[.247]
[.601]
.180
-.020
[.073]
[.845]
-.005
-.022
[.962]
[.826]
-.142
.153
[.160]
[.130]
-.009
.170
[.928]
[.092]
.007
-.106
[.945]
[.292]
.025
-.081
[.804]
[.425]
.193
.203*
[.054]
[.042]
-.038
.159
[.711]
[.115]
.019
.068
[.868]
[.554]
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Appendix K: Fear and sad intensity ratings for target images (full sample data)
The table below gives mean fear and sad intensity ratings for target images across the full
sample (220 participants). Trials presenting images marked with an asterisk were removed in
analyses using Data Subset 1.
Assigned
Emotion

IAPS Code

Mean Sample
Fear Intensity
Rating [SD]

Mean Sample
Sad Intensity
Rating [SD]

Absolute
Difference
score [SE]

Fear

1052

5.19 [3.25]

1.51 [1.18]

3.68 [.206]

Fear

6300

5.80 [3.16]

2.26 [2.20]

3.54 [.205]

Fear

6230

6.18 [3.08]

2.74 [2.36]

3.44 [.198]

Fear

5972

5.13 [3.05]

2.81 [2.28]

2.32 [.200]

Fear

9620*

4.99 [3.05]

3.96 [2.58]

1.03 [.205]

Fear

2751*

4.35 [2.94]

3.96 [2.66]

0.40 [.192]

Sad

9181

2.80 [2.39]

7.35 [2.80]

4.55 [.202]

Sad

9415

2.27 [2.16]

5.93 [2.99]

3.66 [.188]

Sad

9421

2.97 [2.42]

5.84 [3.05]

2.87 [.193]

Sad

9000

3.04 [2.48]

5.01 [3.07]

1.97 [.203]

Sad

9910*

4.38 [2.89]

6.23 [2.87]

1.85 [.197]

Sad

9911*

4.00 [2.90]

5.59 [3.06]

1.59 [.208]

